Spin cycle

by Dr. Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War

The end of three weeks of Disarmament Commission deliberations on April 21 also represented the end of a three year cycle of discussions focused on nuclear disarmament, a fourth disarmament decade, and confidence building on conventional weapons. The final 2011 session, one of the few during these three weeks where NGOs were allowed to participate, was full of compliments for the chair and co-chairs, secretariat facilitators and translators as well as acknowledgment of the helpful content of some of the smaller working group discussions. At the same time, there was subtle, critical language regarding the outcomes of a lengthy process that used up much time, energy and resources of diplomats and the entire UN system.

A much less subtle critique was offered by Mexico, which spoke of the “same predictable results” that offered no surprises. Mexico also noted the “sad atmosphere” of the meetings, punctuated by low levels of participation that seem to mirror the low expectations of delegations.

Delegations following Mexico generally supported the tone, if not the specifics, of the Mexican remarks. Disappointments were palpable, but largely muted, as though delegations were more pleased to arrive at the closing session than dismayed by anything specific that happened en route.

Nobody was “surprised” by the DC results perhaps, but there are repercussions that follow from participating in long sessions that yield little tangible agreement. Delegates are, for the most part, sincerely interested in pushing forward key disarmament agendas, and many did comment on the value of some of the working group discussions, reminding us that a lack of consensus does not necessarily indicate a lack of value.

But diplomats and observers were also conscious of the time and resources expended on an arduous process and unfulfilled agenda. And to the extent that the proceedings of the DC attract public or media interest, however unlikely that might be, the lack of urgent action and apparent 'waste' of resources would surely rankle many in the global public. Whether the issue is the CD or the DC, how do we explain to people the structural issues and institutional costs that strain delegations, frustrate observers, and impede action on issues that so many people see as urgent to the survival of our species? Until we can create a more flexible disarmament structure that empowers as much as it restrains, we need to work harder to create a narrative that explains to wary constituents why bodies like the DC remain a good investment. What are we learning about how to do this better? What is the value in the DC that offers hope for genuine movement on critical issues? In which ways are we moving closer to breakthroughs on disarmament and how do we communicate this?

This narrative must at all costs avoid 'spin.' It must rather represent an honest assessment of progress and an honest willingness to confront and overcome impediments. We all have the right to make mistakes and fall short of goals. We don't have as much right to make the same mistakes over and over, or to accept falling short as inevitable.

Even with all the empty seats in the room, there was more than enough skill, commitment and energy in the DC to forge a more urgent and robust path. We welcome the opportunity to work with delegations to help the DC become (and communicate the fruits of) a more functional, positive and cost-effective conduit for genuine progress on disarmament.

Disarmament Commission fails for 12th consecutive year

On Thursday, 21 April 2011, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) held its final plenary meeting of the 2011 session, which also marked the final meeting of the latest three year cycle. For the twelfth year in a row, as noted by the European Union in its closing remarks, the Commission was unable to agree to substantive recommendations on any of its three topics.

Member states adopted the final report of the Commission along with the reports of the three working groups: nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, a declaration of the 2010s as the next disarmament decade, and confidence-building measures around conventional weapons. All three reports end with the note that the working group was unable to achieve consensus.

In their closing remarks, several delegations, including Cuba, Mexico, Norway, Spain, and Sweden, expressed concern with the lack of substantive results from the UNDC. While many praised the deliberative nature of the Commission’s work, they also criticized its failure to fulfill its whole mandate, which includes adopting recommendations. The Mexican delegation argued that this paralysis is “inadmissible” when the world is “threatened by nuclear weapons and excessive accumulation of destabilizing conventional weapons.” It concluded that the only tangible consequence of the UNDC has been the expenditure of resources provided by taxpayers around the world.

Law’s Imperative for the Urgent Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

by Dr. John Burroughs, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

Released March 23 by The Simons Foundation and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) and signed by eminent experts in international law and diplomacy, the Vancouver Declaration affirms that nuclear weapons are incompatible with international humanitarian law (IHL). The declaration observes that with their uncontrollable blast, heat, and radiation effects, nuclear weapons are indeed weapons of mass destruction that by their nature cannot comply with fundamental rules forbidding the infliction of indiscriminate and disproportionate harm.

The declaration builds upon the 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmation “of the need for all states at all times to comply with applicable international law, including [IHL],” as well as other developments since the 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on nuclear weapons. They include the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the achievement of treaty bans on landmines and cluster munitions.

In connection with already banned weapons, the declaration observes: “Reasons advanced for the continuing existence of nuclear weapons, including military necessity and case-by-case analysis, were once used to justify other inhumane weapons. But elementary considerations of humanity persuaded the world community that such arguments were outweighed by the need to eliminate them. This principle must now be applied to nuclear weapons, which pose an infinitely greater risk to humanity.” (Emphasis supplied.) The ICJ had made clear the link between illegality and humanitarian values, stating that the broad participation in Hague and Geneva treaties is “undoubtedly” because “a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person and ‘elementary considerations of humanity’.”

