Nuclear disarmament panorama: an assessment

by Sergio Duarte

A familiar pattern seen in multilateral disarmament efforts, prevalent since the mid 1990s, also seems to have established itself in the review process of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Commenting on the result of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT 2015 Review Conference, last May, an assiduous and perceptive observer wrote: “This is a typical outcome of NPT meetings, because the review cycle is a process that favors the status quo by pit­ting possible forward momentum against maintaining the ‘stability’ of the ‘regime’. But this status quo is seen as increasingly untenable to the majority of states parties”. A similar assessment can be made about the multilateral nuclear disarmament process as a whole. 
 

A qualified success

Lead editorial from the final edition of the NPT News in Review, written by Michael Spies and Ray Acheson:

By the abysmal standards that have typified the preparatory process—instituted in 1995—leading up to each five year review of the NPT, the third and final Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting before the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) must certainly be considered a success. The PrepCom was able to agree to an agenda for the RevCon, on its third day, no less, amid a chorus of accolades for what many described as a new, positive atmosphere in multilateral disarmament, stemming entirely from US President Obama’s 5 April speech in Prague.

However, it did not surprise many delegates—most of whom are veterans of the so-called decade of deadlock that had accompanied the Bush administration’s allergy to multilateralism—that the PrepCom would become snagged once it attempted to work through matters of substance.

The PrepCom’s failure to adopt substantive recommendations for the RevCon, a feat no previous PrepCom had ever accomplished, may have temporarily tainted the atmosphere, but was not unforeseen. During his opening remarks to the PrepCom, its Chair, Ambassador Chidyausiku of Zimbabwe, cautioned that despite recent signs of progress, in many areas the positions of states had actually grown further apart rather than closer.

With this note of caution, on Monday, 11 May, the Chair circulated a clever and concise first draft of recommendations, intended to capture specific proposals that identify concrete practical actions on implementing the Treaty, stand a reasonable chance of gaining consensus, and build upon earlier decision. Its strongest provisions dealt with moving the disarmament agenda forward and even included consideration of a nuclear weapons convention (see NPT News in Review, No. 6).

It must be noted that the vast majority of states could have accepted the first draft, including many members of NATO, with little or no modifications. Following consultations, and in particular input from the nuclear weapon states, on Wednesday, 13 May, the Chair put forward a revised set of recommendations that significantly weakened the sections on disarmament, civil society participation, and education, but bolstered those on implementing the 1995 Middle East resolution and on non-proliferation.

For some, the second draft proved to be a bridge too far. As the conference moved into its final hours, it devolved into a tense blame game that pitted western delegations against the Non-Aligned Movement and some of its more outspoken members, most notably Cuba, Egypt, and Iran. On Thursday, 14 May, the Chair advised states let the recommendations go, as to not to ruin the spirit of cooperation. Despite the Chair’s judgment that the differences in position were too vast, a large number of delegations urged the Chair to continue the process of seeking consensus (see NPT News in Review, No. 10).

The breakdown of the recommendations process
Despite the positive atmosphere, disarmament rhetoric of the US and UK administrations, and the quick adoption of the agenda, the PrepCom delegates did not find enough common ground—or at least, enough common rhetoric—to agree to a set of non-binding recommendations for next year. Breaking with the recent past, the Chair decided not to forward the recommendations to the RevCon as a working paper.

The Chair had introduced a newly revised draft recommendations on Friday, 15 May. Delegations consulted with their regional groups before resuming an informal meeting of the PrepCom. During this last attempt to reach consensus on the draft recommendations, the Chair determined that the Committee did not have a sufficient amount of time to reach agreement. Later, at a press briefing, he said the “differences were very minor; with time, we could have done it.”

The differences, as laid out by delegations during Thursday’s plenary discussion on the draft recommendations, did not seem very minor (see NPT News in Review, No. 10), though the revisions in the third draft were quite minimal. The additional changes brought on board an additional caveat to the already thoroughly conditioned preambular paragraph, further emphasized its non-binding character and marginally indicative character—a change insisted upon by the UK. Other amendments made minor changes to the sections on universality, disarmament, non-proliferation, regional initiatives, and education.

