Engendering New Nonproliferation Research and Viewpoints?

That military matters and foreign policy tend to be dominated by men is hardly news. Built into the military are institutionalized hierarchies favoring male leadership. The civilian leadership structures also favor male leaders over female. Furthermore, while shallow, first-wave feminism has been adopted in many state and military institutions, deeper (transformative) understandings of feminism remain exiled.

The same gender inequalities seen in the state and military operate within the scholarly communities that exist to study national security theories and state policy.

This quick and dirty analysis of content in the Nonproliferation Review, a leading arms control journal, demonstrates an extreme gender imbalance. By counting the gender of authors of articles, viewpoints, and interviews in every NPR issue since 1994 it is observable that 84% of authors are men while only 16% are women. Men were published no less than 400 times while women were published only 74 times. See figure 1. Furthermore, in some articles women only appear as co-authors, not the principle authors, meaning that the instigators of particular studies appearing in the NPR are even more often men than the 84% figure implies.

In addition to this gross over-representation of male points of view are other problems built into nonproliferation scholarship as represented by the NPR. For example, while the NPR does publish an international roster of authors, the vast majority are US citizens with over-representation from EU nations, especially the UK. Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, and Russian authors also appear, but there is a lack of authors from Africa and much of Latin America. This observer could identify no African American, Latino-American or Native American voices, although there might be several examples. Indigenous voices are virtually non-existent in the pages of the NPR.

There is an over-representation of a set of elite US institutions such as Stanford University's Hoover and CSIS, the University of California, Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Henry L. Stimson Center, MacArthur Foundation, and of course the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterrey Institute of International Studies. Although I did not operationalize and count the representation of institutions, it is apparent that well-funded, centrist to conservative think tanks and academic centers dominate the NPR. They, along with the military and executive branch of government, represent the US nuclear weapons policy formation network. It's lonely at the top, and it's designed to be so.

The absence of certain voices from the pages of publications like the NPR is disconcerting, but not for the obvious reason. Solving this problem does not mean adding women, non-whites, and global-south nations, and stirring. The problems inherent in the tight and high circles that trade ideas in the pages of journals like the NPR are much deeper than that. In a sense, the lack of diversity represents a very real lack of democracy in policy making around nuclear weapons in the US. This is the same in virtually every nuclear nation, of course. The US, however, has by far the largest policy formation network. The ideological weight of the US is hegemonic world-wide and influences the possibilities of scholarship around nuclearism, war and international relations, for good and ill.

Figure 1.

UNDC struggles to elect working group chair

On 20 April 2009, the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) convened to elect vice chairs and chairs for each of the two working groups scheduled to begin this year.

The Commission unanimously elected representatives of Benin and South Africa to serve as UNDC Vice Chairs, and South Africa to serve as chair of the working group on drafting elements for a declaration for the fourth disarmament decade. However, no candidate was nominated to chair the working group on recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. That meetings of that working group have been cancelled until a volunteer steps forward to chair it.

After the chairs were elected, the working group on the draft declaration commenced its work.

Thanks to Martin Cieslik of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy for reporting.

UNDC general statements

After finally adopting its agenda on the morning of 15 April (see previous posts for information on the struggle to adopt the agenda), the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) began hearing general statements from delegations. Few delegations commented on the specific nature of the agenda or the work of the UNDC, except to express hope that this three year cycle would be more productive than the last two. Most outlined their governments’ general positions on all subjects related to disarmament.

A few brief notes

• The US delegate largely quoted from President Obama’s Prague speech and called for the declaration of the fourth disarmament decade to include “a new security paradigm to replace nuclear deterrence as an essential step in creating the conditions for nuclear zero.”
• The Brazilian delegation emphasized the importance of confidence-building measures, which will be taken up by the UNDC in 2010 or 2011, for altering inaccurate perceptions between states, fostering stable political relations, transforming states’ ideas about their security needs, and identifying shared security interests.
  