The many signatories include Christopher G. Weeramantry, former Vice President of the ICJ and current President of IALANA; Mohammed Bedjaoui, who was ICJ President when it handed down its advisory opinion on nuclear weapons; Louise Doswald-Beck, Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, and co-author of a major International Committee of the Red Cross study of IHL; and Gareth Evans, QC, former Foreign Minister of Australia who recently served as Co-Chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.

Especially in view of its endorsement by former ICJ judges and leading international law scholars, it is noteworthy that the declaration resolves issues the ICJ left for another day. It affirms the universally binding character of the prohibition of reprisals against civilian populations, vindicating the position taken by Mexico before the ICJ: “Torture is not a permissible response to torture. Nor is mass rape acceptable retaliation to mass rape. Just as unacceptable is retaliatory deterrence—‘You have burnt my city, I will burn yours.’” The declaration similarly affirms the mandatory nature of the prohibition of the infliction of widespread, severe, and long-term damage to the natural environment. It also unreservedly states the unlawfulness of both specific signals of intent to use nuclear weapons and general policies (“deterrence”) declaring a readiness to resort to nuclear weapons when vital interests are at stake.

On his blog disarmingconflict.ca, analyst Ernie Regehr observes that the international community “has been unforgivably slow in fully facing the profound legal questions raised by the possession and threatened use of nuclear weapons,” and praises the Vancouver Declaration for succinctly demonstrating that nuclear disarmament is “not only an urgent political objective and moral imperative, but also an unambiguous legal requirement.” That requirement should now more than ever be central to deliberations of the Disarmament Commission and other governmental bodies charged with achieving peace and security through disarmament.

An urgent decade

by Dr. Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War

The opening sessions of the UN Disarmament Commission were punctuated by procedural issues, a few misplaced comments from 2010, and many expressions of urgency that the DC conduct its work more effectively and build, as France's delegation noted, “a safer world for all.”

Many delegations raised the urgency issue in the early days of the DC: in the context of addressing nuclear weapons; of revitalizing disarmament structure; and of fulfilling commitments on disarmament to an anxious world.

In English, when we think of ‘urgency’ two things come to mind. The first usually occurs in relation to some situation in the world requiring immediate attention. With relevance to the DC we can cite the multi-lateral bodies which, as India noted, are running out of time; to the elimination of weapons that continue to threaten populations, drain resources, and exacerbate development crises; to the energies and resources of UN officials and member states which are being deployed in challenging and sometimes frustrating circumstances.

The second and related sense of ‘urgent’ has to do less with objective circumstances and more with our own responsibilities. The ‘facts’ of a militarized world, including unregulated transfers, unmanaged stockpiles and unbridled spending, create objective conditions for urgency. But so do the expectations of families, friends, neighbors, constituents and more. The public sense that it is high time – even past time – to move together resolutely towards general and complete disarmament weighs heavily on many in the diplomatic community.

There is urgency from within as well as from without that motivates the language that we use to define our most challenging disarmament tasks.

To many observers, the ‘decade’ question in the DC might appear to be a classic example of ‘low-hanging fruit.’ Absent concrete benchmarks on negative security assurances, WMD-free zones, the regulation of arms transfers, or key provisions of the PoA, the ‘decade’ would seem (especially to those who have lived through previous iterations) to be as much a substitute for movement on weapons as an inspiration for that movement. This characterization may not be fair, but it is relevant to how the DC is perceived, and it is something that we all have power to change.

Of the many synonyms conjured up for the English term ‘urgency,’ the two that seem most relevant are ‘compelling’ and ‘burning.’ The compelling part is related to the millions of weapons – so many of them unregulated -- that threaten our security and even our very existence. The burning part is related more to us – the sense that we have the skill and the will to do more in the name of that ‘safer world’ that so many people in our countries and communities clamor for. This is the urgency of responsibility which diplomats – and those of us who seek to support their disarmament work – must be more mindful of.

Urgency is an important dimension of disarmament efforts and the diplomats were wise to raise it. The reminder is that it is public expectation and not only objective circumstance that drives these challenging efforts. Whatever number and title we eventually give to a resolution on this ‘decade,’ it is most assuredly an urgent one.

The next open meeting of the UNDC will be on Friday, 22 April and a final post will be published then to report on the Commission's work this year.

UNDC Day Three: Work on the draft declaration begins

by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On the third day of the UN Disarmament Commission’s 2011 session, Working Group II (the only working group with a Chair, and hence, the only working group currently able to convene), started its work on elements of a draft declaration for the fourth disarmament decade.

Armed with a compilation of a Chair’s draft from 2009 and amendments from 2010, the delegations present for the meetings today started going through the proposed elements paragraph by paragraph. The text offered options between elements proposed in 2009 and amendments proposed in 2010 and also welcomed the introduction of new text. Work advanced slowly as delegates tried to reach consensus on precise wording. While for the most part suggestions were limited to minor tweaks, there were a few substantive areas of disagreement.

