WILPF Statement on the 64th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

On 6 and 9 August 1945, the United States dropped two nuclear weapons on two Japanese cities—one on Hiroshima and the other on Nagasaki. These acts killed 200,000 civilians by the end of 1945 and many more in the years that followed. The development, manufacture, testing, deployment, and sharing of nuclear weapons continues affecting the Earth and its people today. The threat of the use of these weapons still exists. The arms race is not yet over.

While the United States and Russia are currently engaged in talks to reduce their stockpiles, the proposed agreement does not affect warheads held in reserve, “non-strategic” weapons, or the size of the total stockpile, nor does it require dismantlement of any nuclear warheads.¹ Meanwhile, both countries have plans to modernize their nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

A US plan for the development of a missile “defence” system in Europe has also increased tensions between the two countries. Meanwhile, China continues to modernize and expand its arsenal. The United Kingdom decided to renew its nuclear system last year. France’s president, while promising to reduce his country’s stockpile, also promised that he will retain the possibility to “send a nuclear warning” to underscore France’s “resolve” to protect its interests.²

There are also four countries that possess nuclear explosive devices but are not recognized as nuclear weapon states by the primary nuclear treaty regime, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—and are thus not bound by its rules. India, Pakistan, and Israel are still making materials for use in nuclear weapons, while North Korea has threatened to resume production. Pakistan and India are both building new reactors to increase their capacity to make plutonium for nuclear weapons. Both are actively developing and testing ballistic and cruise missiles to carry nuclear weapons.³

Despite the end of the Cold War, despite supposed “thawing of tensions” between the major powers, and despite the reality of an interconnected, interdependent world order, the mythical ideal of the power of the bomb persists. It continues to influence national security doctrines, international relations, and multilateral negotiations, subsequently undermining international law, human security, and our ability to build resilience to the converging climate, peak oil, food, water, and financial crises we face.

WILPF urges all governments and citizens to consider our options for the future. It encourages everyone to support and work for the elimination of nuclear weapons and for the redirection of nuclear weapon expenditures to meet environmental, social, health, housing, food, and economic needs. We need to creatively build resilience into our international system that does not rely on violence or military power but rather promotes cooperation, ingenuity, and human security. As a first step toward this end, WILPF calls on all nuclear weapon possessors to cease modernizing their arsenals as a step toward the good faith pursuit of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear weapon free world.

For more information about WILPF’s work on nuclear disarmament, please go to www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

1Hans Kristensen, “START Follow-On: What SORT of Agreement?” Federation of American Scientists, Strategic Security Blog, 8 July 2009, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/start.php?pfstyle=wp.

2For more on the nuclear programmes of the five NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states, see Rhetoric vs. Reality: Elite Disarmament Proposals and Real Disarmament Prospects, Information Briefing, Western States Legal Foundation, May 2009, http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/rhetoricvreality.pdf.

3Zia Mian, “Pushing South Asia Toward the Brink,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 27 July 2009, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/6295.

CD adopts a programme of work!

On Friday, 29 May, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) adopted a programme of work for the first time in ten years.

Before bringing the decision to the floor, Ambassador Jazaïry of Algeria, current president of the CD, explained that the six presidents (P6) of the 2009 session were inspired by the “new momentum” for disarmament, expressed in US President Obama’s Prague speech, the announcements of further US-Russian bilateral nuclear reductions, etc. After consultations with member states, they reached the conclusion that: they had the “historic responsibility” to not pass up the opportunity to relaunch the work of the CD and that they had to go beyond pre-established positions “and allow ourselves to be guided only by the manifest community of our shared interest in this matter; that the programme of work should be tackled in a comprehensive and balanced manner; and that consensus should be sought “part and parcel of a process refining previous efforts to overcome” the stumbling blocks of recent years.

Intercessional consultations on a draft programme by all members of the P6 were met with expressions at support in a variety of fora outside the UN system, so the presidents decided to introduce their proposal to the CD on 19 May. Ambassador Jazaïry argued, the programme is not perfect but “is a compromise which provides a delicate balance” and “in no way establishes a hierarchy in terms of priority,” but rather establishes a basis of compromise to launch negotiations.

He then asked if there was any objection to the adoption of CD/1863 by consensus. There was none. The gavel dropped and the room burst into applause.

Before the programme was adopted,a few delegations spoke about CD/1863, including Ukraine, Iran, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Morocco. After the adoption, a great number of delegations delivered interventions, voicing their support for the programme of work. Two, India and Pakistan, elaborated their positions on negotiating a fissile materials treaty.

