22 May 2009

Pakistan supports new proposed programme of work at the CD

On Friday morning at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Ambassador Zamir Khan formally announced Pakistan’s support for “the initiation of work” in the CD on the basis of CD/1863 (the new proposed programme of work for the Conference). For the past two years, Pakistan has been considered the key holdout from adopting a programme of work in the CD. This endorsement is expected to pave the way for the long-awaited commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials treaty and the resumption of meaningful work by the Conference.

For details on CD/1863 and other endorsements of it, please read/subscribe to Reaching Critical Will’s CD Reports.

19 May 2009

New programme of work introduced to the CD

During the first plenary meeting of the second part of the Conference on Disarmament’s 2009 session, the current president of the CD, Ambassador Idriss Jazaïry, formally submitted CD/1863, a new proposed programme of work on behalf of the six presidents.

The new proposal differs substantially from those of 2008 and 2007. It establishes working groups on the four core issues and special coordinators on the other three agenda items. It calls, inter alia, for negotiation of a fissile materials treaty on the basis of the 1995 Shannon Mandate, for recommendations for dealing with negative security assurances, and for an “exchange of views and information on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of their elimination, including on approaches toward potential future work of multilateral character.” (For more details, see Reaching Critical Will's 19 May 2009 CD Report.)

Coming merely a few days after the qualified success of the third nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee for the 2010 review cycle, the introduction of a more balanced programme of work for the CD not only maintains the positive spirit but increases its momentum. The call for fissile material treaty negotiations on the basis of the Shannon Mandate, while effectively winding back the clock almost fifteen years, is a substantial step forward from other recent attempts to formulate a programme of work. In addition, the significantly enhanced mandates for discussions on nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances are progressively forward-looking and will surely go a long way to alleviating non-nuclear weapon states’ concerns about the imbalanced nature of previous proposed programmes of work.

Consensus is near. Current president Ambassador Jazaïry noted that consultations are still ongoing, but the majority of delegations seem to assume that CD/1863 will be adopted very soon. After twelve years without substantive work and ten years without even a programme of work, the adoption of this document cannot come a moment too soon. Ambassador Jazaïry expressed hope that, if adopted, CD/1863 would extend beyond the current year, providing a framework for future negotiations. This is particularly important since most CD member states do not currently have the capacity at their Geneva missions to engage in negotiations. It would likely take until the beginning of the CD’s 2010 session before working group two could seriously get to work. Hopefully, the Conference will not have to worry about developing a new programme of work at that time but can rely on CD/1863 to carry forward the momentum.

High-level support for the proposed programme of work
The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addressed the CD plenary meeting, as did Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey and Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci. They all urged the CD to rapidly adopt CD/1863 as its programme of work for the year. For details, please see Reaching Critical Will's 19 May 2009 CD Report.

A qualified success

Lead editorial from the final edition of the NPT News in Review, written by Michael Spies and Ray Acheson:

By the abysmal standards that have typified the preparatory process—instituted in 1995—leading up to each five year review of the NPT, the third and final Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting before the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) must certainly be considered a success. The PrepCom was able to agree to an agenda for the RevCon, on its third day, no less, amid a chorus of accolades for what many described as a new, positive atmosphere in multilateral disarmament, stemming entirely from US President Obama’s 5 April speech in Prague.

However, it did not surprise many delegates—most of whom are veterans of the so-called decade of deadlock that had accompanied the Bush administration’s allergy to multilateralism—that the PrepCom would become snagged once it attempted to work through matters of substance.

The PrepCom’s failure to adopt substantive recommendations for the RevCon, a feat no previous PrepCom had ever accomplished, may have temporarily tainted the atmosphere, but was not unforeseen. During his opening remarks to the PrepCom, its Chair, Ambassador Chidyausiku of Zimbabwe, cautioned that despite recent signs of progress, in many areas the positions of states had actually grown further apart rather than closer.

With this note of caution, on Monday, 11 May, the Chair circulated a clever and concise first draft of recommendations, intended to capture specific proposals that identify concrete practical actions on implementing the Treaty, stand a reasonable chance of gaining consensus, and build upon earlier decision. Its strongest provisions dealt with moving the disarmament agenda forward and even included consideration of a nuclear weapons convention (see NPT News in Review, No. 6).

