Nuclear Newspeak

"Orwellian" was a popular description of the Bush administration's tendency to name policies in ways diametrically opposite to their results. There were the "clear skies," and "healthy forests" initiatives of the Interior Dept. which resulted in increased pollution, weakened regulation, and stepped up logging of public and private lands. The administration named military missions and labor reforms in similar ways, ramming through rapacious and belligerent directives under the guise of happy, democratic, and sustainable sounding monikers.

Many voters hoped for a change under the Obama administration. It seems, however, that the Obama White House subscribes to a similar political philosophy - say one thing, do the other. The recent troop surge announced for the war and occupation of Afghanistan is a case in point; the antiwar president who was elected largely because of the antiwar movement, who has talked a good talk about ending the war in Iraq, closing Guantanamo, banning torture, and other horrors of the "war on terror," is turning into quite the war president. The mission in Iraq is moving ahead par course with the Bush team's original goals, Guantanamo is still open (as are the dozens of other secret prisons in the CIA's network, even though we've been told they're closing), and now Obama is sending 30,000 Marines and GIs to Central Asia. And yet Obama won the Nobel Peace Prize and continues to project an image of peaceful intent. "War is peace."

Nowhere is this Orwellian modus —"ignorance is strength"— more refined than in the formulation of US nuclear weapons policies. Whether with respect to Sec. Clinton's maneuverings against Iran, N. Korea and other states, or current US nuclear weapons complex schemes to boost funding and build billion dollar infrastructure for weapons research, design and production far into the future, the message is, following Obama and a litany of big-whigs, "a world free of nuclear weapons," but the substance is money and authorization for "nukes forever."

In this month's Z Magazine Will Parrish, Nick Robinson and I have written up a small part of this story.

Operationalising the vision for a nuclear weapon free world

Presented by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will, at the UNGA First Committee, 23 October 2009

For more than sixty years, civil society has been calling on governments to take action to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons. US President Obama’s pledge in Prague to seek “a world free of nuclear weapons” brought the hope of billions of people to the highest levels of international responsibility.

We have chosen in this statement not to comment in detail on specific resolutions that the First Committee has before it, but to talk about how nuclear disarmament interconnects with other weapons and security challenges in today’s complex security environment and to put forward a few concrete ideas toward operationalising the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.

First, some interconnections.

At the DPI/NGO conference in Mexico City in September, 1300 participants representing over 340 NGOs from more than 55 countries endorsed a final declaration recognising that security, peace, disarmament, human rights, gender equality, and development are closely interconnected at the local national, regional, and global levels.

One important element underscoring all of these issues is military spending. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, global military expenditure in 2008 is estimated to have totaled $1464 billion. This represents an increase of 45 per cent in the past ten years. The US military expenditure has reached the highest level in real terms since World War II. It is now responsible for at least 40 per cent of total global military spending.

Nuclear weapons, and the wider global military-industrial complex, consume vast resources that could be put to better use.

Consider just one example. The head of the UN Climate Change Secretariat Yvo De Boer estimated recently that the annual cost of cutting global emissions of greenhouse gases will be $200 billion. It will cost another US$100 billion per year to cope with the effects of climate change. This means that just one-fifth of annual global military spending budget can help reduce the scale and worldwide consequences of climate change.

Nuclear weapons cannot help us address climate change, poverty, child mortality, or injustice. Instead, they act as an existential threat to humanity and life on this planet. They also maintain the structural inequalities between the nuclear-armed powers and the great majority of states, and incite some states to seek nuclear weapons. They support establishments and institutions that see their interests as being well served by a mode of military dominance ultimately underwritten by nuclear weapons. They do not provide security for the citizens of the world.

Civil society groups and many states have long recognised the need to develop more effective resources and tools for security, defence, and conflict resolution than weapons. We advocate pursuit of human security, through the advancement of the interconnected issues above. However, none of the interconnecting issues should be treated as preconditions for nuclear disarmament. In fact, there is no basis for demanding general and complete disarmament or a settlement of all regional disputes as preconditions for eliminating nuclear weapons. The pursuit of nuclear disarmament and achievement of a legally-binding regime that eliminates and prohibits nuclear weapons will greatly facilitate global security and efforts to build peace.

Which leads us to a few suggestions on how to operationalise the vision for a world free of nuclear weapons.

There are many resolutions before you on various aspects of nuclear weapons. We join in supporting many of these efforts, including bringing the CTBT into force, reinforcing the existing nuclear weapon free zones and promoting the establishment of additional zones in Europe and the Arctic as well as the Middle East and North-East Asia, reducing and eliminating strategic and non-strategic arsenals, and fulfilling the NPT disarmament commitments undertaken in 1995 and 2000.

The common factor preventing progress on all these issues is that some governments continue to place high value on nuclear weapons, whether for security, status, or power projection.

When leaders come to the UN General Assembly and Security Council and say they want a nuclear weapon free world, we have to ask how they are changing their policies and doctrines to make this possible. The most conducive path to such a world is for all of the nuclear weapon states to marginalise the role of nuclear weapons in concrete ways, such as by:

• agreeing to legally-binding security assurances not to attack non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons;

• committing not to use nuclear weapons as a tool for “pre-emptive strike”;

• rejecting counterforce and countervalue doctrines; and

• excluding “extended deterrence” arrangements in their doctrines;

• declaring that as a matter of national policy they will not design, develop, or produce new design nuclear warheads or modernise existing warheads.

Trading some arms control agreements or arsenal reduction for modernised nuclear weapons research and production facilities capable of building the nuclear threat anew is not disarmament. If the danger of nuclear war is to be eliminated, ceasing to plan and build for an eternal nuclear threat must come early, not late, in the process. The “nuclear danger” does not come from without, but from within. To seek to “hedge” against the nuclear threat only perpetuates it, sustaining the global climate of fear and distrust that makes real disarmament progress always a receding goal.

To this end, it is good that the United States and Russian Federation have returned to the negotiating table to replace START. The NPT Review Conference should include commitment to further bilateral reductions. In the next round, the United States and Russian Federation should each cut their deployed and stored nuclear weapons and delivery systems to at least the low hundreds. This would facilitate multilateral negotiations on elimination. They should also cut their nuclear weapon budgets in half and commit to zero funding for any modernisation or refurbishment programmes.

Furthermore, it is important not to be mesmerised by negotiations, which can be derailed by domestic or international developments. The United States and Russia, and other states with nuclear weapons, can and should undertake unilateral reductions, as the 13 Practical Steps provide.