Despite the lack of time to make additional major changes to the text (delegations would have needed to consult with their capitals had the second draft text been heavily amended), western and non-aligned delegations traded blame for the impasse. Since the first draft was not agreeable to a few western states and the second was not agreeable to a few NAM states, it would be cynical and insincere to place“blame” on any particular group or delegation. Instead, the experience only serves to further illuminate the wide gulfs between states’ positions.

Paradoxically on the surface, this result came as a relief to many delegations. While the vast majority of states parties seemed ready to accept either the first or second drafts, no one was entirely content with either. Rather than becoming stuck with an imperfect text, delegations will have the freedom in 2010 to negotiate and reach agreement with a clean slate on the many fraught issues facing the NPT regime.

PrepCom finale

After a short informal session Friday morning, during which states parties started going through the track change suggestions in the newly revised draft recommendations, the Chair declared that the Commmittee did not have a sufficient amount of time to reach agreement. The formal meeting resumed and the Committee adopted the draft final report (an entirely procedural report) and heard a few brief closing statements, ending the PrepCom by 1:00 PM. The recommendations will not be forwarded to the Review Conference as a working paper or a Chair's paper.

Still searching for consensus

On Friday morning, the Chair called for an informal meeting to discuss a few slight changes to the revised draft recommendations. Delegations asked for 20 minutes to look over the new document, after which they will resume informals to look at the changed paragraphs. Civil society will not be allowed back into the room until after this process is completed.

For an overview of the discussions on the recommendations from Thursday's plenary meeting, indicative of what some of the changes in the new text are, see the editorial from the NPT News in Review No. 10 (reprinted below):

Searching for consensus
Front page article from the NPT News in Review, 15 May 2009

On Thursday, consensus on Chair’s draft recommendations continued to elude delegations. After another morning of consultations and regional group meetings, the Chair opened the plenary meeting lamenting that he had not been able to garner consensus on his draft recommendations. Expressing the belief that it would be best not to ruin the spirit of cooperation that had been demonstrated thus far at the PrepCom by continuing to fight over the recommendations, he opened the floor for comments on ways to move forward.

Of the 25 delegations that spoke, most expressed disappointment that consensus on the document could not be met. Many, including those of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and South Africa, said they would be willing to agree to the revised text. Most of these delegations said they would have agreed to the original text as well and reiterated their understanding that the recommendations are not binding and do not prejudge the outcome of the RevCon.

Only a few delegations took the initiative to be transparent about their positions. The UK ambassador said that while the revised text contains four policy issues that the United Kingdom has opposed on public record, the only remaining problem for his delegation was two letters in the preambular paragraph. Sources suggested the UK wanted to alter the sentence explaining that the recommendations identify “areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future” to “could be sought in the future.”

The Egyptian delegation expressed very clearly that it is dissatisfied with large portions of the revised recommendations. The Egyptian ambassador listed several specific examples. He questioned the title of Section 1, “Universality of the treaty, and of principles of disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,” arguing that this could lead one to believe that the rights related to nuclear energy granted to NPT states parties under article IV of the Treaty are to be universally applied. He also criticized the revised disarmament action plan for recommending only some but not all of the 13 practical steps from the 2000 RevCon, arguing that only partially citing previous decisions undermines them. Further, while noting that some of the recommendations in the Middle East section have been improved, he objected to the use of the word “consider,” arguing that the PrepCom must be more assertive in recommending the RevCon take action on things.

The Cuban delegation said it would have supported the original draft but that the watering down of practical disarmament measures moved the Committee further away from consensus. It expressed belief that some states parties seem to not really be “in a position to produce substantive recommendations at present time that would help us to truly move forward in applying three pillars.”

Despite these discrepancies, many delegations—including those of the African Group, Chile, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States—encouraged the Chair not to give up just yet. The US delegation argued the Committee was “closer than is apparent” to reaching agreement and asked for more time to “work out the small differences” between delegations. However, the Iranian delegation expressed disbelief that any consensus could be reached and urged the Chair to close consideration of this issue and move on. The Iranian ambassador argued that the states insisting that consensus could be reached were simply trying to ensure they would not be blamed for the stalemate.

