President Obama's Nuclear "Surge"

The Obama administration released its budget for FY 2011 today.

The centerpiece of the budget's National Nuclear Security Administration section is a "surge."

You can read about president Obama's $5 billion dollar nuke spending hike by downloading the NNSA budget. According to the administration they are boosting spending on nuclear weapons by 9.8% this year, with larger increases in outyears, so as to "take steps toward achieving a world without nuclear weapons" (p. 7).

Here's an excerpt (emphases added):

"Weapons Activities: The request for this appropriation is $7.0 billion, an increase of 9.8 percent over the FY 2010 appropriated level. This level is sustained and increased in the later outyears. Increased funding is requested for programs in direct support of the nuclear weapon stockpile, for scientific, technical and engineering activities related to maintenance assessment and certification capabilities for the stockpile, and for critical infrastructure improvements" (p. 9).

By "critical infrastructure improvements" the administration means the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Faciltiy planned for Los Alamos Lab, and the Uranium Processing Facility being built at Y-12 in Tennessee. The first is essentially a plutonium pit factory costing several billion. The second will provide uranium for US nuclear weapons programs, also at a cost of several billion. Neither facility is needed to "maintain" the stockpile, especially if the US is poised to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Both of these projects are necessary to lock-in nuclear weapons spending at the labs for many decades, and fully commit the US to nuclear weapons, regardless of how well international treaty discussions might go.

The importance of these facilities is emphasized in the NNSA's budget request:

"The President’s Request includes funding to complete the design and begin construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement (CMRR) nuclear facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. This facility conducts plutonium research and development and provides analytical capabilities in support of pit surveillance and production. Current planning would have this facility fully operational by 2022. A related project is requested to increase pit production capacity and capability at the adjoining PF-4 facility that is part of the main plutonium facility at Los Alamos to demonstrate pit reuse by 2017 and production by 2018-2020. The budget request also includes funding to complete the design and begin construction of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex to support production and surveillance of highly-enriched uranium components. This facility is also planned to achieve full operations by 2022" (p. 11).

The Obama administration's budget also appears to be easing the way for design efforts of new weapons at the laboratories, something that was resisted under the Bush White House's tenure. The NNSA budget states that;

"The President’s Request provides funding necessary to protect and advance the scientific capabilities at the U.S. national security laboratories — including the ability to design nuclear warheads as well as development and engineering expertise and capabilities— through a stockpile stewardship program that fully exercises these capabilities" (p. 10).

UN Security Council: Working toward a nuclear weapon free world?

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Full report and other materials available online

Yesterday, US President Obama chaired a UN Security Council meeting on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It was a great opportunity for the five permanent members and nuclear weapon states—China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States—to make concrete commitments to nuclear disarmament and lay out the steps toward a nuclear weapon free world.

Unfortunately, these governments instead used the Summit to lay out their vision for stricter requirements for non-nuclear weapon states to prove they are not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. As UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown said during his General Assembly statement: “Britain will insist that the onus on non-nuclear states is that in future it is for them to prove they are not developing nuclear weapons.”

Yet despite rhetoric to the contrary, the five permanent members did not extend any new commitments for themselves to eliminate nuclear weapons in compliance with their legal obligation to do so.

• The Summit resolution emphasised non-proliferation over disarmament, requesting new requirements for non-nuclear weapon states to prove their status and intent.


• Most of the nuclear weapon states did not reference their previous commitments to steps toward nuclear disarmament nor set out new ones.


• The Summit promoted nuclear power as a safe, clean, source of energy that will help combat climate change.
  

However, many of the non-permanent members of the Council recognised the problem with this approach to non-proliferation and disarmament and outlined several concrete proposals
to advance both agendas in a balanced manner.

Read Reaching Critical Will’s report on the Summit for details of these suggestions!

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom released a statement before the meeting, calling on the UN Security Council members to make serious commitments to disarmament along with their requests on non-proliferation. WILPF continues to call upon Council members—and all other members of the United Nations—to work toward a nuclear free world through real, concrete actions and commitments. For example:

1. The UN Security Council should call for a halt to development, production, design, modernization, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

2. It should also fulfill its commitment to formulate a plan for disarmament with the least diversion of the world’s human and economic resources toward weapons, as it is instructed to do in Article 26 of the UN Charter.

3. The context of all non-proliferation measures should be designed as steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, not toward their indefinite possession by an elite group of states.

4. The UN Security Council should urge governments to accelerate and enlarge their support for development of commercially viable renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy and to phase-out nuclear power, as a measure strengthening both non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

WILPF Statement to the UN Security Council in anticipation of its 24 September 2009 meeting on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) welcomes the UN Security Council Summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament to be held on 24 September 2009. We urge the UN Security Council to use this opportunity to constructively contribute to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by taking steps toward a nuclear weapon free world and the promotion of collective human security and security for all life on this planet.