Many non-nuclear weapon states also have a role to play. Thirty non-nuclear weapon states shelter under the US nuclear umbrella. Citizens in NATO countries, Australia, South Korea, and Japan have long advocated for their countries to let go of the cold war nuclear umbrellas and forge more independent and balanced relationships for national, regional, and international security. Now key legislators from all these countries are joining the call. We urge governments to heed these calls and act to denuclearise their alliances and relations with other states. Many proponents of retaining nuclear weapons in the United States espouse “extended deterrence” as their justification. Public statements from governments under the US nuclear umbrella stating that they believe their security commitments will still be viable without nuclear weapons would thus remove a key obstacle to deeper reductions in the US nuclear arsenal. Removing nuclear sharing from NATO’s Strategic Concept, combined with removal of nuclear weapons from Europe, would be an important confidence-building measure and would likely facilitate bilateral dialogue that could lead to much deeper cuts in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals.

Like many of you, we welcomed that the UN Security Council held a special session this September on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. While Resolution 1887 included concrete operational commitments to help prevent nuclear proliferation and other kinds of nuclear insecurity, it failed to include similarly concrete measures to advance disarmament. Disarmament cannot take a back seat to non-proliferation, nor can measures undertaken to prevent proliferation be considered acts of disarmament.

We hope that the cooperation forged among the P5 in the drafting of this resolution will continue and grow to engage non-nuclear weapon states, and that the P5 and other nuclear weapon possessors will find similar unity of purpose in implementing specific disarmament measures.

To this end, all states interested in serious nuclear disarmament should, inter alia:

• Oppose conditioning approval of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on deals for entrenching and expanding weapons complexes, on retaining the option of designing and manufacturing modified or new-design warheads, or on modernizing delivery systems. They should also call for the closure of all nuclear test sites.

• Negotiate for a fissile materials treaty that comprehensively prevents use of existing materials outside military programs for weapons acquisition and that facilitates disarmament.

• Immediately and forcefully convey to nuclear weapon possessors that they must reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines and in international relations.

• Support UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s call, in his five-point plan for nuclear disarmament, for the possession of any weapon of mass destruction to be considered a ‘global taboo’.

• Emphasise that it would be a crime against humanity if anyone were to use nuclear weapons, anywhere in the world, for any purpose whatsoever. In this context, we applaud the decision of the International Committee of the Red Cross to speak out on nuclear weapons during this First Committee session.

• Commit to the objective of a Nuclear Weapons Convention and begin the process that will lead towards this objective. Those that are states parties to the NPT should put this commitment into their statements and papers to the 2010 Review Conference and push for it to be included in any final documents.

Civil society experts developed a model Nuclear Weapons Convention some years ago as a resource and guide, with suggestions and options for how to prohibit, reduce, and eliminate nuclear weapons safely and securely, while providing insurance against future break-outs. This model Convention has been circulated by the Secretary-General as an official UN document.

There are some who say that it is premature to consider a Nuclear Weapons Convention at this time. Work on a Nuclear Weapons Convention will ensure full implementation of the NPT and help facilitate nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation steps.

Abolishing nuclear weapons will help move the world away from a system of competing nation-states seeking military advantage and open the way to putting real, equitable, environmentally sustainable, human security interests at the centre of national policies.

Victor Hugo wrote that: “More powerful than the march of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come.” The idea whose time has come is that the abolition of nuclear weapons is not only desirable, but possible, achievable, practical, and urgently necessary.

First Committee 2009 opens

This year's UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security will run from 5 October-3 November 2009. Check out the Reaching Critical Will website for all statements, resolutions, reports, and other information. Also subscribe to RCW's First Committee Monitor for full NGO reporting coverage of all topics.

Heading into another session of the First Committee, the situation looks a little more positive than last year. Issues related to disarmament—from nuclear weapons to cluster bombs—have received increasing attention throughout 2009 from governments, the media, and the general public. Many high-profile individuals have called for a nuclear weapon free world; many governments have ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Civil society has continued campaigning around these weapons and others—small arms, antipersonnel landmines, depleted uranium weapons, space weapons—to prevent their development, modernisation, production, trade, and stockpiling.

There is a new administration in Washington that appears interested in active multilateralism. The United States fully participated in EU3+3 talks with Iran for the first time. Russian and US officials have been talking about reducing their arsenals further. The UN Security Council held a presidential Summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on 24 October, coinciding with the sixth Entry Into Force conference of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—which 150 states have now ratified. Disarmament was a central theme for many high-level delegates speaking to the UN General Assembly’s general debate in September, with 80 countries speaking about disarmament—up from 19 in 2008.

The heightened awareness and activity around disarmament is encouraging. However, those concerned with concrete movement toward a more secure and equitable world order with less armaments and reduced military expenditure need to take the time to separate the rhetoric from the reality. Now is the time for action, but it is equally crucial to ensure that the actions taken in the name of disarmament actually achieve that goal.

With the change in administration in the United States, the US government and several of its allies have adopted a new rhetoric on nuclear disarmament. They have begun to espouse policies for a “nuclear weapon free world” that do not actually include specific or time-bound steps for disarmament. In fact, these measures have focused nearly exclusively on strengthening or demanding new nuclear non-proliferation measures and commitments from non-nuclear weapon states, while at the same time maintaining the status quo (i.e. no progress) on nuclear disarmament.

The process toward an Arms Trade Treaty faces similar dangers of co-option by the powerful few who have interests at stake other than peace, justice, and security. Civil society and most governments want the ATT to reduce the human costs associated with the proliferation of conventional arms. However, thus far discussions have reached a lowest common denominator consensus only on dealing with illicit trade. Whether or not states will be able to agree to a treaty that has any real benefit to human security, by applying humanitarian and human rights standards to arms transfer decisions, is far from assured.

Civil society and concerned governments need to ensure that discussions and actions around disarmament and non-proliferation are clear and balanced. We also need to shift the language of the debate away from that which focuses on so-called “national security”—which in reality is the economic security only of the elite, technologically proficient classes of the state—to that which focuses on human security. To a large extent this is already happening in the Arms Trade Treaty process. For nuclear weapons, it has hardly happened at all outside of particular segments of civil society.

John Borrie, who works for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, has looked closely at the initiatives to ban cluster munitions and landmines for lessons that could potentially be applied to the elimination of nuclear weapons. He notes that those working to abolish cluster munitions and antipersonnel landmines reframed the discourse and acceptability of these weapons in broader terms than before. Campaigners focused on the human impacts of the weapons alongside their purported military advantages and consciously shifted the burden of proof for the continued acceptability of a weapon onto users and producers. In the case of nuclear weapons, this means forcing those who want to keep them to try to make a convincing case for their acceptability in humanitarian terms, regardless of their purported military advantage.