• The Russian ambassador noted an “inseparable link between strategic offensive and defensive (…anti-missile defense) weapons,” arguing, “It is impossible to succeed in nuclear disarmament if this link is undermined by the unilateral development of strategic [anti-ballistic missile] systems.”
• India’s delegation noted that previous disarmament decades have seen successes such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and expressed hope that the 2010s could bring a Nuclear Weapons Convention.
• China’s delegation observed that the financial crisis has demonstrated the interconnectedness of the world and suggested that multilateralism is on the rise, arguing that only by maintaining mutual trust and cooperation and new outlook on security and insisting on multilateralism can we address variety of challenges.
• Australia’s ambassador lamented that the Chairs of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament were not invited to speak to the UNDC, arguing that the UNDC’s stance against non-government involvement is detrimental to the body’s credibility.
  

Please see the Reaching Critical Will website for more statements and the agenda.

The UNDC will now work within closed working groups for the next two weeks, hopefully taking concrete steps toward fulfilling the items on its agenda. A final plenary meeting will be held on 1 May at which reports from the working groups will be presented.

UNDC Agenda adopted!

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) adopted its agenda immediately upon opening this morning. The text of the agenda, which will be released as an official document tomorrow, reflects the Non-Aligned Movement’s initial proposal—that the UNDC will address the following issues in the following manner:

• Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
• Elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade; and
• Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons, upon conclusion of elements of draft declaration (preferably by 2010 and in any case no later than 2011).

It is unclear to me what exactly allowed the agenda to be adopted this morning but not yesterday or the day before. General statements are now underway and will be posted on the Reaching Critical Will UNDC web page.

UNDC Update: Day 2

The latest meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) ended this evening still without an agenda. The Chair expressed hope that agreement would be possible by tomorrow morning, though some delegates are more skeptical. The Non-Aligned Movement was reportedly unable to agree to the changes suggested by the Chair this morning, and is waiting for a reaction from the US delegation on the NAM proposal, which is still on the table.

The next meeting will be tomorrow at 10:00 AM.

The elusive UNDC agenda

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) agenda still seems to be eluding delegates here in New York as they embark on a second day of negotiations and compromise. The plenary meeting opened at 10:35 AM and was suspended for informal consultations at 10:36 AM. During informals, the Chair introduced a new proposal for the agenda, which specifies that a working group on conventional weapons would start in 2010 regardless of whether the Commission has finished its work on elements for a draft declaration on the fourth Disarmament Decade. The new language also suggests that a resolution could be tabled in the UN General Assembly in October 2009 directing the Commission to direct its work as laid out in the agenda. The Non-Aligned Movement has left Conference Room 4 to work out this language internally and the meeting is expected to resume in 30 minutes or so.

The US delegation has indicated the agenda must be “balanced” and thus must include a working group on conventional weapons at least by 2010. Other delegations wonder if the US delegation even has any instruction from capitol on the matter. The US government has not appointed anyone to deal with multilateral disarmament matters and there the US delegation to the UNDC might not have any instructions to agree to anything. In light of this situation, I have begun to wonder whether the US delegation should simply not participate. In the General Assembly last year, the US delegation chose not to participate in the vote regarding the work of the UNDC rather than register a “no” vote against it. Couldn’t the United States do the same now, rather than block all work in this forum?

Unfortunately, as mentioned in a previous post, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee begins immediately after the UNDC closes at the beginning of May. The 2009 NPT PrepCom is supposed to come up with an agenda for the 2010 NPT Review Conference—the stalemate at the Disarmament Commission does not give anyone a sense of hope for success at the PrepCom.

UNDC Update: Day 1

Unfortunately, the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) was unable to adopt an agenda and the Chair ended the meeting an hour and a half early, after spending most of the day in informal mode (closed to NGOs). The session will resume at 10:00 AM tomorrow morning. (See my previous post for details on the situation.)

At the end of today's meeting, the Non-Aligned Movement articulated its frustration with member states who were unwilling to accept its compromise proposal, which is reportedly:

The Commission would start work this year, in 2009, on elements for a draft declaration on the fourth Disarmament Decade and on recommendations for achieving the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The agenda would also indicate that if the Commission successfully completed the elements on the Disarmament Decade declaration this year, then work on practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons would begin in 2010 and work on the nuclear issues would continue. If the Commission did not conclude the elements on the Disarmament Decade declaration this year, then it would continue in 2010 and the agenda would clearly state that work on conventional weapons issues would start no later than 2011.