Ahead of the summit, the US government released a draft resolution for the UN Security Council to consider as an outcome document, which was then consolidated into a revised draft with input from other Council members. WILPF is encouraged by the scope of the document, which covers a wide range of important issues. In particular, WILPF welcomes its recognition of the importance of negative security assurances and nuclear weapon free zone treaties and its commitment to supporting the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency on non-proliferation and safeguards. We are especially pleased with the addition of a preambular paragraph in the revised version that the welcomes and encourages “the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament” (PP23).

However, both versions of the draft resolution focus nearly exclusively on strengthening existing non-proliferation measures and advocating new, more stringent requirements, while at the same time maintaining the status quo (i.e. no progress) on nuclear disarmament.

The only reference to disarmament in the operative paragraphs of the resolution simply reiterates Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (OP4—all references are to the revised version of the resolution, dated 18 September 2009). The references to nuclear weapon free zone treaties (PP13 and PP14), negative security assurances (PP15), and “the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament” (PP11) in the preamble are not accompanied by concrete actions in the operative paragraphs. Neither draft mentions the thirteen practical steps toward nuclear disarmament that was unanimously agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, nor any other nuclear disarmament proposal, such as the UN Secretary-General’s five-point plan for disarmament or an international Nuclear Weapons Convention or framework agreement. In addition, the only reference in the resolution to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is to “monitor closely any situations” involving their proliferation (OP25).

Meanwhile, the draft goes far beyond non-proliferation commitments outlined in the NPT, calling for UN Security Council consideration of all “situations of noncompliance with nonproliferation commitments” (OP1), encouraging states to consider the Additional Protocol a new standard when making nuclear export decisions (OP17), and urging states “to require as a condition of nuclear exports” that IAEA safeguards continue even if the state withdraws from its safeguards agreement (OP16). The first of these demands does not indicate how determinations of non-compliance will be made, or by whom, or which non-proliferation obligations are included in the scope of this demand. In addition, there has of yet been no agreement in the NPT or IAEA frameworks about where or by which methods situations of non-compliance should be dealt with. It is traditionally up to the relevant treaty or organisation to determine these conditions, not external bodies. Furthermore, the resolution does not refer cases of non-compliance with disarmament obligations to the UN Security Council.

The other two non-proliferation examples given above—and several others in the resolution—have been brought up in the NPT context before and have been met with opposition by many non-nuclear weapons states. These measures could indeed be beneficial to strengthening non-proliferation, but they cannot be extended without reciprocal commitments to disarmament.

The obfuscation of several paragraphs in the resolution is also problematic. OP7 “deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.” It is unclear which resolutions are being referred to in this paragraph. None of the UN Security Council resolutions on Iran’s nuclear programme determine that the programme constitutes a “threat to international peace and security.” However, these resolutions are reaffirmed in PP17 of the draft.

PP11 fails to acknowledge that some of the recognised nuclear weapon states have not ratified relevant protocols of some nuclear weapon free zone treaties. In addition, the encouragement of “efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy” in OP9 does not acknowledge the extreme environmental risks of nuclear power or the nuclear fuel cycle or the problems posed by both for the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world.

In order to achieve a meaningful outcome that advances an equitable and secure nuclear weapon free world, WILPF encourages the UN Security Council to call for concrete actions and commitments to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

On disarmament, the UN Security Council should:

• Call for a halt to development, production, design, modernization, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and for the establishment of international controls on delivery systems and anti-missile systems;

• Call for transparency regarding the size and status of nuclear weapon forces;

• Refer to the International Court of Justice’s 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons;

• Call for concrete actions on the 1995 and 2000 NPT decisions and commitments;

• Fulfill its commitment to formulate a plan for nuclear disarmament with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, pursuant to Article 26 of the UN Charter;

• Call upon the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations of a fissile material treaty in 2010 on the basis of the Shannon Mandate and to address the factors that have complicated the negotiation process in the interim months; and

• Call on all nuclear weapon states to drop their reservations to relevant protocols of nuclear weapon free zone treaties and ratify all such treaties.

On non-proliferation, the UN Security Council should ensure that its related requirements and commitments do not exhort the current imbalance between “nuclear have’s and have not’s” by demanding tighter restrictions on the behaviour of non-nuclear weapon states while promising disarmament by the nuclear weapon states as an “ultimate” goal in the distant future. The context of all non-proliferation measures should designed as steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, not toward their indefinite possession by an elite group of states.

On nuclear energy, the UN Security Council should urge governments to accelerate and enlarge their support for development of commercially viable renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy and to phase-out nuclear power, as a measure strengthening both non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

US President Obama calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons

During a much-anticipated speech in Prague on 5 April 2009, US President Obama announced “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” He noted the United States has a moral obligation to lead nuclear disarmament efforts since it has one of the largest arsenals and is the only country to have ever used the weapons—a very interesting and welcome admission. However, his plans for the way forward do not comprise the “radical drive” many had hoped for or that is arguably necessary for success.’