Reaching Critical Will asks all delegations to the First Committee to take the time this year to debate the humanitarian merits of nuclear weapons. During the thematic debate on nuclear weapons, it would be extremely useful if delegations would address the values, perceptions, and interests of nuclear weapon possession and abolition. Getting away from Cold War deterrence theories, we are interested in hearing a debate on the moral, legal, and humanitarian justifications for the retention or elimination of nuclear weapons.

The First Committee is the place for this debate. All UN member states can participate. It makes recommendations to the General Assembly through resolutions related to all issues of disarmament and international security. Its work feeds into other disarmament machinery, including the Conference on Disarmament and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The time is ripe—we are coming out of the UN Security Council Summit on nuclear issues and heading into the NPT Review Conference. Having a frank discussion about the reality of nuclear weapons, without all the rhetoric, would be instrumental to actually making concrete steps toward true disarmament and stronger non-proliferation.

UN Security Council: Working toward a nuclear weapon free world?

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Full report and other materials available online

Yesterday, US President Obama chaired a UN Security Council meeting on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It was a great opportunity for the five permanent members and nuclear weapon states—China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States—to make concrete commitments to nuclear disarmament and lay out the steps toward a nuclear weapon free world.

Unfortunately, these governments instead used the Summit to lay out their vision for stricter requirements for non-nuclear weapon states to prove they are not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. As UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown said during his General Assembly statement: “Britain will insist that the onus on non-nuclear states is that in future it is for them to prove they are not developing nuclear weapons.”

Yet despite rhetoric to the contrary, the five permanent members did not extend any new commitments for themselves to eliminate nuclear weapons in compliance with their legal obligation to do so.

• The Summit resolution emphasised non-proliferation over disarmament, requesting new requirements for non-nuclear weapon states to prove their status and intent.


• Most of the nuclear weapon states did not reference their previous commitments to steps toward nuclear disarmament nor set out new ones.


• The Summit promoted nuclear power as a safe, clean, source of energy that will help combat climate change.
  

However, many of the non-permanent members of the Council recognised the problem with this approach to non-proliferation and disarmament and outlined several concrete proposals
to advance both agendas in a balanced manner.

Read Reaching Critical Will’s report on the Summit for details of these suggestions!

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom released a statement before the meeting, calling on the UN Security Council members to make serious commitments to disarmament along with their requests on non-proliferation. WILPF continues to call upon Council members—and all other members of the United Nations—to work toward a nuclear free world through real, concrete actions and commitments. For example:

1. The UN Security Council should call for a halt to development, production, design, modernization, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

2. It should also fulfill its commitment to formulate a plan for disarmament with the least diversion of the world’s human and economic resources toward weapons, as it is instructed to do in Article 26 of the UN Charter.

3. The context of all non-proliferation measures should be designed as steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, not toward their indefinite possession by an elite group of states.

4. The UN Security Council should urge governments to accelerate and enlarge their support for development of commercially viable renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy and to phase-out nuclear power, as a measure strengthening both non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

Disarmament at the General Assembly

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

This morning the UN General Assembly began its general debate, with heads of state and foreign ministers delivering statements on their policies and priorities on a broad range of issues for the year ahead. Reaching Critical Will will be monitoring these statements and creating an index of all references made to issues of disarmament, peace, and security. As the debate continues, please keep an eye on the index, which is searchable both by country and by topic.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon opened the session morning; here are his remarks related to disarmament:

“...let this be the year that nations united to free our world of nuclear weapons. For too long, this great cause has lain dormant. That is why, last October, I proposed a 5-point plan for putting disarmament back on the global agenda. And now the international climate is changing. The Russian Federation and the United States have pledged to cut their nuclear arsenals. This coming May, at the UN Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, we have opportunity to push for real progress.

Tomorrow’s historic Security Council summit—chaired by the President of the United States, with us for the first time—offers a fresh start. With action now, we can get the ratifications to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into force. Together, let us make this the year we agreed to banish the bomb.”

US President Obama also delivered his remarks, much of which had to do with disarmament and related issues:

“I have outlined a comprehensive agenda to seek the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. In Moscow, the United States and Russia announced that we would pursue substantial reductions in our strategic warheads and launchers.”

“And we address our priorities here, in this institution—for instance, through the Security Council meeting that I will chair tomorrow on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.”

“Today, I put forward four pillars that are fundamental to the future that we want for our children: non-proliferation and disarmament; the promotion of peace and security; the preservation of our planet; and a global economy that advances opportunity for all people.”

“First, we must stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and seek the goal of a world without them. This institution was founded at the dawn of the atomic age, in part because man’s capacity to kill had to be contained. For decades, we averted disaster, even under the shadow of a super-power stand-off. But today, the threat of proliferation is growing in scope and complexity. If we fail to act, we will invite nuclear arms races in every region, and the prospect of wars and acts of terror on a scale that we can hardly imagine.

“A fragile consensus stands in the way of this frightening outcome – the basic bargain that shapes the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. It says that all nations have the right to peaceful nuclear energy; that nations with nuclear weapons have the responsibility to move toward disarmament; and those without them have the responsibility to forsake them. The next twelve months could be pivotal in determining whether this compact will be strengthened or will slowly dissolve.

“America will keep our end of the bargain. We will pursue a new agreement with Russia to substantially reduce our strategic warheads and launchers.”

“We will complete a Nuclear Posture Review that opens the door to deeper cuts, and reduces the role of nuclear weapons.”

Nuclear Testing: “We will move forward with ratification of the Test Ban Treaty, and work with others to bring the Treaty into force so that nuclear testing is permanently prohibited.”

Fissile Materials: “And we will call upon countries to begin negotiations in January on a treaty to end the production of fissile material for weapons.”

Nuclear Terrorism: “I will also host a Summit next April that reaffirms each nation’s responsibility to secure nuclear material on its territory, and to help those who can’t – because we must never allow a single nuclear device to fall into the hands of a violent extremist. And we will work to strengthen the institutions and initiatives that combat nuclear smuggling and theft.”

Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programmes: “All of this must support efforts to strengthen the NPT. Those nations that refuse to live up to their obligations must face consequences. This is not about singling out individual nations – it is about standing up for the rights of all nations that do live up to their responsibilities. Because a world in which IAEA inspections are avoided and the United Nation’s demands are ignored will leave all people less safe, and all nations less secure. In their actions to date, the governments of North Korea and Iran threaten to take us down this dangerous slope. We respect their rights as members of the community of nations. I am committed to diplomacy that opens a path to greater prosperity and a more secure peace for both nations if they live up to their obligations.

“But if the governments of Iran and North Korea choose to ignore international standards; if they put the pursuit of nuclear weapons ahead of regional stability and the security and opportunity of their own people; if they are oblivious to the dangers of escalating nuclear arms races in both East Asia and the Middle East – then they must be held accountable. The world must stand together to demonstrate that international law is not an empty promise, and that Treaties will be enforced. We must insist that the future not belong to fear.”