Most notable was the French’s delegations efforts to eliminate specific references to nuclear disarmament from the principles and objectives portion of the declaration as well as from the section on weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

For example, in the section on principles and objectives, the French delegation argued strongly against any specific reference to nuclear disarmament (1.2a and 1.2b), while most other delegates argued that it is a not only a priority for most member states but is also timely, given the increased attention to the issue over the last few years. Further, in the section on WMD, the French delegations suggested that instead of reaffirming and mobilizing efforts to translate into reality the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and other WMD within a specified timeframe (2.1.a), the declaration should use much vaguer, non-committal language, such as, “to seek a safer world for all and to create conditions a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the NPT, in a way that promotes international stability, based on the principle of undiminished security for all....” The UK delegation supported this proposal, while most others who commented on it emphasized their preference for maintaining the language proposed in 2010 (2.1.a).

Overall, it appears there are major substantive differences over what delegations want this declaration to say. The vast majority, however, seemed to agree with Brazil’s representative, who argued that the declaration needs to be something that government’s can show their publics, to demonstrate that they are in fact discussing nuclear disarmament seriously, and that they are moving forward on the issue, without necessarily getting into detail. The Chair and several other delegations emphasized the importance of producing a concise text that conveys a general spirit of progress on disarmament issues rather than one that hashes out precise approaches or commits states to a particular path—as the Norwegian delegation reminded everyone, there are other working groups in this very Commission that are mandated to develop more specific recommendations on nuclear and conventional weapon issues.

Working Group II will resume its discussion on the draft elements on Friday. Tomorrow, Working Group I, on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, will begin its work.

UNDC Day Two: Laying the groundwork for consensus

by Katherine Prizeman, Global Action to Prevent War

The second day of General Debate at the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) was characterized by another broad discussion on the three agenda items for the 2011 session—nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the draft elements for the fourth disarmament decade, and confidence-building measures in the field conventional weapons—with heavy emphasis, once again, on the nuclear issue. The delegations of Egypt, Nepal, Indonesia, Switzerland, India, France, Cuba, Russia, Liechtenstein, and Mexico offered statements.

In terms of nuclear weapons, Egypt’s delegation expressed concern over the lack of progress on disarmament made by the five nuclear weapon states. The Egyptian delegate called for a greater synergy between the twin pillars of non-proliferation and disarmament. Nepal’s delegation addressed the lack of economic and social progress, notably the failure to abate extreme poverty, as the context for its own call for disarmament. Likewise, the Cuban delegation underscored the annual accelerated growth of military expenditures, which compromise economic and social development. Liechtenstein’s representative highlighted the connection between disarmament, non-proliferation, international human rights, and humanitarian law, declaring that the ultimate goal of disarmament is to ‘prevent human suffering.’

The adoption of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by the two states with the largest nuclear arsenals was also praised by several delegations, including Indonesia. Russia, however, made it known that it and the US should not shoulder all the burden of nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, Russia’s delegation argued that in order to discuss further nuclear reductions, there must be a ‘favorable international environment’ for such negotiations.

Emphasis on the nuclear issue was shared by India whose delegate declared that nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority for the Non-Aligned Movement as well as for its own national policy. The Indian delegate lamented that the international community is nowhere near achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament and no closer than it was in 1988 when the then-Indian Prime Minister presented an Action Plan for a Nuclear Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World Order.

Comments on the draft elements for a fourth disarmament decade (the 2010s) were varied and included calls for convening the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-IV) as well as calls to emphasize the priority of nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. Nonetheless, there was general consensus that there should be substantive discussions on the revised draft from the previous year and renewed efforts to reach consensus on elements that provide elusive in 2010. Other delegations gave cursory reference to the disarmament decade, such as Cuba’s, which called for a declaration that mobilizes general efforts to face current disarmament challenges.

The implementation of the UN Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (UNPoA) also received attention by several delegations. There were several calls for using this existing UN framework more robustly to deal with illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. Switzerland made particular reference to the link between illegal and uncontrolled trafficking in conventional arms and armed conflict, which in turn leads to a lack of human security and peace. The Swiss delegate explained that the existing disarmament bodies do not seem to be able to find answers to these challenges. According to the Swiss delegation, such ‘deadlocks’ must be addressed, perhaps through a revitalization and re-organization of the UNDC or of the disarmament machinery as a whole.

Despite Switzerland’s disappointment with the current disarmament machinery, there were some positive assessments of the potential of existing UN disarmament structure. The French delegate expressed support for the upcoming Meeting of Governmental Experts in May 2011 on the themes of marking, tracking, and registering of small arms and light weapons as part of implementation of the UNPoA. Russia also declared support for the UN Register of Conventional Arms as the ‘only global instrument of transparency to keep close watch on destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms.’ Liechtenstein identified transparency as one of the most important confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons. In this light, reporting to the UN Register was strongly encouraged by Liechtenstein.

The last two days have offered a glimpse into the wide variety of perspectives on disarmament among delegations. Member states are using the opportunity provided by the UNDC to underscore the areas of disarmament they feel most committed to and outline their vision of what the UNDC could and should accomplish. However, as the General Debate comes to a close, the real work begins towards consensus on recommendations to be sent in advance to the First Committee. The three Working Groups must take seriously their deliberations with a view towards clear, practical, and concrete recommendations relevant to the three agenda items, rather than engaging in repetitive musings on general issues of peace and security.