Many of the most drastic revisions to the draft recommendations, particular those relating to disarmament, are now more in line with nuclear weapon state positions—for example, the elimination of a recommendation to examine ways and means to commence negotiations “on a convention or framework of agreements to achieve global nuclear disarmament,” and another to identify “refraining from the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons” as a practical disarmament measure. Given this, and given that the Egyptian and Cuban problems with the recommendations are well known, it could be disingenuous for some delegations to suggest that consensus is nigh.

However, as Ambassador Landman of the Netherlands pointed out, the Chair knows best what the remaining difficulties are. He noted that while the statements delivered during Thursday’s plenary made it sound like the PrepCom could “make the extra mile” and arrive at an agreement, the Chair should call upon those countries that in his view have to make that mile, to do so. The Chair agreed to postpone a decision on the recommendations until Friday morning, though he said he would not hold consultations with delegations between now and then. Suggesting that the delegations work with each other on the issue, he said he would be happy to hear about any new initiatives.

Despite uncertainty about the future of the recommendations, most delegations welcomed the overwhelmingly positive atmosphere at this PrepCom. The Australian ambassador, describing some of her previous PrepCom experiences as similar to “pulling teeth,” emphasized that since the Committee has already adopted an agenda and held substantive debates, the session should by no means be considered a failure if it is unable to forward recommendations to the RevCon.

Indeed, this is the most constructive NPT conference in quite some time. While it will be disappointing if the spirit of compromise is diminished in the debate over the recommendations, it does not mean the RevCon is a lost cause. The fact is, the majority of states parties were willing to compromise. And while it remains to be seen what the Obama administration’s official policies will look like by the 2010 RevCon or to what degree other states parties might be willing to “give and take” next year, there have been many promising indications of good will and cooperation at this PrepCom that should be carried forward as a manifestation of the recommendations.

Reworking the recommendations

On Wednesday evening, after consultations with various delegations, the Chair released a revised version of his draft recommendations to the 2010 Review Conference.

Overall, the revisions weakened the recommendations on disarmament, civil society participation, and education, but have bolstered those on implementing the Middle East resolution. The sections on non-proliferation and nuclear energy have also been adjusted, purportedly in an attempt to create more balance between the three pillars. Each of the three pillars now has an “action plan,” as several delegates requested during their general comments on Tuesday.

It remains unclear as to whether the PrepCom will be able to adopt the recommendations the end of its session. The amount of time remaining could possibly allow for a second revised document to be offered Thursday afternoon, giving the PrepCom a last chance to adopt it Friday afternoon. However, if the Committee cannot agree to adopt the revised document on Thursday, it is likely that the Chair will have to forward it to the RevCon as a working paper, despite his aversion to such a solution.

Below is a detailed assessment of the differences between the original recommendations and the revised version, pointing out where recommendations have been strengthened, weakened, or changed to some effect.

Introduction
The introductory paragraph of the revised text, CRP.4/Rev.1, adds a sentence noting, “[t]he States parties reaffirm the need to maintain a balance between the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty.” It also explains in more depth the methodology of the recommendations, explaining that the recommendations include “elements for [the RevCon’s] consideration in evaluating the implementation of the undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty,” and “areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future.”

Section 1. Universality
The revised section on promoting universality has weaker language on disarmament. Where CRP.4 recommended the RevCon “declare that the Treaty provides a legal foundation for the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and for the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control” (the language of Article VI), CRP.4/Rev.1 simply recommends the RevCon, “[d]eclare that the Treaty remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.”

As per the Algerian delegation’s suggestion during the general comments on Tuesday, the language on non-states parties has been changed to recommend the RevCon call on them to join as non-nuclear weapon states and without conditions.