This compromise was worked out between the Non-Aligned Movement and France, which had submitted a slightly different proposal. However, after this agreement was made, it appears that the US delegation objected to this formulation. It is unclear to me what exactly the US delegation objects to, though it apparently indicated the formulation would not be approved by Washington, for some reason.

The Chair expressed hope that the Commission would have some “new ideas” by the time it resumed its meeting tomorrow morning, but many delegates are not optimistic that the Commission will be able to make up the time it has already lost, especially those who had hoped to complete work on the elements for the Disarmament Decade declaration this year.

The UNDC is expected to set a tone of compromise, trust, and cooperation for the upcoming nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, which starts immediately after the UNDC finishes in May 2009. Unfortunately, it is so far setting quite a bad example.

Disarmament Commission opens … and is immediately suspended

Today, the first plenary meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is meeting in New York. The Commission has met for three weeks every April since it was established in 1978. This year marks the first year of new three year cycle—the 2006–2008 cycle ended without agreement after three unfruitful years of debate. So far today, the Commission is struggling to adopt its agenda for the new cycle.

The dispute is not over which items should be included. These have already been agreed upon as: a) elements for a draft resolution on the declaration of a fourth Disarmament Decade (this item was requested by the UN General Assembly) and the two agenda items from the previous Commission cycle—b) recommendations for achieving the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and c) practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons.

The stalemate over the agenda has arisen because states cannot agree to the order in which these topics will be addressed. The Non-Aligned Movement is reportedly urging for the first year of the Commission to focus on the elements for the draft declaration on the Disarmament Decade, in order to have these elements prepared before 2010. It’s unclear (to me) why others have opposed this suggestion, though it seems some have suggested establishing working groups for all three issues in all three years rather than working on and wrapping up one issue this year and then moving on to the other issues.

The first plenary meeting is currently suspended for informal consultations. Please check back later for updates.

A farewell to (a few) arms

On 6 April 2009, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates released a $534 billion military budget proposal for 2010 (not including the Iraq or Afghanistan wars) that attempts to move away from so-called “Cold War” technologies to those needed to fight “insurgencies” in Afghanistan and Iraq. His plans are being welcomed by some who support arms control as a “credible effort to bring new discipline and focus to military spending after the unrestrained, inchoate years of the Bush administration” (New York Times editorial).

The money
However, few who either oppose or support the cuts have noted that the US military budget went up again this year. 2009’s budget was $515.4 billion—without including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, nuclear weapon research, maintenance, and production, and veteran affairs.

Writing on AfterDowningStreet.org, David Swanson noted the radically different spin put on the budget by mainstream media and business sources. He pointed out, for example, that MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow said, “... that thump-thump-thump sound that you heard in the distance as [Gates revealed the budget] was the sound of executives at all the big defense contractors passing out.” Meanwhile, MarketWatch, in an article entitled, “Pentagon still a cash cow despite budget cuts,” quoted the Wall Street analysts’ perspective: “there’s still plenty of funding for the country’s top military contractors.”

“Lockheed Martin had the best outcome from Gates’ budget decisions, there was also strong support for Northrop Grumman’s and General Dynamics’ shipbuilding businesses,” said Douglas Harned, an analyst with Bernstein Research. “Notably, there were no indications of plans to bring budgets down significantly in 2011.”

Likewise, Janes noted, “Major US defence stocks were raised out of the doldrums by Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ budget proposals thanks to the lifting of a degree of uncertainty and proposals that were not as dramatic as the markets expected.”

The programmes
An editorial in the New York Times, which overall advocated for more spending on weapons of “use” rather than a reduction of spending, did at least note, “Scrapping wasteful weapons programs is essential, but how much better it would be if they were never built at all. The Pentagon’s procurement system has so run amok that 70 percent of the weapons were over budget last year by a total $296 billion.”

A good example of this is the Airborne Laser—a chemical laser mounted on a Boeing 747. No, really. The Airborne Laser programme suffered from chronic cost and schedule overruns—according to Ellen Tauscher, chair of the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee: four years and billions of dollars over. Government funding for the programme has been reduced for the past several years, though the Missile Defense Agency continued requesting more money, shrilly arguing that its first “live shoot-down test” couldn’t afford to be postponed any longer, for the security of the nation.

