Nuclear disarmament panorama: an assessment

by Sergio Duarte

A familiar pattern seen in multilateral disarmament efforts, prevalent since the mid 1990s, also seems to have established itself in the review process of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Commenting on the result of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT 2015 Review Conference, last May, an assiduous and perceptive observer wrote: “This is a typical outcome of NPT meetings, because the review cycle is a process that favors the status quo by pit­ting possible forward momentum against maintaining the ‘stability’ of the ‘regime’. But this status quo is seen as increasingly untenable to the majority of states parties”. A similar assessment can be made about the multilateral nuclear disarmament process as a whole. 
 

Direct action at First Committee

by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

First Committee is set to begin once again in the midst of dynamic and dangerous times. The relevance of its mandate, disarmament and international security, is as pressing as ever. Looking around the world today one can see mounting regional and international tensions, civil wars and revolutions, increasing armed violence, and, overshadowing us all, the threat of nuclear weapons. High levels of military spending, weapons production, trade, and stockpiling, and armed conflict undermine the key objective of the United Nations: preserving international peace and security. Yet one can also see many examples of ordinary people trying to rein back the violence, overcome militarism, and achieve peace.

Reflections on the UN General Assembly general debate 2012

by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) held its general debate from 25 September–1 October. The theme for this year’s debate, set by UNGA President Vuk Jeremić of Serbia, was “adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations by peaceful means”. In his open remarks he specified, “A solution to an international problem can be legitimately achieved only upon renunciation of unilateralism; it can become truly sustainable only when its provisions are willingly accepted and fulfilled in good faith.” 

UN General Assembly plenary on the CD

The UN General Assembly plenary meetings indicate that while the international diplomatic community is frustrated over the continued deadlock, the majority of countries—including many of those in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and most of permanent five members of the UN Security Council (P5)—appear unwilling to consider actions that could potentially disrupt the status quo.

Judging by their statements to the plenary meetings, neither the majority of NAM countries (assuming that the NAM statement delivered on 27 July reflects the position of most NAM countries) nor most of the P5 (with the exception of the United States) have signaled willingness to start negotiations on any of the CD’s four core issues outside of the CD. At the same time, most of the NAM and at least two of the P5 (China and Russia) are also opposed to reforming the CD’s working methods or rules of procedure.

(Note: Despite issuing a collective statement on this topic that indicated unwillingness to reform or circumvent the CD, the NAM’s position on this matter cannot be considered uniform. Several members of the Movement spoke in their individual capacity with remarks contradictory to this position, including Chile, Colombia, the Philippines, and South Africa. Based on this sample, it could be concluded that other NAM states may also disagree with the umbrella NAM statement.)

Most countries argue that the problem with the CD is not procedural but political. They’re not wrong. The CD has, in the past, managed to negotiate international disarmament and arms control treaties, with the same working methods it operates under today. Furthermore, with all nuclear weapon-possessors currently undertaking or planning modernization programmes for their nuclear weapon arsenals, delivery systems, and related facilities, it is clear that genuine political will to achieve nuclear disarmament is a missing key ingredient.

However, the solution of continuing to call for “more political will,” after fifteen years without negotiations, is like calling for another bucket of water to put out a fire that’s been blazing for months. What is needed is a massive downpour, a change in climate—or in the case of the CD, a fundamental shift of governmental thinking around disarmament, arms control, and national security.

Many of the states delivering statements to the plenary meetings recognize this. The Costa Rican and Swiss delegations in particular emphasized the need for a new approach to these critical topics.

“We are living in a global, interdependent world that faces as a community a multitude of disarmament and non-proliferation challenges,” said Swiss Counsellor Serge Bavaud. “It is important to move from one-dimensional approaches to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation to more holistic approaches.” He also noted, “It is critical to recognize that disarmament and nonproliferation affect numerous areas of concern to the international community besides peace and security, notably human security and human rights, development, the environment and health to name just a few. Only if we further include these aspects will we be able to confront the challenges we are facing.”

Similarly, Costa Rica’s Ambassador Eduardo Ulibarri said that “disarmament is not an isolated event of an exclusively militaristic nature. It is an organic process that interests and affects us all, and in which we must constantly advance through productive negotiations.”Arguing that “an essentially militaristic approach on security and disarmament could bring us closer to arms regulation and the control of international arsenals, but never to global disarmament,” he urged that “any action taken in the process of revitalization and restructuring of the multilateral disarmament negotiations must prioritize a focus on human security.”