This section also has new language on compliance—adding “[recognizing] consequences for breaches of Treaty violations”— and on nuclear energy—adding “[r]eaffirm that the Treaty fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”

Section 2. Action plans
Rather than outlining one action plan on nuclear disarmament, CRP.4/Rev.1 includes a three-part action plan for all three pillars.

Disarmament
The “plan” for nuclear disarmament is similar, but contains a few substantial changes that diminish disarmament. While CRP.4 recommended the RevCon “[r]ecognize growing expectations for progress to achieve nuclear disarmament, and indicate support for ongoing and future efforts in these fields,” CRP.4/Rev.1 recommends the RevCon indicates support for ongoing and future efforts and recognizes “the importance of practical nuclear disarmament by all nuclear-weapon States.”

Likewise, while CRP.4 recommended the RevCon acknowledge that several commitments from 1995 and 2000 have not yet been fulfilled and called for an action plan to implement these commitments, CRP.4/Rev.1 simply recommends the RevCon “[r]eaffirm and update” these commitments, without mentioning they have not been fulfilled. It also divides the original list of disarmament initiatives into two paragraphs: one calling for facilitation of the entry into force of the CTBT and negotiations on a fissile materials [cut-off] treaty and the other calling for discussion on “ways and means to ensure the irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency of disarmament activities” and for recognition of the benefits of reducing operational status, reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons, and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, while the original version recommend the RevCon examine “ways and means to commence negotiations, in accordance with article VI, on a convention or framework of agreements to achieve global nuclear disarmament, and to engage non-parties to the Treaty,” the updates severely undermine this call by only recommending commencement of “open-ended discussions to identify possibilities available to establish an international legal framework for the achievement of global nuclear disarmament.” At least the new language also recommends the engagement of non-states parties “with the aim of attaining a world free of nuclear weapons.”

The language on security assurances, formerly in the non-proliferation section, has been moved to the disarmament section but remains identical.

Non-proliferation
The non-proliferation section has been strengthened. It now recommends the RevCon reaffirm that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is “a threat to international peace and security,” which is established language, rather than simply a “global challenge”.The paragraph on export controls adds quite a bit of substance, including a recommendation on transparency, dialogue, and cooperation and another calling for recognition of the importance of national rules and regulations on nuclear-related transfers.

There is also additional language on the IAEA, including a call for affirmation of “the need for full cooperation with the [IAEA] to resolve any outstanding verification issues,” which follows a new paragraph on the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. CRP.4/Rev.1 also recommends the RevCon “[r]eaffirm the importance of acceptance of the Agency’s full-scope safeguards,” and welcome the IAEA’s efforts to “increase the Agency’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activity” rather than just welcoming the IAEA’s efforts to strengthen safeguards.

Nuclear energy
Section 4 of CRP.4 covered nuclear energy, safety, and security. In CRP.4/Rev.1, ways to “advance peaceful uses of nuclear energy” has been given its own action plan and “ways and means to strengthen nuclear safety and security” is now a separate section.

The action plan on nuclear energy “notes” rather than “welcomes” the “growing applications” of nuclear technology, though it still reaffirms the “inalienable right” to nuclear energy of states parties.

Rather than stressing “the need to intensify consideration of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle,” the new version recommends stressing “the importance of extensive and transparent consultations in the consideration of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.” The rest of the language in this paragraph is the same as in the original.

Another paragraph has been added to include language on cooperation programmes to assist new-nuclear energy states develop adequate infrastructures.

Section 3. Nuclear safety and security
Maintaining much of the original language, the revised recommendations do not include the note that acquisition of nuclear materials by non-state actors “could potentially jeopardize the Treaty.” This section also no longer includes a recommendation to urge “careful consideration of measures of control and monitoring of global stocks” of weapon- usable materials “and the capacity to produce such materials” or to support efforts to “enhance the security of stockpiles” of such materials or to minimize their use in the civilian nuclear sector.