It must be noted that the vast majority of states could have accepted the first draft, including many members of NATO, with little or no modifications. Following consultations, and in particular input from the nuclear weapon states, on Wednesday, 13 May, the Chair put forward a revised set of recommendations that significantly weakened the sections on disarmament, civil society participation, and education, but bolstered those on implementing the 1995 Middle East resolution and on non-proliferation.

For some, the second draft proved to be a bridge too far. As the conference moved into its final hours, it devolved into a tense blame game that pitted western delegations against the Non-Aligned Movement and some of its more outspoken members, most notably Cuba, Egypt, and Iran. On Thursday, 14 May, the Chair advised states let the recommendations go, as to not to ruin the spirit of cooperation. Despite the Chair’s judgment that the differences in position were too vast, a large number of delegations urged the Chair to continue the process of seeking consensus (see NPT News in Review, No. 10).

The breakdown of the recommendations process
Despite the positive atmosphere, disarmament rhetoric of the US and UK administrations, and the quick adoption of the agenda, the PrepCom delegates did not find enough common ground—or at least, enough common rhetoric—to agree to a set of non-binding recommendations for next year. Breaking with the recent past, the Chair decided not to forward the recommendations to the RevCon as a working paper.

The Chair had introduced a newly revised draft recommendations on Friday, 15 May. Delegations consulted with their regional groups before resuming an informal meeting of the PrepCom. During this last attempt to reach consensus on the draft recommendations, the Chair determined that the Committee did not have a sufficient amount of time to reach agreement. Later, at a press briefing, he said the “differences were very minor; with time, we could have done it.”

The differences, as laid out by delegations during Thursday’s plenary discussion on the draft recommendations, did not seem very minor (see NPT News in Review, No. 10), though the revisions in the third draft were quite minimal. The additional changes brought on board an additional caveat to the already thoroughly conditioned preambular paragraph, further emphasized its non-binding character and marginally indicative character—a change insisted upon by the UK. Other amendments made minor changes to the sections on universality, disarmament, non-proliferation, regional initiatives, and education.

Despite the lack of time to make additional major changes to the text (delegations would have needed to consult with their capitals had the second draft text been heavily amended), western and non-aligned delegations traded blame for the impasse. Since the first draft was not agreeable to a few western states and the second was not agreeable to a few NAM states, it would be cynical and insincere to place“blame” on any particular group or delegation. Instead, the experience only serves to further illuminate the wide gulfs between states’ positions.

Paradoxically on the surface, this result came as a relief to many delegations. While the vast majority of states parties seemed ready to accept either the first or second drafts, no one was entirely content with either. Rather than becoming stuck with an imperfect text, delegations will have the freedom in 2010 to negotiate and reach agreement with a clean slate on the many fraught issues facing the NPT regime.

15 May 2009

PrepCom finale

After a short informal session Friday morning, during which states parties started going through the track change suggestions in the newly revised draft recommendations, the Chair declared that the Commmittee did not have a sufficient amount of time to reach agreement. The formal meeting resumed and the Committee adopted the draft final report (an entirely procedural report) and heard a few brief closing statements, ending the PrepCom by 1:00 PM. The recommendations will not be forwarded to the Review Conference as a working paper or a Chair's paper.

Still searching for consensus

On Friday morning, the Chair called for an informal meeting to discuss a few slight changes to the revised draft recommendations. Delegations asked for 20 minutes to look over the new document, after which they will resume informals to look at the changed paragraphs. Civil society will not be allowed back into the room until after this process is completed.

For an overview of the discussions on the recommendations from Thursday's plenary meeting, indicative of what some of the changes in the new text are, see the editorial from the NPT News in Review No. 10 (reprinted below):

Searching for consensus
Front page article from the NPT News in Review, 15 May 2009

On Thursday, consensus on Chair’s draft recommendations continued to elude delegations. After another morning of consultations and regional group meetings, the Chair opened the plenary meeting lamenting that he had not been able to garner consensus on his draft recommendations. Expressing the belief that it would be best not to ruin the spirit of cooperation that had been demonstrated thus far at the PrepCom by continuing to fight over the recommendations, he opened the floor for comments on ways to move forward.