Highlighting the relationship between human rights, international law, and disarmament and arms control, Ambassador Ulibarri also suggested that the CD “could begin to interact and cooperate with the bodies in charge of the promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law, with the goal of carrying out a more effective follow up to the fulfillment of the States’ duties in those subjects in light of their commitments to disarmament.” For example, “the fulfillment of the agreements on disarmament [should] be incorporated as a variable to the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council.”

The NAM itself recognized the need for a paradigm shift, arguing that part of realizing a world free of nuclear weapons will require the “colossal global expenditures and energies” devoted by nuclear weapon-possessors to the “possession, development and modernization of nuclear weapons” to instead be “used to further global development and peace.”

Yet for the most part, discussions related to the substantive work of the CD continue to be firmly predicated on a narrow, traditional view of “national security”.

At the plenary meeting, as it has before, Pakistan’s delegation stated, “No treaty can be negotiated in the CD which is contrary to the security interests of any of its member states.”

Indeed, this has been held as a truism in the CD—and not just by Pakistan. The US delegation is single-handedly blocking negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and during the Bush administration, it blocked negotiations on an FMCT because of the inclusion of verification in the negotiating mandate. The US and Pakistani administrations both relied on the argument that such treaties would undermine their security interests.

However, how can a government possibly know this before negotiations even begin, let alone conclude? Pakistan is not the only country with concerns about negotiating a fissile material treaty that does not include stocks. However, those others are willing to engage in negotiations and to insist on the inclusion of stocks in due course. If the treaty does not, in the end, include stocks, delegations can walk away from negotiations at any time, or refuse to ratify the resulting treaty. But stating that a treaty that does not yet exist undermines one’s national security in fact undermines the principles of good faith, multilateralism, and collective security. Furthermore, blocking negotiations of treaties on such critical matters as disarmament and non-proliferation threatens the national security interests of the majority of the countries in the world, especially since, as Ireland’s delegation noted, small states that depend on the rule of law and international treaties to ensure their security.

Pakistan’s delegation is not wrong that the FMCT sought by the majority of nuclear weapon-possessors is indeed “cost free” for those that already possess major stocks of fissile materials. This makes it all the more important to negotiate the treaty in a multilateral forum where the interests of all states, including those that do not possess any fissile materials at all, are on the table.

Pakistan’s delegation is also not wrong that the US, which is now open to options outside the CD for negotiating the FMCT, at one time firmly rejected taking any issues outside the CD when it was the sole obstacle to progress in that forum. But just as the United States was incorrect in 2005, in saying that taking the issues of the CD will “retard the very international non-proliferation and disarmament objectives that [those countries] want to advance,” Pakistan is likewise incorrect about that now.

Ambassador Ulibarri of Costa Rica described the CD as “going through the ‘illusion of disarmament’,” arguing, “It is the illusion that destroying certain weapons signifies an advance, despite their being immediately replaced by more powerful ones; it is the illusion of proscribing certain weapons because the strategic advantage they may have is exponentially inferior to the one offered by newer and more advanced ones; it is the illusion of fulfilling the requirements of civil society, when the only result is a paralyzed and paralyzing process.”

The states that are most actively seeking to break this status quo of illusion and paralysis do not want to “circumvent” the CD so that they can “get their way”. These states are also not pursuing action simply for the sake of negotiating an FMCT—most of them actually probably prefer negotiations directly on nuclear disarmament. Rather, these states seek to break through the rigid conception of national security and pursue collective security, human security in a multilateral forum that respects the views and concerns of all states but does not allow the interests of the few to outweigh the interests of the many.

Mr. Bavaud of the Swiss delegation argued, “Our institutions should not be based upon, and continuously favor, a clearly outdated conception of an all-prevailing national security paradigm.” Instead, he called for “institutions that are designed to produce results and do not favor the preservation of the status quo. They must be both responsive and preventive and thus be able to produce the instruments needed to address current as well as future challenges.”