Much work remains to be done before negotiations and other substantive work can begin. But at least, for the first time in a decade, the CD has a plan.

For details, please see Reaching Critical Will’s CD Report for 29 May.

North Korea conducts a second nuclear test

On 25 May, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducted what it claims to be a second nuclear test. According to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, the International Monitoring System’s (IMS) seismic stations registered a seismic event at 41.2896 degrees North and 129.0480 degrees East at 00:54:43 GMT (09:54 local time). The signal’s area of origin is largely identical with the 2006 DPRK nuclear test. The event’s magnitude is slightly higher than in 2006, measuring 4.52 on the Richter scale, while in 2006 it was 4.1. Those doing the calculations at ArmsControlWonk.com suggest the yield of the nuclear explosive device was likely around 4 KT.

WILPF issued a statement in response to the DPRK test, over which it expresses deep concern. However, WILPF remains equally concerned about previous nuclear tests of other states and their continued possession of nuclear weapons. In its formal response to the test, WILPF called on all states outside of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to ratify it without delay or conditions and called on all states possessing nuclear weapons to immediately shut down their nuclear test facilities and to acknowledge and compensate the victims of their testing programmes.

In this statement, WILPF also noted that if the CTBT were in force, the Treaty would give greater legitimacy to international responses. Its member states could adopt sanctions against the DPRK for violating international law. Currently, the task of coordinating an international response falls to the UN Security Council, a body not entitled to enforce international norms per se, but an unrepresentative political body dominated by the interests of its five permanent, veto-wielding members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, two of whom (China and the US) have yet to ratify the CTBT themselves.

Keep an eye on the CTBTO website for news about the test.

Pakistan supports new proposed programme of work at the CD

On Friday morning at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Ambassador Zamir Khan formally announced Pakistan’s support for “the initiation of work” in the CD on the basis of CD/1863 (the new proposed programme of work for the Conference). For the past two years, Pakistan has been considered the key holdout from adopting a programme of work in the CD. This endorsement is expected to pave the way for the long-awaited commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials treaty and the resumption of meaningful work by the Conference.

For details on CD/1863 and other endorsements of it, please read/subscribe to Reaching Critical Will’s CD Reports.

New programme of work introduced to the CD

During the first plenary meeting of the second part of the Conference on Disarmament’s 2009 session, the current president of the CD, Ambassador Idriss Jazaïry, formally submitted CD/1863, a new proposed programme of work on behalf of the six presidents.

The new proposal differs substantially from those of 2008 and 2007. It establishes working groups on the four core issues and special coordinators on the other three agenda items. It calls, inter alia, for negotiation of a fissile materials treaty on the basis of the 1995 Shannon Mandate, for recommendations for dealing with negative security assurances, and for an “exchange of views and information on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of their elimination, including on approaches toward potential future work of multilateral character.” (For more details, see Reaching Critical Will's 19 May 2009 CD Report.)

Coming merely a few days after the qualified success of the third nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee for the 2010 review cycle, the introduction of a more balanced programme of work for the CD not only maintains the positive spirit but increases its momentum. The call for fissile material treaty negotiations on the basis of the Shannon Mandate, while effectively winding back the clock almost fifteen years, is a substantial step forward from other recent attempts to formulate a programme of work. In addition, the significantly enhanced mandates for discussions on nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances are progressively forward-looking and will surely go a long way to alleviating non-nuclear weapon states’ concerns about the imbalanced nature of previous proposed programmes of work.

Consensus is near. Current president Ambassador Jazaïry noted that consultations are still ongoing, but the majority of delegations seem to assume that CD/1863 will be adopted very soon. After twelve years without substantive work and ten years without even a programme of work, the adoption of this document cannot come a moment too soon. Ambassador Jazaïry expressed hope that, if adopted, CD/1863 would extend beyond the current year, providing a framework for future negotiations. This is particularly important since most CD member states do not currently have the capacity at their Geneva missions to engage in negotiations. It would likely take until the beginning of the CD’s 2010 session before working group two could seriously get to work. Hopefully, the Conference will not have to worry about developing a new programme of work at that time but can rely on CD/1863 to carry forward the momentum.

High-level support for the proposed programme of work
The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addressed the CD plenary meeting, as did Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey and Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci. They all urged the CD to rapidly adopt CD/1863 as its programme of work for the year. For details, please see Reaching Critical Will's 19 May 2009 CD Report.