Fissile Materials: “At the Conference on Disarmament, we agreed on a work plan to negotiate an end to the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.”

Nuclear Testing: “And this week, my Secretary of State will become the first senior American representative to the annual Members Conference of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”

He also had some good remarks on multilateralism:

“Now is the time for all of us to take our share of responsibility for a global response to global challenges.”

“Responsibility and leadership in the 21st century demand more. In an era when our destiny is shared, power is no longer a zero sum game. No one nation can or should try to dominate another nation. No world order that elevates one nation or group of people over another will succeed. No balance of power among nations will hold. The traditional division between nations of the south and north makes no sense in an interconnected world. Nor do alignments of nations rooted in the cleavages of a long gone Cold War.

“The time has come to realize that the old habits and arguments are irrelevant to the challenges faced by our people. They lead nations to act in opposition to the very goals that they claim to pursue, and to vote – often in this body – against the interests of their own people. They build up walls between us and the future that our people seek, and the time has come for those walls to come down. Together, we must build new coalitions that bridge old divides – coalitions of different faiths and creeds; of north and south, east and west; black, white, and brown.”

Keeping checking the RCW Disarmament Index for more.

WILPF Statement to the UN Security Council in anticipation of its 24 September 2009 meeting on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) welcomes the UN Security Council Summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament to be held on 24 September 2009. We urge the UN Security Council to use this opportunity to constructively contribute to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by taking steps toward a nuclear weapon free world and the promotion of collective human security and security for all life on this planet.

Ahead of the summit, the US government released a draft resolution for the UN Security Council to consider as an outcome document, which was then consolidated into a revised draft with input from other Council members. WILPF is encouraged by the scope of the document, which covers a wide range of important issues. In particular, WILPF welcomes its recognition of the importance of negative security assurances and nuclear weapon free zone treaties and its commitment to supporting the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency on non-proliferation and safeguards. We are especially pleased with the addition of a preambular paragraph in the revised version that the welcomes and encourages “the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament” (PP23).

However, both versions of the draft resolution focus nearly exclusively on strengthening existing non-proliferation measures and advocating new, more stringent requirements, while at the same time maintaining the status quo (i.e. no progress) on nuclear disarmament.

The only reference to disarmament in the operative paragraphs of the resolution simply reiterates Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (OP4—all references are to the revised version of the resolution, dated 18 September 2009). The references to nuclear weapon free zone treaties (PP13 and PP14), negative security assurances (PP15), and “the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament” (PP11) in the preamble are not accompanied by concrete actions in the operative paragraphs. Neither draft mentions the thirteen practical steps toward nuclear disarmament that was unanimously agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, nor any other nuclear disarmament proposal, such as the UN Secretary-General’s five-point plan for disarmament or an international Nuclear Weapons Convention or framework agreement. In addition, the only reference in the resolution to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is to “monitor closely any situations” involving their proliferation (OP25).

Meanwhile, the draft goes far beyond non-proliferation commitments outlined in the NPT, calling for UN Security Council consideration of all “situations of noncompliance with nonproliferation commitments” (OP1), encouraging states to consider the Additional Protocol a new standard when making nuclear export decisions (OP17), and urging states “to require as a condition of nuclear exports” that IAEA safeguards continue even if the state withdraws from its safeguards agreement (OP16). The first of these demands does not indicate how determinations of non-compliance will be made, or by whom, or which non-proliferation obligations are included in the scope of this demand. In addition, there has of yet been no agreement in the NPT or IAEA frameworks about where or by which methods situations of non-compliance should be dealt with. It is traditionally up to the relevant treaty or organisation to determine these conditions, not external bodies. Furthermore, the resolution does not refer cases of non-compliance with disarmament obligations to the UN Security Council.

The other two non-proliferation examples given above—and several others in the resolution—have been brought up in the NPT context before and have been met with opposition by many non-nuclear weapons states. These measures could indeed be beneficial to strengthening non-proliferation, but they cannot be extended without reciprocal commitments to disarmament.

The obfuscation of several paragraphs in the resolution is also problematic. OP7 “deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.” It is unclear which resolutions are being referred to in this paragraph. None of the UN Security Council resolutions on Iran’s nuclear programme determine that the programme constitutes a “threat to international peace and security.” However, these resolutions are reaffirmed in PP17 of the draft.

PP11 fails to acknowledge that some of the recognised nuclear weapon states have not ratified relevant protocols of some nuclear weapon free zone treaties. In addition, the encouragement of “efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy” in OP9 does not acknowledge the extreme environmental risks of nuclear power or the nuclear fuel cycle or the problems posed by both for the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world.

In order to achieve a meaningful outcome that advances an equitable and secure nuclear weapon free world, WILPF encourages the UN Security Council to call for concrete actions and commitments to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

On disarmament, the UN Security Council should:

• Call for a halt to development, production, design, modernization, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and for the establishment of international controls on delivery systems and anti-missile systems;

• Call for transparency regarding the size and status of nuclear weapon forces;

• Refer to the International Court of Justice’s 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons;

• Call for concrete actions on the 1995 and 2000 NPT decisions and commitments;

• Fulfill its commitment to formulate a plan for nuclear disarmament with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, pursuant to Article 26 of the UN Charter;

• Call upon the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations of a fissile material treaty in 2010 on the basis of the Shannon Mandate and to address the factors that have complicated the negotiation process in the interim months; and

• Call on all nuclear weapon states to drop their reservations to relevant protocols of nuclear weapon free zone treaties and ratify all such treaties.

On non-proliferation, the UN Security Council should ensure that its related requirements and commitments do not exhort the current imbalance between “nuclear have’s and have not’s” by demanding tighter restrictions on the behaviour of non-nuclear weapon states while promising disarmament by the nuclear weapon states as an “ultimate” goal in the distant future. The context of all non-proliferation measures should designed as steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, not toward their indefinite possession by an elite group of states.

On nuclear energy, the UN Security Council should urge governments to accelerate and enlarge their support for development of commercially viable renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy and to phase-out nuclear power, as a measure strengthening both non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

Conference on Disarmament concludes, without conducting substantive work

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Thursday, 17 September, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) met for its final plenary meeting of 2009. It adopted its report to the General Assembly, with a few amendments, and the delegations of Japan, the Netherlands, and Canada submitted the International Panel on Fissile Materials’ draft fissile materials treaty to the CD as an official document. But the fact that the Conference was unable to implement its programme of work, adopted back in May, overshadowed the closing meeting.