Section 4. Regional initiatives
Most of the language on nuclear weapon free zones remains the same, though in the new version the new Central Asian NWFZ is “noted” rather than welcomed. The new version adds a recommendation noting the importance of the UNDC’s guidelines for NWFZ, but it takes away the recommendation to “[n]ote the existence of strong support for the creating of a [NWFZ] in the Southern Hemisphere,” replacing it with a call to consider establishment of new zones “in regions with nuclear facilities and materials” and to note the importance of establishing WMDFZs.

Section 5. Middle East
Previously folded into the section on regional initiatives, the Middle East resolution now has its own section. Rather than describing the 1995 resolution as being “integrally linked” to the extension of the NPT, it is now “an essential element” of the decision to extend the Treaty.

The new version does continue to recommend consideration of a conference on implementing the resolution, though it no longer specifies the nuclear weapon states as the potential convenors. The rest of the section goes much further than the original language, adding a recommendation to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II at the RevCon “to consider practical steps to promote the earliest implementation” of the resolution and to consider appointing a special coordinator to hold consultations with the countries in the region and report to the review process, which has been suggested by Egypt and supported by other delegations, including the Russian Federation.

Section 6. Withdrawal
The two short paragraphs on withdrawal remain identical to the originals.

Section 7. Strengthening the review process
The new version eliminates the recommendation for consideration establishment of a “uniform, practical and cost-efficient reporting system for the implementation of the Treaty.” This section otherwise remains the same.

Section 8. Civil society; education
The new version significantly diminishes the recommendations on both subjects. It only recommends “noting” rather than “considering” the proposals for enhanced participation of NGOs in the review process. It also recommends “consideration” of the UN Secretary-General’s recommendations on disarmament and non-proliferation education rather than “encouraging” states to implement them, for which the original text called.

Revised recommendations

After facilitating informal consultations between delegations on Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday morning, the PrepCom Chair released, at 5:45 PM on Wednesday, a revised version of his draft recommendations to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Analysis is forthcoming.

A glance at the recommendations

At the end of the morning meeting on Friday, 8 May, Ambassador Chidyausiku released his draft recommendations for the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon). The recommendations include specific proposals that identify concrete practical actions; stand a reasonable prospect of commanding consensus; address issues related to implementation of Treaty; and build upon earlier decisions such as those at 2000 and 1995. He emphasized that they are not a comprehensive summary of all proposals that have been made to the RevCon, nor do they preclude any other item states parties might want to address.

The document attempts to balance the three pillars of the Treaty. Section 2 focuses on disarmament. It calls for the RevCon to consider adopting an action plan “setting practical and achievable and specified goals, and measures leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons,” such as the CTBT, FMCT, verified reductions, greater transparency, reducing operational status, refraining from qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, etc. It specifically recommends the RevCon “[e]xamine, inter alia, ways and means to commence negotiations, in accordance with article VI, on a convention or framework of agreements to achieve global nuclear disarmament, and to engage non-parties to the Treaty.”

In this context, the Chair’s disarmament recommendations seek a small but definite step forward in the disarmament agenda, beset by a decade of deadlock. Its inclusion of a nuclear weapons convention would, if adopted, for the first time put on the horizon the means for eliminating nuclear weapons.The non-proliferation recommendations do not go as far as those on disarmament, though they do emphasize the importance of safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Meeting the call of many delegations to this PrepCom who seek to eliminate double standards and political discrimination, this section suggests the RevCon affirm that export controls should be “implemented in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner ... in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty.” The non-proliferation section also addresses the issue of negative security assurances, where it recommends the RevCon look at ways “to achieve additional assurances that are legally-binding.”

While many governments are justifiably concerned about the emergence of a two-tiered international system, where global rules enforce the division between haves and have nots and where some “responsible” states are trusted with “sensitive” materials while others are not, the strengthening of non-proliferation norms is a worthy objective. In particular, improvements in the safeguards regime will certainly be vital in ensuring confidence in a nuclear weapon free world.

Section 4, on nuclear energy, calls on the RevCon to reaffirm article IV and to “[r]eiterate that restrictions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be applied for political purposes.” This rather extensive section addresses both the access and security aspects of nuclear energy. It tries to balance these two objectives in a way that supports multilateralization of the fuel cycle while ensuring that states’ decisions in this field, as long as they meet the obligations of the Treaty, do not jeopardize their access to nuclear material and equipment.