Furthermore, those that seek to reform the CD and/or go outside the body to begin negotiations do believe that political will is essential. They do not assume that taking up negotiations in a different venue will magically eliminate the political problems faced by the CD. However, as Ambassador Alexander Kmentt, Austria’s Director for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, argued, “political will can also be created through process.” That is, “by starting to address the issues that have been stuck on the CD agenda for all these years,” states that are resistant to engage can be encouraged to join in by the reality of the international community moving along without them. This has been seen in other negotiation process and with treaty ratifications. Furthermore, a different negotiating environment or under different working methods could enable states to find new compromises and overcome some of the political difficulties currently facing the CD.

Before the plenary meetings, Reaching Critical Will and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy drafted a possible formulation to advance multilateral disarmament negotiations. We suggest that the UN General Assembly establish two open-ended working groups: one on nuclear disarmament and the other on prevention of an arms race in outer space. The open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament could have three main committees: a convention or framework agreement on nuclear disarmament; fissile materials; and negative security assurances and the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons.

In addition to cutting off future production for weapons purposes, we argue that an agreement on fissile materials must prevent the use of existing materials, civilian and military, in weapons, and contribute directly to irreversible disarmament. Its negotiation must not be treated as a step to be completed before negotiations on elimination of nuclear forces are commenced. A convention or framework agreement on nuclear disarmament could have a protocol on fissile materials, or provide for its subsequent negotiation. The policy of sequentialism, which has not proved to be an efficient way to achieve nuclear disarmament, must be abandoned, and a policy of integration and parallelism adopted.

As many delegations have pointed out over the years, the FMCT is not the only item “ripe” for negotiation. The majority of CD member states appear ready to work on any of the other core issues of the CD’s agenda—very few would block the commencement of negotiation on any particular issue, even if they might prefer one over another.

There are also actions that can be undertaken while the international community establishes some sort of negotiating framework. As the European Union urged, all nuclear weapon possessors should declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. In our joint paper, RCW and LCNP suggest that until a fissile material treaty is negotiated, all nuclear weapon possessors should act as if it is already in force, as they do with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. All states possessing nuclear weapons should also engage in collaborative transparency and verification measures regarding their fissile material production facilities and stockpiles in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Furthermore, as the Costa Rican delegation suggested, “To build trust and signal good intentions in order to achieve the commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament or a parallel process, nuclear weapons States should drop their plans for modernization, replacement, refurnishing and upgrading of these arsenals and their facilities, amongst others.” Ambassador Ulibarri argued, small reductions of nuclear weapons are not conducive to disarmament when they “command robust resources towards the research and modernization of facilities capable of maintaining or multiplying these threats.”

The question now is what happens next. Almost every single delegation taking the floor at the plenary meetings said they wanted to revitalize the CD. It is unclear what this means to those delegations that do not wish to reform its working methods or rules of procedure. Unfortunately, many of the delegations participating on the plenary meetings did not offer concrete proposals for moving forward, leaving uncertainty about what will be tried—and what will succeed—at the UN General Assembly in a few months time. The US and UK indicated that the P5 would be engaging in consultations ahead of the next UNGA, and it’s clear that many non-nuclear weapon states are interested in pursuing something concrete during First Committee in October. But if a decision is not made before the end of year about what should happen with the CD and with multilateral disarmament negotiations, are we doomed to waste another year in 2012? There seems to be very little to be done in terms of “revitalization” if states are unwilling to change the way the CD operates or to consider creative, alternative methods and venue of work. It is the sincere hope of civil society that the states take a bold step this year by taking a concrete decision at the General Assembly’s upcoming session to begin multilateral negotiations with an integrated approach that links disarmament and non-proliferation to human security.

President Obama's Nuclear "Surge"

The Obama administration released its budget for FY 2011 today.

The centerpiece of the budget's National Nuclear Security Administration section is a "surge."

You can read about president Obama's $5 billion dollar nuke spending hike by downloading the NNSA budget. According to the administration they are boosting spending on nuclear weapons by 9.8% this year, with larger increases in outyears, so as to "take steps toward achieving a world without nuclear weapons" (p. 7).