Many delegations expressed frustration that despite all best attempts to move forward with concrete action, the CD remained in deadlock for its twelfth year in a row. Mexico’s Ambassador Gómez-Oliver lamented that the CD, whose “very mandate would oblige it to be a main role player,” is not only on the margins but is actually blocking concrete action. She called on the CD to seek every means possible to transcend its difficulties, examine its methods of work, reflect on its mandate, and reestablish its credibility.

The CD’s failure to reach consensus on implementing its programme of work reflects the deeply entrenched obstacles in the path of abolishing nuclear weapons. These obstacles are by no means intractable; the differences in delegate positions and concerns are certainly not impassable.

However, with only four months until the start of the 2010 session, CD member states have some intense intersessional consultations ahead of them to bridge the gaps between positions, or more importantly, resolve underlying concerns. The commitment of this year’s and next year’s P6 members to work together during these months is encouraging.

Some of the work toward consensus, however, can only be accomplished through the good faith relations between states in the international community at large. The impasse in the CD is a product of poor international relations, characterized by double-standards, discrimination, mistrust, and regional and international power imbalances. These issues deserve serious attention in the intervening months and should be considered in the context of moving toward an equitable nuclear weapon free world that enhances human security and the security for all life on the planet.

WILPF Statement on the 64th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

On 6 and 9 August 1945, the United States dropped two nuclear weapons on two Japanese cities—one on Hiroshima and the other on Nagasaki. These acts killed 200,000 civilians by the end of 1945 and many more in the years that followed. The development, manufacture, testing, deployment, and sharing of nuclear weapons continues affecting the Earth and its people today. The threat of the use of these weapons still exists. The arms race is not yet over.

While the United States and Russia are currently engaged in talks to reduce their stockpiles, the proposed agreement does not affect warheads held in reserve, “non-strategic” weapons, or the size of the total stockpile, nor does it require dismantlement of any nuclear warheads.¹ Meanwhile, both countries have plans to modernize their nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

A US plan for the development of a missile “defence” system in Europe has also increased tensions between the two countries. Meanwhile, China continues to modernize and expand its arsenal. The United Kingdom decided to renew its nuclear system last year. France’s president, while promising to reduce his country’s stockpile, also promised that he will retain the possibility to “send a nuclear warning” to underscore France’s “resolve” to protect its interests.²

There are also four countries that possess nuclear explosive devices but are not recognized as nuclear weapon states by the primary nuclear treaty regime, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—and are thus not bound by its rules. India, Pakistan, and Israel are still making materials for use in nuclear weapons, while North Korea has threatened to resume production. Pakistan and India are both building new reactors to increase their capacity to make plutonium for nuclear weapons. Both are actively developing and testing ballistic and cruise missiles to carry nuclear weapons.³

Despite the end of the Cold War, despite supposed “thawing of tensions” between the major powers, and despite the reality of an interconnected, interdependent world order, the mythical ideal of the power of the bomb persists. It continues to influence national security doctrines, international relations, and multilateral negotiations, subsequently undermining international law, human security, and our ability to build resilience to the converging climate, peak oil, food, water, and financial crises we face.

WILPF urges all governments and citizens to consider our options for the future. It encourages everyone to support and work for the elimination of nuclear weapons and for the redirection of nuclear weapon expenditures to meet environmental, social, health, housing, food, and economic needs. We need to creatively build resilience into our international system that does not rely on violence or military power but rather promotes cooperation, ingenuity, and human security. As a first step toward this end, WILPF calls on all nuclear weapon possessors to cease modernizing their arsenals as a step toward the good faith pursuit of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear weapon free world.

For more information about WILPF’s work on nuclear disarmament, please go to www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

1Hans Kristensen, “START Follow-On: What SORT of Agreement?” Federation of American Scientists, Strategic Security Blog, 8 July 2009, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/start.php?pfstyle=wp.

2For more on the nuclear programmes of the five NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states, see Rhetoric vs. Reality: Elite Disarmament Proposals and Real Disarmament Prospects, Information Briefing, Western States Legal Foundation, May 2009, http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/rhetoricvreality.pdf.

3Zia Mian, “Pushing South Asia Toward the Brink,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 27 July 2009, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/6295.

CD adopts a programme of work!

On Friday, 29 May, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) adopted a programme of work for the first time in ten years.

Before bringing the decision to the floor, Ambassador Jazaïry of Algeria, current president of the CD, explained that the six presidents (P6) of the 2009 session were inspired by the “new momentum” for disarmament, expressed in US President Obama’s Prague speech, the announcements of further US-Russian bilateral nuclear reductions, etc. After consultations with member states, they reached the conclusion that: they had the “historic responsibility” to not pass up the opportunity to relaunch the work of the CD and that they had to go beyond pre-established positions “and allow ourselves to be guided only by the manifest community of our shared interest in this matter; that the programme of work should be tackled in a comprehensive and balanced manner; and that consensus should be sought “part and parcel of a process refining previous efforts to overcome” the stumbling blocks of recent years.

Intercessional consultations on a draft programme by all members of the P6 were met with expressions at support in a variety of fora outside the UN system, so the presidents decided to introduce their proposal to the CD on 19 May. Ambassador Jazaïry argued, the programme is not perfect but “is a compromise which provides a delicate balance” and “in no way establishes a hierarchy in terms of priority,” but rather establishes a basis of compromise to launch negotiations.

He then asked if there was any objection to the adoption of CD/1863 by consensus. There was none. The gavel dropped and the room burst into applause.

Before the programme was adopted,a few delegations spoke about CD/1863, including Ukraine, Iran, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Morocco. After the adoption, a great number of delegations delivered interventions, voicing their support for the programme of work. Two, India and Pakistan, elaborated their positions on negotiating a fissile materials treaty.

Much work remains to be done before negotiations and other substantive work can begin. But at least, for the first time in a decade, the CD has a plan.

For details, please see Reaching Critical Will’s CD Report for 29 May.

North Korea conducts a second nuclear test

On 25 May, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducted what it claims to be a second nuclear test. According to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, the International Monitoring System’s (IMS) seismic stations registered a seismic event at 41.2896 degrees North and 129.0480 degrees East at 00:54:43 GMT (09:54 local time). The signal’s area of origin is largely identical with the 2006 DPRK nuclear test. The event’s magnitude is slightly higher than in 2006, measuring 4.52 on the Richter scale, while in 2006 it was 4.1. Those doing the calculations at ArmsControlWonk.com suggest the yield of the nuclear explosive device was likely around 4 KT.

WILPF issued a statement in response to the DPRK test, over which it expresses deep concern. However, WILPF remains equally concerned about previous nuclear tests of other states and their continued possession of nuclear weapons. In its formal response to the test, WILPF called on all states outside of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to ratify it without delay or conditions and called on all states possessing nuclear weapons to immediately shut down their nuclear test facilities and to acknowledge and compensate the victims of their testing programmes.