The contentious debate between rights and obligations related to article IV will undoubtedly continue, unfortunately distracting attention from dealing with the fact that continued promotion of nuclear power increases the difficulty of achieving or verifying a nuclear weapon free world.

Section 5c, on the Middle East resolution, recommends the RevCon “consider the proposal to call upon the nuclear-weapons States to convene a conference of all states of the Middle East region to address ways and means to implement the Resolution.” This call, along with the one made by Egypt and supported by Russia for the appointment of a special coordinator on the implementation of the resolution, seem to be gaining traction among delegations. However, the special coordinator is not mentioned in these recommendations.

As the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 was bound to the Middle East resolution, the implementation of the goals set forth in the resolution may play a major role in the continued vitality of the NPT regime. As such, failing to adopt serious and practical steps toward this end could begin to jeopardize the objective of achieving a permanent peace in the Middle East through disarmament and diplomacy, rather through the politics of arms racing and antagonism.

Regarding Treaty withdrawal, the document simply recommends that the RevCon acknowledge states’ right to withdraw and consider modalities “under which States parties could collectively respond to notifications of withdrawal.” It does not deal with any specific proposal, such as those suggesting response by the UN Security Council.

In terms of strengthening the Treaty, section 7a recommends the RevCon view the decisions from 1995 and 2000 as “embodying principles, objectives, or means” to promote the Treaty’s universality. Section 1 also deals with this issue, urging the RevCon to “[d]eclare that the Treaty is an expression of fundamental principles of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that are universal in scope.” This formulation emphasizes the relevance of customary international law, wherein even non-parties are legally bound by the Treaty’s provisions. It also recommends the RevCon call on all non-parties to “adhere” to the Treaty, rather than to call on them to join as non-nuclear weapon states (as urged by the majority of delegations at the PrepComs).

The rest of section 7 focuses on strengthening the review process, recommending that the RevCon consider “establishing a uniform, practical and cost-efficient reporting system for the implementation of the Treaty.” While it suggests the consideration of other proposals, it does not specifically mention Canada’s ideas of a standing bureau or annual meetings.

Though many continue to be cynical about the merits of institutional reform, implementing any of the thoughtful reforms suggested by Canada would almost certainly improve the quality of NPT meetings while providing governments with an additional incentive to take serious their obligations under the broader nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation framework.
Finally, section 8 calls on the RevCon to commend the contributions of civil society and to consider proposals for the enhanced participation of NGOs in the Treaty review process. It also encourages the RevCon to underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Last Tuesday, several NGOs presented their own set of recommendations to the PrepCom. Many of the NGO recommendations regarding nuclear disarmament overlapped with those of the Chair. The NGOs pushed for farther reaching measures though, calling for governments to eliminate “nuclear deterrence” from their security strategies; to establish international controls on delivery systems and anti-missile systems; and to join the International Renewable Energy Agency. These and other recommendations can be found at www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

Michael Spies contributed analysis to this article.

NPT PrepCom adopts an agenda for the Review Conference!

First thing in the morning meeting on Wednesday, 6 May, the PrepCom adopted a provisional agenda for next year's Review Conference. The agenda will be the same as the one used at the 2000 Review Conference, with a minor technical update: in paragraph 16, the phrase “and the final document of the 2000 Review Conference” will be added.

In addition, the Committee approved the postponing of the Review Conference by one week. It will now be held from 3-28 May 2010 in New York. The Committee also approved the Non-Aligned Movement's nomination of the ambassador of the Philippines to serve as the Review Conference chair.

2010 NPT RevCon agenda within sight…

On the opening day of the NPT PrepCom, the chair ambitiously announced that he would seek a decision on one of the keys tasks of the meeting: an agenda for the 2010 NPT RevCon (the second key task is agreeing to substantive recommendations to the RevCon). More than an inconsequential procedural step, the agendas to NPT conferences in recent years have become hotly disputed and politicized items. Governments frequently interpret the composition of the agenda as a statement of political value.