Here's an excerpt (emphases added):

"Weapons Activities: The request for this appropriation is $7.0 billion, an increase of 9.8 percent over the FY 2010 appropriated level. This level is sustained and increased in the later outyears. Increased funding is requested for programs in direct support of the nuclear weapon stockpile, for scientific, technical and engineering activities related to maintenance assessment and certification capabilities for the stockpile, and for critical infrastructure improvements" (p. 9).

By "critical infrastructure improvements" the administration means the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Faciltiy planned for Los Alamos Lab, and the Uranium Processing Facility being built at Y-12 in Tennessee. The first is essentially a plutonium pit factory costing several billion. The second will provide uranium for US nuclear weapons programs, also at a cost of several billion. Neither facility is needed to "maintain" the stockpile, especially if the US is poised to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Both of these projects are necessary to lock-in nuclear weapons spending at the labs for many decades, and fully commit the US to nuclear weapons, regardless of how well international treaty discussions might go.

The importance of these facilities is emphasized in the NNSA's budget request:

"The President’s Request includes funding to complete the design and begin construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement (CMRR) nuclear facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. This facility conducts plutonium research and development and provides analytical capabilities in support of pit surveillance and production. Current planning would have this facility fully operational by 2022. A related project is requested to increase pit production capacity and capability at the adjoining PF-4 facility that is part of the main plutonium facility at Los Alamos to demonstrate pit reuse by 2017 and production by 2018-2020. The budget request also includes funding to complete the design and begin construction of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex to support production and surveillance of highly-enriched uranium components. This facility is also planned to achieve full operations by 2022" (p. 11).

The Obama administration's budget also appears to be easing the way for design efforts of new weapons at the laboratories, something that was resisted under the Bush White House's tenure. The NNSA budget states that;

"The President’s Request provides funding necessary to protect and advance the scientific capabilities at the U.S. national security laboratories — including the ability to design nuclear warheads as well as development and engineering expertise and capabilities— through a stockpile stewardship program that fully exercises these capabilities" (p. 10).

More spending for more disarmament?

In a third op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, the “four horsemen”—Schultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn (SPKN)—advocate for increased spending on nuclear weapons. Surprised? You shouldn’t be. As others have pointed out, “their work reflects a pragmatic strategy to maintain U.S. military and economic dominance well into the 21st century, resulting in the formation of a new intellectual paradigm perhaps best described as ‘anti-nuclear imperialism.’” The institutional loyalties of SPKN and their larger political agendas reflect a political economy that is not only fundamentally at odds with nuclear abolition, but is anathema to peace and justice.

Further evidence of this can be found in their 19 January 2010 op-ed, wherein they argue that as we “work to realize the vision of a world without nuclear weapons,” significant investments “are urgently needed to undo the adverse consequences of deep reductions over the past five years in the laboratories’ budgets for the science, technology and engineering programs that support and underwrite the nation’s nuclear deterrent.”

This misleading claim ignores the fact that while the US nuclear weapons budget has been reduced by about $1 billion over the past five years, this followed an increase over a decade (1995–2005) of about $3 billion. Instead, SPKN aim to support their friends at the labs in the expected request for increased funding for nuclear weapons in the FY 2011 budget. Indeed, SPKN argue, “The United States must continue to attract, develop and retain the outstanding scientists, engineers, designers and technicians we will need to maintain our nuclear arsenal, whatever its size, for as long as the nation’s security requires it.”

This statement assumes a lot. It assumes that the United States relies on, and will indefinitely continue to rely on, nuclear weapons for its security. It does not explain whose security nuclear weapons protect in the United States. Its citizens? Or its technocratic elite—the same people who work at the labs that SPKN and others who are part of that elite structure so vigorously defend? “National security,” as it is typically invoked in this sense, does not refer to the well-being of the general population but of those managing the military-industrial-academic complex.

The above statement also assumes that those who design, build, and maintain nuclear weapons have a right to continue doing this work—and what does that say about the possibilities for ever eliminating nuclear weapons throughout the world?