In this statement, WILPF also noted that if the CTBT were in force, the Treaty would give greater legitimacy to international responses. Its member states could adopt sanctions against the DPRK for violating international law. Currently, the task of coordinating an international response falls to the UN Security Council, a body not entitled to enforce international norms per se, but an unrepresentative political body dominated by the interests of its five permanent, veto-wielding members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, two of whom (China and the US) have yet to ratify the CTBT themselves.

Keep an eye on the CTBTO website for news about the test.

Pakistan supports new proposed programme of work at the CD

On Friday morning at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Ambassador Zamir Khan formally announced Pakistan’s support for “the initiation of work” in the CD on the basis of CD/1863 (the new proposed programme of work for the Conference). For the past two years, Pakistan has been considered the key holdout from adopting a programme of work in the CD. This endorsement is expected to pave the way for the long-awaited commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials treaty and the resumption of meaningful work by the Conference.

For details on CD/1863 and other endorsements of it, please read/subscribe to Reaching Critical Will’s CD Reports.

New programme of work introduced to the CD

During the first plenary meeting of the second part of the Conference on Disarmament’s 2009 session, the current president of the CD, Ambassador Idriss Jazaïry, formally submitted CD/1863, a new proposed programme of work on behalf of the six presidents.

The new proposal differs substantially from those of 2008 and 2007. It establishes working groups on the four core issues and special coordinators on the other three agenda items. It calls, inter alia, for negotiation of a fissile materials treaty on the basis of the 1995 Shannon Mandate, for recommendations for dealing with negative security assurances, and for an “exchange of views and information on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of their elimination, including on approaches toward potential future work of multilateral character.” (For more details, see Reaching Critical Will's 19 May 2009 CD Report.)

Coming merely a few days after the qualified success of the third nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee for the 2010 review cycle, the introduction of a more balanced programme of work for the CD not only maintains the positive spirit but increases its momentum. The call for fissile material treaty negotiations on the basis of the Shannon Mandate, while effectively winding back the clock almost fifteen years, is a substantial step forward from other recent attempts to formulate a programme of work. In addition, the significantly enhanced mandates for discussions on nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances are progressively forward-looking and will surely go a long way to alleviating non-nuclear weapon states’ concerns about the imbalanced nature of previous proposed programmes of work.

Consensus is near. Current president Ambassador Jazaïry noted that consultations are still ongoing, but the majority of delegations seem to assume that CD/1863 will be adopted very soon. After twelve years without substantive work and ten years without even a programme of work, the adoption of this document cannot come a moment too soon. Ambassador Jazaïry expressed hope that, if adopted, CD/1863 would extend beyond the current year, providing a framework for future negotiations. This is particularly important since most CD member states do not currently have the capacity at their Geneva missions to engage in negotiations. It would likely take until the beginning of the CD’s 2010 session before working group two could seriously get to work. Hopefully, the Conference will not have to worry about developing a new programme of work at that time but can rely on CD/1863 to carry forward the momentum.

High-level support for the proposed programme of work
The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addressed the CD plenary meeting, as did Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey and Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci. They all urged the CD to rapidly adopt CD/1863 as its programme of work for the year. For details, please see Reaching Critical Will's 19 May 2009 CD Report.

A qualified success

Lead editorial from the final edition of the NPT News in Review, written by Michael Spies and Ray Acheson:

By the abysmal standards that have typified the preparatory process—instituted in 1995—leading up to each five year review of the NPT, the third and final Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting before the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) must certainly be considered a success. The PrepCom was able to agree to an agenda for the RevCon, on its third day, no less, amid a chorus of accolades for what many described as a new, positive atmosphere in multilateral disarmament, stemming entirely from US President Obama’s 5 April speech in Prague.

However, it did not surprise many delegates—most of whom are veterans of the so-called decade of deadlock that had accompanied the Bush administration’s allergy to multilateralism—that the PrepCom would become snagged once it attempted to work through matters of substance.

The PrepCom’s failure to adopt substantive recommendations for the RevCon, a feat no previous PrepCom had ever accomplished, may have temporarily tainted the atmosphere, but was not unforeseen. During his opening remarks to the PrepCom, its Chair, Ambassador Chidyausiku of Zimbabwe, cautioned that despite recent signs of progress, in many areas the positions of states had actually grown further apart rather than closer.

With this note of caution, on Monday, 11 May, the Chair circulated a clever and concise first draft of recommendations, intended to capture specific proposals that identify concrete practical actions on implementing the Treaty, stand a reasonable chance of gaining consensus, and build upon earlier decision. Its strongest provisions dealt with moving the disarmament agenda forward and even included consideration of a nuclear weapons convention (see NPT News in Review, No. 6).

It must be noted that the vast majority of states could have accepted the first draft, including many members of NATO, with little or no modifications. Following consultations, and in particular input from the nuclear weapon states, on Wednesday, 13 May, the Chair put forward a revised set of recommendations that significantly weakened the sections on disarmament, civil society participation, and education, but bolstered those on implementing the 1995 Middle East resolution and on non-proliferation.

For some, the second draft proved to be a bridge too far. As the conference moved into its final hours, it devolved into a tense blame game that pitted western delegations against the Non-Aligned Movement and some of its more outspoken members, most notably Cuba, Egypt, and Iran. On Thursday, 14 May, the Chair advised states let the recommendations go, as to not to ruin the spirit of cooperation. Despite the Chair’s judgment that the differences in position were too vast, a large number of delegations urged the Chair to continue the process of seeking consensus (see NPT News in Review, No. 10).

The breakdown of the recommendations process
Despite the positive atmosphere, disarmament rhetoric of the US and UK administrations, and the quick adoption of the agenda, the PrepCom delegates did not find enough common ground—or at least, enough common rhetoric—to agree to a set of non-binding recommendations for next year. Breaking with the recent past, the Chair decided not to forward the recommendations to the RevCon as a working paper.

The Chair had introduced a newly revised draft recommendations on Friday, 15 May. Delegations consulted with their regional groups before resuming an informal meeting of the PrepCom. During this last attempt to reach consensus on the draft recommendations, the Chair determined that the Committee did not have a sufficient amount of time to reach agreement. Later, at a press briefing, he said the “differences were very minor; with time, we could have done it.”

The differences, as laid out by delegations during Thursday’s plenary discussion on the draft recommendations, did not seem very minor (see NPT News in Review, No. 10), though the revisions in the third draft were quite minimal. The additional changes brought on board an additional caveat to the already thoroughly conditioned preambular paragraph, further emphasized its non-binding character and marginally indicative character—a change insisted upon by the UK. Other amendments made minor changes to the sections on universality, disarmament, non-proliferation, regional initiatives, and education.