A qualified success

Lead editorial from the final edition of the NPT News in Review, written by Michael Spies and Ray Acheson:

By the abysmal standards that have typified the preparatory process—instituted in 1995—leading up to each five year review of the NPT, the third and final Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting before the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) must certainly be considered a success. The PrepCom was able to agree to an agenda for the RevCon, on its third day, no less, amid a chorus of accolades for what many described as a new, positive atmosphere in multilateral disarmament, stemming entirely from US President Obama’s 5 April speech in Prague.

However, it did not surprise many delegates—most of whom are veterans of the so-called decade of deadlock that had accompanied the Bush administration’s allergy to multilateralism—that the PrepCom would become snagged once it attempted to work through matters of substance.

The PrepCom’s failure to adopt substantive recommendations for the RevCon, a feat no previous PrepCom had ever accomplished, may have temporarily tainted the atmosphere, but was not unforeseen. During his opening remarks to the PrepCom, its Chair, Ambassador Chidyausiku of Zimbabwe, cautioned that despite recent signs of progress, in many areas the positions of states had actually grown further apart rather than closer.

With this note of caution, on Monday, 11 May, the Chair circulated a clever and concise first draft of recommendations, intended to capture specific proposals that identify concrete practical actions on implementing the Treaty, stand a reasonable chance of gaining consensus, and build upon earlier decision. Its strongest provisions dealt with moving the disarmament agenda forward and even included consideration of a nuclear weapons convention (see NPT News in Review, No. 6).

It must be noted that the vast majority of states could have accepted the first draft, including many members of NATO, with little or no modifications. Following consultations, and in particular input from the nuclear weapon states, on Wednesday, 13 May, the Chair put forward a revised set of recommendations that significantly weakened the sections on disarmament, civil society participation, and education, but bolstered those on implementing the 1995 Middle East resolution and on non-proliferation.

For some, the second draft proved to be a bridge too far. As the conference moved into its final hours, it devolved into a tense blame game that pitted western delegations against the Non-Aligned Movement and some of its more outspoken members, most notably Cuba, Egypt, and Iran. On Thursday, 14 May, the Chair advised states let the recommendations go, as to not to ruin the spirit of cooperation. Despite the Chair’s judgment that the differences in position were too vast, a large number of delegations urged the Chair to continue the process of seeking consensus (see NPT News in Review, No. 10).

The breakdown of the recommendations process
Despite the positive atmosphere, disarmament rhetoric of the US and UK administrations, and the quick adoption of the agenda, the PrepCom delegates did not find enough common ground—or at least, enough common rhetoric—to agree to a set of non-binding recommendations for next year. Breaking with the recent past, the Chair decided not to forward the recommendations to the RevCon as a working paper.

The Chair had introduced a newly revised draft recommendations on Friday, 15 May. Delegations consulted with their regional groups before resuming an informal meeting of the PrepCom. During this last attempt to reach consensus on the draft recommendations, the Chair determined that the Committee did not have a sufficient amount of time to reach agreement. Later, at a press briefing, he said the “differences were very minor; with time, we could have done it.”

The differences, as laid out by delegations during Thursday’s plenary discussion on the draft recommendations, did not seem very minor (see NPT News in Review, No. 10), though the revisions in the third draft were quite minimal. The additional changes brought on board an additional caveat to the already thoroughly conditioned preambular paragraph, further emphasized its non-binding character and marginally indicative character—a change insisted upon by the UK. Other amendments made minor changes to the sections on universality, disarmament, non-proliferation, regional initiatives, and education.

Despite the lack of time to make additional major changes to the text (delegations would have needed to consult with their capitals had the second draft text been heavily amended), western and non-aligned delegations traded blame for the impasse. Since the first draft was not agreeable to a few western states and the second was not agreeable to a few NAM states, it would be cynical and insincere to place“blame” on any particular group or delegation. Instead, the experience only serves to further illuminate the wide gulfs between states’ positions.

Paradoxically on the surface, this result came as a relief to many delegations. While the vast majority of states parties seemed ready to accept either the first or second drafts, no one was entirely content with either. Rather than becoming stuck with an imperfect text, delegations will have the freedom in 2010 to negotiate and reach agreement with a clean slate on the many fraught issues facing the NPT regime.

PrepCom finale

After a short informal session Friday morning, during which states parties started going through the track change suggestions in the newly revised draft recommendations, the Chair declared that the Commmittee did not have a sufficient amount of time to reach agreement. The formal meeting resumed and the Committee adopted the draft final report (an entirely procedural report) and heard a few brief closing statements, ending the PrepCom by 1:00 PM. The recommendations will not be forwarded to the Review Conference as a working paper or a Chair's paper.