Andrew Lichterman of the Western States Legal Foundation has written extensively about the US nuclear weapon labs. In a recent article, he argues:

The constellation of organizations that constitute the nuclear weapons complex sits close to the apex of global power and privilege, and the upper echelon inhabitants of those organizations are quite determined to hold on to what they have. Nuclear weapons establishments, in fact, are preeminent manifestations of how far those in power will go to preserve it—they will play dice with all humanity, even all life on earth. The nature of the institutions ultimately can not be separated from the purposes and practices that have shaped them since their inception. Born in secrecy and sequestered throughout their existence within the least accountable sector of American government, the nuclear weapons laboratories and the broader nuclear weapons complex have become powerful institutions in their own right. They have done so by using all the tools that the powerful have developed in this society for staving off democracy—control of information and technologies, propaganda, and alliances with other huge organizations in common strategies aimed at extracting a steady and expanding stream of wealth from the rest of the economy. There is no way to provide the upper level denizens of the nuclear weapons establishment—the scientists and engineers, the technocrats, bureaucrats, and propagandists—with some other pursuit that gives them a similarly “rewarding” position in society, unless we can come up with some other set of “missions” that can assure them of an equally comfortable, secure, and largely unaccountable place in the upper few percent of a national and global economy characterized by stark disparities in wealth. And why should we want to do that?

Finally, SPKN frame their call for increased weapons spending in the context of disarmament—if we want to achieve a nuclear weapon free world, we need to make sure that our nuclear weapons are “safe, secure, and reliable” (that they remain an “effective deterrent” to others) until we achieve that world. This is outrageously circular logic. Modernized or “refurbished” nuclear weapons research and production facilities capable of building the nuclear threat anew, as a trade-off for arms control treaties or arsenal reductions, is not disarmament. If the danger of nuclear war is to be eliminated, ceasing to plan and build for an eternal nuclear threat must come early, not late, in the process. The “nuclear danger” does not come from without, but from within. To seek to “hedge” against the nuclear threat only perpetuates it, sustaining the global climate of fear and distrust that makes real disarmament progress always a receding goal.

Operationalising the vision for a nuclear weapon free world

Presented by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will, at the UNGA First Committee, 23 October 2009

For more than sixty years, civil society has been calling on governments to take action to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons. US President Obama’s pledge in Prague to seek “a world free of nuclear weapons” brought the hope of billions of people to the highest levels of international responsibility.

We have chosen in this statement not to comment in detail on specific resolutions that the First Committee has before it, but to talk about how nuclear disarmament interconnects with other weapons and security challenges in today’s complex security environment and to put forward a few concrete ideas toward operationalising the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.

First, some interconnections.

At the DPI/NGO conference in Mexico City in September, 1300 participants representing over 340 NGOs from more than 55 countries endorsed a final declaration recognising that security, peace, disarmament, human rights, gender equality, and development are closely interconnected at the local national, regional, and global levels.

One important element underscoring all of these issues is military spending. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, global military expenditure in 2008 is estimated to have totaled $1464 billion. This represents an increase of 45 per cent in the past ten years. The US military expenditure has reached the highest level in real terms since World War II. It is now responsible for at least 40 per cent of total global military spending.

Nuclear weapons, and the wider global military-industrial complex, consume vast resources that could be put to better use.

Consider just one example. The head of the UN Climate Change Secretariat Yvo De Boer estimated recently that the annual cost of cutting global emissions of greenhouse gases will be $200 billion. It will cost another US$100 billion per year to cope with the effects of climate change. This means that just one-fifth of annual global military spending budget can help reduce the scale and worldwide consequences of climate change.

Nuclear weapons cannot help us address climate change, poverty, child mortality, or injustice. Instead, they act as an existential threat to humanity and life on this planet. They also maintain the structural inequalities between the nuclear-armed powers and the great majority of states, and incite some states to seek nuclear weapons. They support establishments and institutions that see their interests as being well served by a mode of military dominance ultimately underwritten by nuclear weapons. They do not provide security for the citizens of the world.

Civil society groups and many states have long recognised the need to develop more effective resources and tools for security, defence, and conflict resolution than weapons. We advocate pursuit of human security, through the advancement of the interconnected issues above. However, none of the interconnecting issues should be treated as preconditions for nuclear disarmament. In fact, there is no basis for demanding general and complete disarmament or a settlement of all regional disputes as preconditions for eliminating nuclear weapons. The pursuit of nuclear disarmament and achievement of a legally-binding regime that eliminates and prohibits nuclear weapons will greatly facilitate global security and efforts to build peace.

Which leads us to a few suggestions on how to operationalise the vision for a world free of nuclear weapons.