Of the 25 delegations that spoke, most expressed disappointment that consensus on the document could not be met. Many, including those of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and South Africa, said they would be willing to agree to the revised text. Most of these delegations said they would have agreed to the original text as well and reiterated their understanding that the recommendations are not binding and do not prejudge the outcome of the RevCon.

Only a few delegations took the initiative to be transparent about their positions. The UK ambassador said that while the revised text contains four policy issues that the United Kingdom has opposed on public record, the only remaining problem for his delegation was two letters in the preambular paragraph. Sources suggested the UK wanted to alter the sentence explaining that the recommendations identify “areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future” to “could be sought in the future.”

The Egyptian delegation expressed very clearly that it is dissatisfied with large portions of the revised recommendations. The Egyptian ambassador listed several specific examples. He questioned the title of Section 1, “Universality of the treaty, and of principles of disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,” arguing that this could lead one to believe that the rights related to nuclear energy granted to NPT states parties under article IV of the Treaty are to be universally applied. He also criticized the revised disarmament action plan for recommending only some but not all of the 13 practical steps from the 2000 RevCon, arguing that only partially citing previous decisions undermines them. Further, while noting that some of the recommendations in the Middle East section have been improved, he objected to the use of the word “consider,” arguing that the PrepCom must be more assertive in recommending the RevCon take action on things.

The Cuban delegation said it would have supported the original draft but that the watering down of practical disarmament measures moved the Committee further away from consensus. It expressed belief that some states parties seem to not really be “in a position to produce substantive recommendations at present time that would help us to truly move forward in applying three pillars.”

Despite these discrepancies, many delegations—including those of the African Group, Chile, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States—encouraged the Chair not to give up just yet. The US delegation argued the Committee was “closer than is apparent” to reaching agreement and asked for more time to “work out the small differences” between delegations. However, the Iranian delegation expressed disbelief that any consensus could be reached and urged the Chair to close consideration of this issue and move on. The Iranian ambassador argued that the states insisting that consensus could be reached were simply trying to ensure they would not be blamed for the stalemate.

Many of the most drastic revisions to the draft recommendations, particular those relating to disarmament, are now more in line with nuclear weapon state positions—for example, the elimination of a recommendation to examine ways and means to commence negotiations “on a convention or framework of agreements to achieve global nuclear disarmament,” and another to identify “refraining from the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons” as a practical disarmament measure. Given this, and given that the Egyptian and Cuban problems with the recommendations are well known, it could be disingenuous for some delegations to suggest that consensus is nigh.

However, as Ambassador Landman of the Netherlands pointed out, the Chair knows best what the remaining difficulties are. He noted that while the statements delivered during Thursday’s plenary made it sound like the PrepCom could “make the extra mile” and arrive at an agreement, the Chair should call upon those countries that in his view have to make that mile, to do so. The Chair agreed to postpone a decision on the recommendations until Friday morning, though he said he would not hold consultations with delegations between now and then. Suggesting that the delegations work with each other on the issue, he said he would be happy to hear about any new initiatives.

Despite uncertainty about the future of the recommendations, most delegations welcomed the overwhelmingly positive atmosphere at this PrepCom. The Australian ambassador, describing some of her previous PrepCom experiences as similar to “pulling teeth,” emphasized that since the Committee has already adopted an agenda and held substantive debates, the session should by no means be considered a failure if it is unable to forward recommendations to the RevCon.

Indeed, this is the most constructive NPT conference in quite some time. While it will be disappointing if the spirit of compromise is diminished in the debate over the recommendations, it does not mean the RevCon is a lost cause. The fact is, the majority of states parties were willing to compromise. And while it remains to be seen what the Obama administration’s official policies will look like by the 2010 RevCon or to what degree other states parties might be willing to “give and take” next year, there have been many promising indications of good will and cooperation at this PrepCom that should be carried forward as a manifestation of the recommendations.