Despite the lack of time to make additional major changes to the text (delegations would have needed to consult with their capitals had the second draft text been heavily amended), western and non-aligned delegations traded blame for the impasse. Since the first draft was not agreeable to a few western states and the second was not agreeable to a few NAM states, it would be cynical and insincere to place“blame” on any particular group or delegation. Instead, the experience only serves to further illuminate the wide gulfs between states’ positions.

Paradoxically on the surface, this result came as a relief to many delegations. While the vast majority of states parties seemed ready to accept either the first or second drafts, no one was entirely content with either. Rather than becoming stuck with an imperfect text, delegations will have the freedom in 2010 to negotiate and reach agreement with a clean slate on the many fraught issues facing the NPT regime.

PrepCom finale

After a short informal session Friday morning, during which states parties started going through the track change suggestions in the newly revised draft recommendations, the Chair declared that the Commmittee did not have a sufficient amount of time to reach agreement. The formal meeting resumed and the Committee adopted the draft final report (an entirely procedural report) and heard a few brief closing statements, ending the PrepCom by 1:00 PM. The recommendations will not be forwarded to the Review Conference as a working paper or a Chair's paper.

Still searching for consensus

On Friday morning, the Chair called for an informal meeting to discuss a few slight changes to the revised draft recommendations. Delegations asked for 20 minutes to look over the new document, after which they will resume informals to look at the changed paragraphs. Civil society will not be allowed back into the room until after this process is completed.

For an overview of the discussions on the recommendations from Thursday's plenary meeting, indicative of what some of the changes in the new text are, see the editorial from the NPT News in Review No. 10 (reprinted below):

Searching for consensus
Front page article from the NPT News in Review, 15 May 2009

On Thursday, consensus on Chair’s draft recommendations continued to elude delegations. After another morning of consultations and regional group meetings, the Chair opened the plenary meeting lamenting that he had not been able to garner consensus on his draft recommendations. Expressing the belief that it would be best not to ruin the spirit of cooperation that had been demonstrated thus far at the PrepCom by continuing to fight over the recommendations, he opened the floor for comments on ways to move forward.

Of the 25 delegations that spoke, most expressed disappointment that consensus on the document could not be met. Many, including those of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and South Africa, said they would be willing to agree to the revised text. Most of these delegations said they would have agreed to the original text as well and reiterated their understanding that the recommendations are not binding and do not prejudge the outcome of the RevCon.

Only a few delegations took the initiative to be transparent about their positions. The UK ambassador said that while the revised text contains four policy issues that the United Kingdom has opposed on public record, the only remaining problem for his delegation was two letters in the preambular paragraph. Sources suggested the UK wanted to alter the sentence explaining that the recommendations identify “areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future” to “could be sought in the future.”

The Egyptian delegation expressed very clearly that it is dissatisfied with large portions of the revised recommendations. The Egyptian ambassador listed several specific examples. He questioned the title of Section 1, “Universality of the treaty, and of principles of disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,” arguing that this could lead one to believe that the rights related to nuclear energy granted to NPT states parties under article IV of the Treaty are to be universally applied. He also criticized the revised disarmament action plan for recommending only some but not all of the 13 practical steps from the 2000 RevCon, arguing that only partially citing previous decisions undermines them. Further, while noting that some of the recommendations in the Middle East section have been improved, he objected to the use of the word “consider,” arguing that the PrepCom must be more assertive in recommending the RevCon take action on things.

The Cuban delegation said it would have supported the original draft but that the watering down of practical disarmament measures moved the Committee further away from consensus. It expressed belief that some states parties seem to not really be “in a position to produce substantive recommendations at present time that would help us to truly move forward in applying three pillars.”

Despite these discrepancies, many delegations—including those of the African Group, Chile, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States—encouraged the Chair not to give up just yet. The US delegation argued the Committee was “closer than is apparent” to reaching agreement and asked for more time to “work out the small differences” between delegations. However, the Iranian delegation expressed disbelief that any consensus could be reached and urged the Chair to close consideration of this issue and move on. The Iranian ambassador argued that the states insisting that consensus could be reached were simply trying to ensure they would not be blamed for the stalemate.

Many of the most drastic revisions to the draft recommendations, particular those relating to disarmament, are now more in line with nuclear weapon state positions—for example, the elimination of a recommendation to examine ways and means to commence negotiations “on a convention or framework of agreements to achieve global nuclear disarmament,” and another to identify “refraining from the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons” as a practical disarmament measure. Given this, and given that the Egyptian and Cuban problems with the recommendations are well known, it could be disingenuous for some delegations to suggest that consensus is nigh.

However, as Ambassador Landman of the Netherlands pointed out, the Chair knows best what the remaining difficulties are. He noted that while the statements delivered during Thursday’s plenary made it sound like the PrepCom could “make the extra mile” and arrive at an agreement, the Chair should call upon those countries that in his view have to make that mile, to do so. The Chair agreed to postpone a decision on the recommendations until Friday morning, though he said he would not hold consultations with delegations between now and then. Suggesting that the delegations work with each other on the issue, he said he would be happy to hear about any new initiatives.

Despite uncertainty about the future of the recommendations, most delegations welcomed the overwhelmingly positive atmosphere at this PrepCom. The Australian ambassador, describing some of her previous PrepCom experiences as similar to “pulling teeth,” emphasized that since the Committee has already adopted an agenda and held substantive debates, the session should by no means be considered a failure if it is unable to forward recommendations to the RevCon.

Indeed, this is the most constructive NPT conference in quite some time. While it will be disappointing if the spirit of compromise is diminished in the debate over the recommendations, it does not mean the RevCon is a lost cause. The fact is, the majority of states parties were willing to compromise. And while it remains to be seen what the Obama administration’s official policies will look like by the 2010 RevCon or to what degree other states parties might be willing to “give and take” next year, there have been many promising indications of good will and cooperation at this PrepCom that should be carried forward as a manifestation of the recommendations.

Reworking the recommendations

On Wednesday evening, after consultations with various delegations, the Chair released a revised version of his draft recommendations to the 2010 Review Conference.

Overall, the revisions weakened the recommendations on disarmament, civil society participation, and education, but have bolstered those on implementing the Middle East resolution. The sections on non-proliferation and nuclear energy have also been adjusted, purportedly in an attempt to create more balance between the three pillars. Each of the three pillars now has an “action plan,” as several delegates requested during their general comments on Tuesday.

It remains unclear as to whether the PrepCom will be able to adopt the recommendations the end of its session. The amount of time remaining could possibly allow for a second revised document to be offered Thursday afternoon, giving the PrepCom a last chance to adopt it Friday afternoon. However, if the Committee cannot agree to adopt the revised document on Thursday, it is likely that the Chair will have to forward it to the RevCon as a working paper, despite his aversion to such a solution.