There are many resolutions before you on various aspects of nuclear weapons. We join in supporting many of these efforts, including bringing the CTBT into force, reinforcing the existing nuclear weapon free zones and promoting the establishment of additional zones in Europe and the Arctic as well as the Middle East and North-East Asia, reducing and eliminating strategic and non-strategic arsenals, and fulfilling the NPT disarmament commitments undertaken in 1995 and 2000.

The common factor preventing progress on all these issues is that some governments continue to place high value on nuclear weapons, whether for security, status, or power projection.

When leaders come to the UN General Assembly and Security Council and say they want a nuclear weapon free world, we have to ask how they are changing their policies and doctrines to make this possible. The most conducive path to such a world is for all of the nuclear weapon states to marginalise the role of nuclear weapons in concrete ways, such as by:

• agreeing to legally-binding security assurances not to attack non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons;

• committing not to use nuclear weapons as a tool for “pre-emptive strike”;

• rejecting counterforce and countervalue doctrines; and

• excluding “extended deterrence” arrangements in their doctrines;

• declaring that as a matter of national policy they will not design, develop, or produce new design nuclear warheads or modernise existing warheads.

Trading some arms control agreements or arsenal reduction for modernised nuclear weapons research and production facilities capable of building the nuclear threat anew is not disarmament. If the danger of nuclear war is to be eliminated, ceasing to plan and build for an eternal nuclear threat must come early, not late, in the process. The “nuclear danger” does not come from without, but from within. To seek to “hedge” against the nuclear threat only perpetuates it, sustaining the global climate of fear and distrust that makes real disarmament progress always a receding goal.

To this end, it is good that the United States and Russian Federation have returned to the negotiating table to replace START. The NPT Review Conference should include commitment to further bilateral reductions. In the next round, the United States and Russian Federation should each cut their deployed and stored nuclear weapons and delivery systems to at least the low hundreds. This would facilitate multilateral negotiations on elimination. They should also cut their nuclear weapon budgets in half and commit to zero funding for any modernisation or refurbishment programmes.

Furthermore, it is important not to be mesmerised by negotiations, which can be derailed by domestic or international developments. The United States and Russia, and other states with nuclear weapons, can and should undertake unilateral reductions, as the 13 Practical Steps provide.

Many non-nuclear weapon states also have a role to play. Thirty non-nuclear weapon states shelter under the US nuclear umbrella. Citizens in NATO countries, Australia, South Korea, and Japan have long advocated for their countries to let go of the cold war nuclear umbrellas and forge more independent and balanced relationships for national, regional, and international security. Now key legislators from all these countries are joining the call. We urge governments to heed these calls and act to denuclearise their alliances and relations with other states. Many proponents of retaining nuclear weapons in the United States espouse “extended deterrence” as their justification. Public statements from governments under the US nuclear umbrella stating that they believe their security commitments will still be viable without nuclear weapons would thus remove a key obstacle to deeper reductions in the US nuclear arsenal. Removing nuclear sharing from NATO’s Strategic Concept, combined with removal of nuclear weapons from Europe, would be an important confidence-building measure and would likely facilitate bilateral dialogue that could lead to much deeper cuts in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals.

Like many of you, we welcomed that the UN Security Council held a special session this September on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. While Resolution 1887 included concrete operational commitments to help prevent nuclear proliferation and other kinds of nuclear insecurity, it failed to include similarly concrete measures to advance disarmament. Disarmament cannot take a back seat to non-proliferation, nor can measures undertaken to prevent proliferation be considered acts of disarmament.

We hope that the cooperation forged among the P5 in the drafting of this resolution will continue and grow to engage non-nuclear weapon states, and that the P5 and other nuclear weapon possessors will find similar unity of purpose in implementing specific disarmament measures.

To this end, all states interested in serious nuclear disarmament should, inter alia:

• Oppose conditioning approval of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on deals for entrenching and expanding weapons complexes, on retaining the option of designing and manufacturing modified or new-design warheads, or on modernizing delivery systems. They should also call for the closure of all nuclear test sites.

• Negotiate for a fissile materials treaty that comprehensively prevents use of existing materials outside military programs for weapons acquisition and that facilitates disarmament.

• Immediately and forcefully convey to nuclear weapon possessors that they must reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines and in international relations.