In 2006, former Missile Defense Agency chief Lt. Gen. Henry “Trey” Obering, III, explained the value of the Airbone Laser: “I believe we are building the forces of good to beat the forces of evil.... We are taking a major step in giving the American people their first light saber.” Remarking on the rather awkward aesthetics of the weapon system, he also commented, “This is not the prettiest aircraft I have seen. It is not supposed to be pretty. It is supposed to be mean.”

Thankfully, Gates is recommending this programme be cut, along with the deployment of interceptor missiles to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system in Alaska, one segment of the US missile “defense” system. For the most part, tests of the Alaska system have failed miserably. Rockets usually fail to make it out of their launch tubes and kill vehicles have failed to separate from their rockets when they do make it out. A year ago, the Missile Defense Agency estimated the Ground-based segment would cost about $50 billion.

However, as the NYT editorial also argued, “He should have cut deeper than $1.4 billion into the unproven missile defense program.” Likewise, giving a testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capability, William Hartung of the New America Foundation outlined six weapon systems that could be cut “without undermining [US] security,” which included missile defence as a whole. He argued, “This year marks the 26th anniversary of President Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars speech, and there has yet to be realistic test that indicates that we can reliably shoot down incoming nuclear warheads launched from a long-range ballistic missile.”

Unfortunately, Hartung went on to assert, “The elements of the missile defense budget that involve defending against ICBMs can be eliminated without harming our security in any way. There is some indication that mid-range systems designed to protect troops or nearby allies from medium-range missiles may prove to be more effective.” In reality, the vast majority of anti-missile technologies have faced cost overruns and delays. Even more importantly, their development, testing, and deployment will have harsh consequences for international relations, particularly between Russia and the United States, and for the US economy.

Overall, the varying reactions to Gates’ proposed military budget are virtually devoid of any criticism of what the $534 billion is spent on—weapons of war. Weapons that are used in the wars that the United States instigates, wars which have another budget all their own. On the contrary, even those supposedly in support of arms control and disarmament have recommended the military stop wasting money on weapon systems they don’t use and spend it on weapons they do use. Further, no one seems to have questioned the need or right of the United States to use these weapons—that the US would need different types of weapons to fight new types of wars is accepted as fact. For all the talk of giving the military budget a “massive overhaul,” no one has referred to the distinction between offensive and non-offensive defence, the latter focusing on defence systems that protect a state rather than on armed attack against other states.

And no, missile “defence” is not a form of non-offensive defence, as its methods and means are inherently offensive. For example, as has even been argued by pro-missile “defence” advocates, “The mere fact that missile defense ships could be deployed to war zones as part of larger naval armadas gives them an immediately recognizable offensive dimension.” Further, as Mike Moore pointed out, “The infrastructure for a ballistic missile defense system is, in large measure, the same as that needed for an offensive anti-satellite system.”

Finally, as the military budget continues to grow even in a time of the global financial crisis, where is the money for everything else a country needs to survive going to come from? Why isn’t anybody asking that?

US President Obama calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons

During a much-anticipated speech in Prague on 5 April 2009, US President Obama announced “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” He noted the United States has a moral obligation to lead nuclear disarmament efforts since it has one of the largest arsenals and is the only country to have ever used the weapons—a very interesting and welcome admission. However, his plans for the way forward do not comprise the “radical drive” many had hoped for or that is arguably necessary for success.’

His plan for nuclear disarmament entails:
• Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy doctrines;
• Negotiating a follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia;
• “Immediately and aggressively” pursue US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
• Seeking a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in nuclear weapons;
• Strengthening the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation through increased resources and authority to strengthen international inspections and through “real and immediate consequences” for withdrawal from the Treaty; and
• Building a “new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank;”
• Starting a “new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years” in cooperation with Russia;
• Turning the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into “durable international institutions;” and
• Hosting a Global Summit on Nuclear Security within the next year.

The reduction of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, the talk of working for a verifiable fissile materials treaty, and the negotiation of a START sequel are all welcome endeavours. They are not new or radical ideas as suggested by some media reports—all of been on the arms control and disarmament agenda for years. Many were included in the “thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament” agreed upon at the 2000 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which the Bush administration backed away from in 2005. This possible recommitment to some of the steps is worth noting, as is it’s emphasis on international law, highlighted by Obama’s suggestion of institutionalizing Bush-era initiatives like the Proliferation Security Initiatives.