At the 2005 RevCon, NPT delegations were unable to begin their substantive deliberations for nearly three weeks due to disputes over the agenda, and in particular, US insistence that the agenda omit references to past NPT outcomes.

The proposed agenda for the 2010 RevCon is reportedly based on the agenda of the 2000 RevCon, incorporating appropriate technical updates. According to sources, the chair was compelled to drop the addition of language calling for the review to take into account developments subsequent to 2000 – likely out of concern that this would permit the RevCon to single out specific cases of non-compliance. As of Tuesday, a single delegation continued to object to the adoption of the agenda as it stands.

A key sticking point in 2005, the agenda in 2000 provided a mandate for review of the Treaty taking into account the decisions and resolution adopted in 1995. It also provided for two subsidiary bodies: one to deal with practical disarmament steps and the other to deal with implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. In addition to these two topics, during the present review cycle delegations have requested other subsidiary bodies to deal with security assurances and with withdrawal from treaty (the latter was considered by a subsidiary body in 2005).

Especially in light of the numerous statements expressing renewed optimism and welcoming the recent high level attention to nuclear disarmament from many nuclear weapon states, the quick and painless adoption of the RevCon agenda would be a good sign that governments will be able to seriously work toward achieving substantive agreement in 2010.

United States delivers a positive statement to the NPT PrepCom

On 5 May, the US delegation, headed by Rose Gottemoeller, delivered a statement during the Committee's general debate. The statement was a very encouraging sign that this US administration is taking the NPT seriously and is ready to change its attitude toward and position on a few key aspects of the implementation of the Treaty.

Gottemoeller read a message to the PrepCom from President Obama, which reaffirmed the United States' commitment to the Treaty and to achieving a successful outcome at this Committee and at next year's Review Conference.

She then delivered an assessment of the United States' basic positions on each of the three pillars of the Treaty: disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear energy. She reaffirmed that the US would seek ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. Most importantly, she reaffirmed the decision to extend the NPT in 1995 and the decision made at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, including the 1995 Middle East resolution. The statement did not make any reference to Iran or North Korea.

Check the Reaching Critical Will website soon for a complete copy of the US statement.

NPT PrepCom begins

The third and final Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in the current review cycle for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) began today at UN Headquarters in New York. Government representatives delivered their countries’ “general debate” statements and non-government representatives engaged in several interactive panel discussions throughout the day. For details for the days events, see Reaching Critical Will’s newsletter, the NPT News in Review No.2. (Previous and future editions will be available online and you can also subscribe to receive it daily in your inbox.)

Reaching Critical Will is posting all government statements in near-real time. We will also post all other conference documents as we receive them, so stay tuned to the website for regular updates.

US President Obama calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons

During a much-anticipated speech in Prague on 5 April 2009, US President Obama announced “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” He noted the United States has a moral obligation to lead nuclear disarmament efforts since it has one of the largest arsenals and is the only country to have ever used the weapons—a very interesting and welcome admission. However, his plans for the way forward do not comprise the “radical drive” many had hoped for or that is arguably necessary for success.’

His plan for nuclear disarmament entails:
• Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy doctrines;
• Negotiating a follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia;
• “Immediately and aggressively” pursue US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
• Seeking a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in nuclear weapons;
• Strengthening the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation through increased resources and authority to strengthen international inspections and through “real and immediate consequences” for withdrawal from the Treaty; and
• Building a “new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank;”
• Starting a “new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years” in cooperation with Russia;
• Turning the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into “durable international institutions;” and
• Hosting a Global Summit on Nuclear Security within the next year.

The reduction of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, the talk of working for a verifiable fissile materials treaty, and the negotiation of a START sequel are all welcome endeavours. They are not new or radical ideas as suggested by some media reports—all of been on the arms control and disarmament agenda for years. Many were included in the “thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament” agreed upon at the 2000 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which the Bush administration backed away from in 2005. This possible recommitment to some of the steps is worth noting, as is it’s emphasis on international law, highlighted by Obama’s suggestion of institutionalizing Bush-era initiatives like the Proliferation Security Initiatives.