His plan for nuclear disarmament entails:
• Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy doctrines;
• Negotiating a follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia;
• “Immediately and aggressively” pursue US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
• Seeking a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in nuclear weapons;
• Strengthening the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation through increased resources and authority to strengthen international inspections and through “real and immediate consequences” for withdrawal from the Treaty; and
• Building a “new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank;”
• Starting a “new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years” in cooperation with Russia;
• Turning the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into “durable international institutions;” and
• Hosting a Global Summit on Nuclear Security within the next year.

The reduction of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, the talk of working for a verifiable fissile materials treaty, and the negotiation of a START sequel are all welcome endeavours. They are not new or radical ideas as suggested by some media reports—all of been on the arms control and disarmament agenda for years. Many were included in the “thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament” agreed upon at the 2000 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which the Bush administration backed away from in 2005. This possible recommitment to some of the steps is worth noting, as is it’s emphasis on international law, highlighted by Obama’s suggestion of institutionalizing Bush-era initiatives like the Proliferation Security Initiatives.

Unfortunately, some of the other points in Obama’s plan for a nuclear weapon free world require thoughtful consideration.

Arsenal reductions
The first point of concern is actually the START negotiations. The current buzz on US-Russian reductions is now focused on the number 1500—close to the 1000 hoped for by many arms control groups, not close enough to the zero hoped for by most abolition groups. Most importantly, the context of the number of 1500 has to be scrutinized. According to Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists and Stan Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council, there are approximately 5200 total warheads and bombs in the active and reserve nuclear stockpiles of the United States today, including approximately 500 so-called “tactical” nuclear warheads and bombs, with some 4200 warheads and bombs awaiting dismantlement, for a total of approximately 9400 warheads. Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group notes,

The stockpile declines being discussed are in the range we might associate with retirement of obsolete systems that nobody much wants. So nobody is giving up much. But even so the effects ramify throughout the management of the enterprise and the talks themselves and the transparency frameworks they will hopefully create are very important.

Strengthening the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
While Obama does mention that the “bargain” of the NPT includes nuclear disarmament, he does not cite compliance with this obligation in his remedy for strengthening the Treaty. His silence on this aspect of the NPT is deafening, especially when the majority of non-nuclear weapon states have repeatedly articulated that they are unwilling to accept additional non-proliferation measures until they see tangible progress from the nuclear weapon states on disarmament. His call for increased authority for the inspections directly relates to European Union’s call for the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol to become mandatory under the NPT (currently only the IAEA’s safeguards are mandatory and the Additional Protocol, which allows more access for UN inspectors, is optional). This will not be acceptable to groups like the Non-Aligned Movement if it is not accompanied by more than rhetoric on disarmament measures.

Further, Obama’s emphasis on inspections and consequences for withdrawal fits in well with the theory of “anti-nuclear nuclearism” or anti-nuclear imperialism expounded by Darwin BondGraham and Will Parrish in their Foreign Policy in Focus article of January 2009. This theory posits that such “strategies” include minor steps toward arsenal reductions, “at least rhetorically recommitting the United States to international treaties” such as the NPT, “a fig leaf that the United States isn’t developing new nuclear weapons,” and that it is slowly “de-emphasizing its nuclear arsenal.” BondGraham and Parrish argue, “By these means the United States has tried to avoid the charge of hypocrisy, even though it has designed and built newly modified weapons with qualitatively new capacities over the last decade and a half.”

Missile “defence” in Europe
Outside of the specific plans for nuclear disarmament laid out above, perhaps the most troubling element of Obama’s speech was his comments on missile “defence” in Europe. He stated
The Czech Republic and Poland have been courageous in agreeing to host a defense against these missiles. As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed.

For one thing, the line from the Obama administration used to be, “if it doesn’t work, we won’t deploy it.” Now, the question of deploying missile “defence” in Europe seems to rest on the Bush administration’s justification: the threat of Iran. Further, Obama neglects to note that the Czech government failed to garner ratification for the treaties on the proposed anti-missile base, which was followed by a vote of no-confidence by Czech parliament for the government, or that two-thirds of the Czech public rejects the idea of hosting US missile “defence” technology on their soil.

Nuclear power
Obama’s call to “harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our efforts to combat climate change” is also unfortunate—and misleading. Taking into account the entire nuclear fuel cycle, the CO2 output from nuclear power is much higher from those produced by renewable energy sources—not to mention the problems with nuclear waste and the threat of weapon-material and technology proliferation. It’s unfortunate that Obama did not take the opportunity to commit his administration to working with the new International Renewable Energy Agency as an alternative to promoting the expansion of nuclear power.

Moving forward
While the speech was disappointing, particularly for those of us hoping to hear President Obama call for the removal of nuclear weapons of Europe, a recommitment to Article VI of the NPT, or bigger cuts to the arsenal, it was certainly an improvement from Bush administration foreign policy statements. Further, Obama’s reference to US use of nuclear weapons seems significant. There is still hope.