Unfortunately, some of the other points in Obama’s plan for a nuclear weapon free world require thoughtful consideration.

Arsenal reductions
The first point of concern is actually the START negotiations. The current buzz on US-Russian reductions is now focused on the number 1500—close to the 1000 hoped for by many arms control groups, not close enough to the zero hoped for by most abolition groups. Most importantly, the context of the number of 1500 has to be scrutinized. According to Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists and Stan Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council, there are approximately 5200 total warheads and bombs in the active and reserve nuclear stockpiles of the United States today, including approximately 500 so-called “tactical” nuclear warheads and bombs, with some 4200 warheads and bombs awaiting dismantlement, for a total of approximately 9400 warheads. Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group notes,

The stockpile declines being discussed are in the range we might associate with retirement of obsolete systems that nobody much wants. So nobody is giving up much. But even so the effects ramify throughout the management of the enterprise and the talks themselves and the transparency frameworks they will hopefully create are very important.

Strengthening the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
While Obama does mention that the “bargain” of the NPT includes nuclear disarmament, he does not cite compliance with this obligation in his remedy for strengthening the Treaty. His silence on this aspect of the NPT is deafening, especially when the majority of non-nuclear weapon states have repeatedly articulated that they are unwilling to accept additional non-proliferation measures until they see tangible progress from the nuclear weapon states on disarmament. His call for increased authority for the inspections directly relates to European Union’s call for the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol to become mandatory under the NPT (currently only the IAEA’s safeguards are mandatory and the Additional Protocol, which allows more access for UN inspectors, is optional). This will not be acceptable to groups like the Non-Aligned Movement if it is not accompanied by more than rhetoric on disarmament measures.

Further, Obama’s emphasis on inspections and consequences for withdrawal fits in well with the theory of “anti-nuclear nuclearism” or anti-nuclear imperialism expounded by Darwin BondGraham and Will Parrish in their Foreign Policy in Focus article of January 2009. This theory posits that such “strategies” include minor steps toward arsenal reductions, “at least rhetorically recommitting the United States to international treaties” such as the NPT, “a fig leaf that the United States isn’t developing new nuclear weapons,” and that it is slowly “de-emphasizing its nuclear arsenal.” BondGraham and Parrish argue, “By these means the United States has tried to avoid the charge of hypocrisy, even though it has designed and built newly modified weapons with qualitatively new capacities over the last decade and a half.”

Missile “defence” in Europe
Outside of the specific plans for nuclear disarmament laid out above, perhaps the most troubling element of Obama’s speech was his comments on missile “defence” in Europe. He stated
The Czech Republic and Poland have been courageous in agreeing to host a defense against these missiles. As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed.

For one thing, the line from the Obama administration used to be, “if it doesn’t work, we won’t deploy it.” Now, the question of deploying missile “defence” in Europe seems to rest on the Bush administration’s justification: the threat of Iran. Further, Obama neglects to note that the Czech government failed to garner ratification for the treaties on the proposed anti-missile base, which was followed by a vote of no-confidence by Czech parliament for the government, or that two-thirds of the Czech public rejects the idea of hosting US missile “defence” technology on their soil.

Nuclear power
Obama’s call to “harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our efforts to combat climate change” is also unfortunate—and misleading. Taking into account the entire nuclear fuel cycle, the CO2 output from nuclear power is much higher from those produced by renewable energy sources—not to mention the problems with nuclear waste and the threat of weapon-material and technology proliferation. It’s unfortunate that Obama did not take the opportunity to commit his administration to working with the new International Renewable Energy Agency as an alternative to promoting the expansion of nuclear power.

Moving forward
While the speech was disappointing, particularly for those of us hoping to hear President Obama call for the removal of nuclear weapons of Europe, a recommitment to Article VI of the NPT, or bigger cuts to the arsenal, it was certainly an improvement from Bush administration foreign policy statements. Further, Obama’s reference to US use of nuclear weapons seems significant. There is still hope.