Below is a detailed assessment of the differences between the original recommendations and the revised version, pointing out where recommendations have been strengthened, weakened, or changed to some effect.

Introduction
The introductory paragraph of the revised text, CRP.4/Rev.1, adds a sentence noting, “[t]he States parties reaffirm the need to maintain a balance between the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty.” It also explains in more depth the methodology of the recommendations, explaining that the recommendations include “elements for [the RevCon’s] consideration in evaluating the implementation of the undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty,” and “areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future.”

Section 1. Universality
The revised section on promoting universality has weaker language on disarmament. Where CRP.4 recommended the RevCon “declare that the Treaty provides a legal foundation for the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and for the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control” (the language of Article VI), CRP.4/Rev.1 simply recommends the RevCon, “[d]eclare that the Treaty remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.”

As per the Algerian delegation’s suggestion during the general comments on Tuesday, the language on non-states parties has been changed to recommend the RevCon call on them to join as non-nuclear weapon states and without conditions.

This section also has new language on compliance—adding “[recognizing] consequences for breaches of Treaty violations”— and on nuclear energy—adding “[r]eaffirm that the Treaty fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”

Section 2. Action plans
Rather than outlining one action plan on nuclear disarmament, CRP.4/Rev.1 includes a three-part action plan for all three pillars.

Disarmament
The “plan” for nuclear disarmament is similar, but contains a few substantial changes that diminish disarmament. While CRP.4 recommended the RevCon “[r]ecognize growing expectations for progress to achieve nuclear disarmament, and indicate support for ongoing and future efforts in these fields,” CRP.4/Rev.1 recommends the RevCon indicates support for ongoing and future efforts and recognizes “the importance of practical nuclear disarmament by all nuclear-weapon States.”

Likewise, while CRP.4 recommended the RevCon acknowledge that several commitments from 1995 and 2000 have not yet been fulfilled and called for an action plan to implement these commitments, CRP.4/Rev.1 simply recommends the RevCon “[r]eaffirm and update” these commitments, without mentioning they have not been fulfilled. It also divides the original list of disarmament initiatives into two paragraphs: one calling for facilitation of the entry into force of the CTBT and negotiations on a fissile materials [cut-off] treaty and the other calling for discussion on “ways and means to ensure the irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency of disarmament activities” and for recognition of the benefits of reducing operational status, reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons, and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, while the original version recommend the RevCon examine “ways and means to commence negotiations, in accordance with article VI, on a convention or framework of agreements to achieve global nuclear disarmament, and to engage non-parties to the Treaty,” the updates severely undermine this call by only recommending commencement of “open-ended discussions to identify possibilities available to establish an international legal framework for the achievement of global nuclear disarmament.” At least the new language also recommends the engagement of non-states parties “with the aim of attaining a world free of nuclear weapons.”

The language on security assurances, formerly in the non-proliferation section, has been moved to the disarmament section but remains identical.

Non-proliferation
The non-proliferation section has been strengthened. It now recommends the RevCon reaffirm that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is “a threat to international peace and security,” which is established language, rather than simply a “global challenge”.The paragraph on export controls adds quite a bit of substance, including a recommendation on transparency, dialogue, and cooperation and another calling for recognition of the importance of national rules and regulations on nuclear-related transfers.

There is also additional language on the IAEA, including a call for affirmation of “the need for full cooperation with the [IAEA] to resolve any outstanding verification issues,” which follows a new paragraph on the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. CRP.4/Rev.1 also recommends the RevCon “[r]eaffirm the importance of acceptance of the Agency’s full-scope safeguards,” and welcome the IAEA’s efforts to “increase the Agency’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activity” rather than just welcoming the IAEA’s efforts to strengthen safeguards.

Nuclear energy
Section 4 of CRP.4 covered nuclear energy, safety, and security. In CRP.4/Rev.1, ways to “advance peaceful uses of nuclear energy” has been given its own action plan and “ways and means to strengthen nuclear safety and security” is now a separate section.

The action plan on nuclear energy “notes” rather than “welcomes” the “growing applications” of nuclear technology, though it still reaffirms the “inalienable right” to nuclear energy of states parties.

Rather than stressing “the need to intensify consideration of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle,” the new version recommends stressing “the importance of extensive and transparent consultations in the consideration of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.” The rest of the language in this paragraph is the same as in the original.

Another paragraph has been added to include language on cooperation programmes to assist new-nuclear energy states develop adequate infrastructures.

Section 3. Nuclear safety and security
Maintaining much of the original language, the revised recommendations do not include the note that acquisition of nuclear materials by non-state actors “could potentially jeopardize the Treaty.” This section also no longer includes a recommendation to urge “careful consideration of measures of control and monitoring of global stocks” of weapon- usable materials “and the capacity to produce such materials” or to support efforts to “enhance the security of stockpiles” of such materials or to minimize their use in the civilian nuclear sector.

Section 4. Regional initiatives
Most of the language on nuclear weapon free zones remains the same, though in the new version the new Central Asian NWFZ is “noted” rather than welcomed. The new version adds a recommendation noting the importance of the UNDC’s guidelines for NWFZ, but it takes away the recommendation to “[n]ote the existence of strong support for the creating of a [NWFZ] in the Southern Hemisphere,” replacing it with a call to consider establishment of new zones “in regions with nuclear facilities and materials” and to note the importance of establishing WMDFZs.

Section 5. Middle East
Previously folded into the section on regional initiatives, the Middle East resolution now has its own section. Rather than describing the 1995 resolution as being “integrally linked” to the extension of the NPT, it is now “an essential element” of the decision to extend the Treaty.

The new version does continue to recommend consideration of a conference on implementing the resolution, though it no longer specifies the nuclear weapon states as the potential convenors. The rest of the section goes much further than the original language, adding a recommendation to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II at the RevCon “to consider practical steps to promote the earliest implementation” of the resolution and to consider appointing a special coordinator to hold consultations with the countries in the region and report to the review process, which has been suggested by Egypt and supported by other delegations, including the Russian Federation.

Section 6. Withdrawal
The two short paragraphs on withdrawal remain identical to the originals.

Section 7. Strengthening the review process
The new version eliminates the recommendation for consideration establishment of a “uniform, practical and cost-efficient reporting system for the implementation of the Treaty.” This section otherwise remains the same.

Section 8. Civil society; education
The new version significantly diminishes the recommendations on both subjects. It only recommends “noting” rather than “considering” the proposals for enhanced participation of NGOs in the review process. It also recommends “consideration” of the UN Secretary-General’s recommendations on disarmament and non-proliferation education rather than “encouraging” states to implement them, for which the original text called.