• Support UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s call, in his five-point plan for nuclear disarmament, for the possession of any weapon of mass destruction to be considered a ‘global taboo’.

• Emphasise that it would be a crime against humanity if anyone were to use nuclear weapons, anywhere in the world, for any purpose whatsoever. In this context, we applaud the decision of the International Committee of the Red Cross to speak out on nuclear weapons during this First Committee session.

• Commit to the objective of a Nuclear Weapons Convention and begin the process that will lead towards this objective. Those that are states parties to the NPT should put this commitment into their statements and papers to the 2010 Review Conference and push for it to be included in any final documents.

Civil society experts developed a model Nuclear Weapons Convention some years ago as a resource and guide, with suggestions and options for how to prohibit, reduce, and eliminate nuclear weapons safely and securely, while providing insurance against future break-outs. This model Convention has been circulated by the Secretary-General as an official UN document.

There are some who say that it is premature to consider a Nuclear Weapons Convention at this time. Work on a Nuclear Weapons Convention will ensure full implementation of the NPT and help facilitate nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation steps.

Abolishing nuclear weapons will help move the world away from a system of competing nation-states seeking military advantage and open the way to putting real, equitable, environmentally sustainable, human security interests at the centre of national policies.

Victor Hugo wrote that: “More powerful than the march of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come.” The idea whose time has come is that the abolition of nuclear weapons is not only desirable, but possible, achievable, practical, and urgently necessary.

UN Security Council: Working toward a nuclear weapon free world?

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Full report and other materials available online

Yesterday, US President Obama chaired a UN Security Council meeting on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It was a great opportunity for the five permanent members and nuclear weapon states—China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States—to make concrete commitments to nuclear disarmament and lay out the steps toward a nuclear weapon free world.

Unfortunately, these governments instead used the Summit to lay out their vision for stricter requirements for non-nuclear weapon states to prove they are not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. As UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown said during his General Assembly statement: “Britain will insist that the onus on non-nuclear states is that in future it is for them to prove they are not developing nuclear weapons.”

Yet despite rhetoric to the contrary, the five permanent members did not extend any new commitments for themselves to eliminate nuclear weapons in compliance with their legal obligation to do so.

• The Summit resolution emphasised non-proliferation over disarmament, requesting new requirements for non-nuclear weapon states to prove their status and intent.


• Most of the nuclear weapon states did not reference their previous commitments to steps toward nuclear disarmament nor set out new ones.


• The Summit promoted nuclear power as a safe, clean, source of energy that will help combat climate change.
  

However, many of the non-permanent members of the Council recognised the problem with this approach to non-proliferation and disarmament and outlined several concrete proposals
to advance both agendas in a balanced manner.

Read Reaching Critical Will’s report on the Summit for details of these suggestions!

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom released a statement before the meeting, calling on the UN Security Council members to make serious commitments to disarmament along with their requests on non-proliferation. WILPF continues to call upon Council members—and all other members of the United Nations—to work toward a nuclear free world through real, concrete actions and commitments. For example:

1. The UN Security Council should call for a halt to development, production, design, modernization, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

2. It should also fulfill its commitment to formulate a plan for disarmament with the least diversion of the world’s human and economic resources toward weapons, as it is instructed to do in Article 26 of the UN Charter.

3. The context of all non-proliferation measures should be designed as steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, not toward their indefinite possession by an elite group of states.

4. The UN Security Council should urge governments to accelerate and enlarge their support for development of commercially viable renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy and to phase-out nuclear power, as a measure strengthening both non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

WILPF Statement to the UN Security Council in anticipation of its 24 September 2009 meeting on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) welcomes the UN Security Council Summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament to be held on 24 September 2009. We urge the UN Security Council to use this opportunity to constructively contribute to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by taking steps toward a nuclear weapon free world and the promotion of collective human security and security for all life on this planet.

Ahead of the summit, the US government released a draft resolution for the UN Security Council to consider as an outcome document, which was then consolidated into a revised draft with input from other Council members. WILPF is encouraged by the scope of the document, which covers a wide range of important issues. In particular, WILPF welcomes its recognition of the importance of negative security assurances and nuclear weapon free zone treaties and its commitment to supporting the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency on non-proliferation and safeguards. We are especially pleased with the addition of a preambular paragraph in the revised version that the welcomes and encourages “the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament” (PP23).