Unfortunately, some of the other points in Obama’s plan for a nuclear weapon free world require thoughtful consideration.

Arsenal reductions
The first point of concern is actually the START negotiations. The current buzz on US-Russian reductions is now focused on the number 1500—close to the 1000 hoped for by many arms control groups, not close enough to the zero hoped for by most abolition groups. Most importantly, the context of the number of 1500 has to be scrutinized. According to Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists and Stan Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council, there are approximately 5200 total warheads and bombs in the active and reserve nuclear stockpiles of the United States today, including approximately 500 so-called “tactical” nuclear warheads and bombs, with some 4200 warheads and bombs awaiting dismantlement, for a total of approximately 9400 warheads. Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group notes,

The stockpile declines being discussed are in the range we might associate with retirement of obsolete systems that nobody much wants. So nobody is giving up much. But even so the effects ramify throughout the management of the enterprise and the talks themselves and the transparency frameworks they will hopefully create are very important.

Strengthening the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
While Obama does mention that the “bargain” of the NPT includes nuclear disarmament, he does not cite compliance with this obligation in his remedy for strengthening the Treaty. His silence on this aspect of the NPT is deafening, especially when the majority of non-nuclear weapon states have repeatedly articulated that they are unwilling to accept additional non-proliferation measures until they see tangible progress from the nuclear weapon states on disarmament. His call for increased authority for the inspections directly relates to European Union’s call for the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol to become mandatory under the NPT (currently only the IAEA’s safeguards are mandatory and the Additional Protocol, which allows more access for UN inspectors, is optional). This will not be acceptable to groups like the Non-Aligned Movement if it is not accompanied by more than rhetoric on disarmament measures.

Further, Obama’s emphasis on inspections and consequences for withdrawal fits in well with the theory of “anti-nuclear nuclearism” or anti-nuclear imperialism expounded by Darwin BondGraham and Will Parrish in their Foreign Policy in Focus article of January 2009. This theory posits that such “strategies” include minor steps toward arsenal reductions, “at least rhetorically recommitting the United States to international treaties” such as the NPT, “a fig leaf that the United States isn’t developing new nuclear weapons,” and that it is slowly “de-emphasizing its nuclear arsenal.” BondGraham and Parrish argue, “By these means the United States has tried to avoid the charge of hypocrisy, even though it has designed and built newly modified weapons with qualitatively new capacities over the last decade and a half.”

Missile “defence” in Europe
Outside of the specific plans for nuclear disarmament laid out above, perhaps the most troubling element of Obama’s speech was his comments on missile “defence” in Europe. He stated
The Czech Republic and Poland have been courageous in agreeing to host a defense against these missiles. As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed.

For one thing, the line from the Obama administration used to be, “if it doesn’t work, we won’t deploy it.” Now, the question of deploying missile “defence” in Europe seems to rest on the Bush administration’s justification: the threat of Iran. Further, Obama neglects to note that the Czech government failed to garner ratification for the treaties on the proposed anti-missile base, which was followed by a vote of no-confidence by Czech parliament for the government, or that two-thirds of the Czech public rejects the idea of hosting US missile “defence” technology on their soil.

Nuclear power
Obama’s call to “harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our efforts to combat climate change” is also unfortunate—and misleading. Taking into account the entire nuclear fuel cycle, the CO2 output from nuclear power is much higher from those produced by renewable energy sources—not to mention the problems with nuclear waste and the threat of weapon-material and technology proliferation. It’s unfortunate that Obama did not take the opportunity to commit his administration to working with the new International Renewable Energy Agency as an alternative to promoting the expansion of nuclear power.

Moving forward
While the speech was disappointing, particularly for those of us hoping to hear President Obama call for the removal of nuclear weapons of Europe, a recommitment to Article VI of the NPT, or bigger cuts to the arsenal, it was certainly an improvement from Bush administration foreign policy statements. Further, Obama’s reference to US use of nuclear weapons seems significant. There is still hope.