However, both versions of the draft resolution focus nearly exclusively on strengthening existing non-proliferation measures and advocating new, more stringent requirements, while at the same time maintaining the status quo (i.e. no progress) on nuclear disarmament.

The only reference to disarmament in the operative paragraphs of the resolution simply reiterates Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (OP4—all references are to the revised version of the resolution, dated 18 September 2009). The references to nuclear weapon free zone treaties (PP13 and PP14), negative security assurances (PP15), and “the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament” (PP11) in the preamble are not accompanied by concrete actions in the operative paragraphs. Neither draft mentions the thirteen practical steps toward nuclear disarmament that was unanimously agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, nor any other nuclear disarmament proposal, such as the UN Secretary-General’s five-point plan for disarmament or an international Nuclear Weapons Convention or framework agreement. In addition, the only reference in the resolution to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is to “monitor closely any situations” involving their proliferation (OP25).

Meanwhile, the draft goes far beyond non-proliferation commitments outlined in the NPT, calling for UN Security Council consideration of all “situations of noncompliance with nonproliferation commitments” (OP1), encouraging states to consider the Additional Protocol a new standard when making nuclear export decisions (OP17), and urging states “to require as a condition of nuclear exports” that IAEA safeguards continue even if the state withdraws from its safeguards agreement (OP16). The first of these demands does not indicate how determinations of non-compliance will be made, or by whom, or which non-proliferation obligations are included in the scope of this demand. In addition, there has of yet been no agreement in the NPT or IAEA frameworks about where or by which methods situations of non-compliance should be dealt with. It is traditionally up to the relevant treaty or organisation to determine these conditions, not external bodies. Furthermore, the resolution does not refer cases of non-compliance with disarmament obligations to the UN Security Council.

The other two non-proliferation examples given above—and several others in the resolution—have been brought up in the NPT context before and have been met with opposition by many non-nuclear weapons states. These measures could indeed be beneficial to strengthening non-proliferation, but they cannot be extended without reciprocal commitments to disarmament.

The obfuscation of several paragraphs in the resolution is also problematic. OP7 “deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.” It is unclear which resolutions are being referred to in this paragraph. None of the UN Security Council resolutions on Iran’s nuclear programme determine that the programme constitutes a “threat to international peace and security.” However, these resolutions are reaffirmed in PP17 of the draft.

PP11 fails to acknowledge that some of the recognised nuclear weapon states have not ratified relevant protocols of some nuclear weapon free zone treaties. In addition, the encouragement of “efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy” in OP9 does not acknowledge the extreme environmental risks of nuclear power or the nuclear fuel cycle or the problems posed by both for the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world.

In order to achieve a meaningful outcome that advances an equitable and secure nuclear weapon free world, WILPF encourages the UN Security Council to call for concrete actions and commitments to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

On disarmament, the UN Security Council should:

• Call for a halt to development, production, design, modernization, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and for the establishment of international controls on delivery systems and anti-missile systems;

• Call for transparency regarding the size and status of nuclear weapon forces;

• Refer to the International Court of Justice’s 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons;

• Call for concrete actions on the 1995 and 2000 NPT decisions and commitments;

• Fulfill its commitment to formulate a plan for nuclear disarmament with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, pursuant to Article 26 of the UN Charter;

• Call upon the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations of a fissile material treaty in 2010 on the basis of the Shannon Mandate and to address the factors that have complicated the negotiation process in the interim months; and

• Call on all nuclear weapon states to drop their reservations to relevant protocols of nuclear weapon free zone treaties and ratify all such treaties.

On non-proliferation, the UN Security Council should ensure that its related requirements and commitments do not exhort the current imbalance between “nuclear have’s and have not’s” by demanding tighter restrictions on the behaviour of non-nuclear weapon states while promising disarmament by the nuclear weapon states as an “ultimate” goal in the distant future. The context of all non-proliferation measures should designed as steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, not toward their indefinite possession by an elite group of states.

On nuclear energy, the UN Security Council should urge governments to accelerate and enlarge their support for development of commercially viable renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy and to phase-out nuclear power, as a measure strengthening both non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.