14 May 2009

Reworking the recommendations

On Wednesday evening, after consultations with various delegations, the Chair released a revised version of his draft recommendations to the 2010 Review Conference.

Overall, the revisions weakened the recommendations on disarmament, civil society participation, and education, but have bolstered those on implementing the Middle East resolution. The sections on non-proliferation and nuclear energy have also been adjusted, purportedly in an attempt to create more balance between the three pillars. Each of the three pillars now has an “action plan,” as several delegates requested during their general comments on Tuesday.

It remains unclear as to whether the PrepCom will be able to adopt the recommendations the end of its session. The amount of time remaining could possibly allow for a second revised document to be offered Thursday afternoon, giving the PrepCom a last chance to adopt it Friday afternoon. However, if the Committee cannot agree to adopt the revised document on Thursday, it is likely that the Chair will have to forward it to the RevCon as a working paper, despite his aversion to such a solution.

Below is a detailed assessment of the differences between the original recommendations and the revised version, pointing out where recommendations have been strengthened, weakened, or changed to some effect.

Introduction
The introductory paragraph of the revised text, CRP.4/Rev.1, adds a sentence noting, “[t]he States parties reaffirm the need to maintain a balance between the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty.” It also explains in more depth the methodology of the recommendations, explaining that the recommendations include “elements for [the RevCon’s] consideration in evaluating the implementation of the undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty,” and “areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future.”

Section 1. Universality
The revised section on promoting universality has weaker language on disarmament. Where CRP.4 recommended the RevCon “declare that the Treaty provides a legal foundation for the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and for the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control” (the language of Article VI), CRP.4/Rev.1 simply recommends the RevCon, “[d]eclare that the Treaty remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.”

As per the Algerian delegation’s suggestion during the general comments on Tuesday, the language on non-states parties has been changed to recommend the RevCon call on them to join as non-nuclear weapon states and without conditions.

This section also has new language on compliance—adding “[recognizing] consequences for breaches of Treaty violations”— and on nuclear energy—adding “[r]eaffirm that the Treaty fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”

Section 2. Action plans
Rather than outlining one action plan on nuclear disarmament, CRP.4/Rev.1 includes a three-part action plan for all three pillars.

Disarmament
The “plan” for nuclear disarmament is similar, but contains a few substantial changes that diminish disarmament. While CRP.4 recommended the RevCon “[r]ecognize growing expectations for progress to achieve nuclear disarmament, and indicate support for ongoing and future efforts in these fields,” CRP.4/Rev.1 recommends the RevCon indicates support for ongoing and future efforts and recognizes “the importance of practical nuclear disarmament by all nuclear-weapon States.”

Likewise, while CRP.4 recommended the RevCon acknowledge that several commitments from 1995 and 2000 have not yet been fulfilled and called for an action plan to implement these commitments, CRP.4/Rev.1 simply recommends the RevCon “[r]eaffirm and update” these commitments, without mentioning they have not been fulfilled. It also divides the original list of disarmament initiatives into two paragraphs: one calling for facilitation of the entry into force of the CTBT and negotiations on a fissile materials [cut-off] treaty and the other calling for discussion on “ways and means to ensure the irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency of disarmament activities” and for recognition of the benefits of reducing operational status, reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons, and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, while the original version recommend the RevCon examine “ways and means to commence negotiations, in accordance with article VI, on a convention or framework of agreements to achieve global nuclear disarmament, and to engage non-parties to the Treaty,” the updates severely undermine this call by only recommending commencement of “open-ended discussions to identify possibilities available to establish an international legal framework for the achievement of global nuclear disarmament.” At least the new language also recommends the engagement of non-states parties “with the aim of attaining a world free of nuclear weapons.”

The language on security assurances, formerly in the non-proliferation section, has been moved to the disarmament section but remains identical.

Non-proliferation
The non-proliferation section has been strengthened. It now recommends the RevCon reaffirm that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is “a threat to international peace and security,” which is established language, rather than simply a “global challenge”.The paragraph on export controls adds quite a bit of substance, including a recommendation on transparency, dialogue, and cooperation and another calling for recognition of the importance of national rules and regulations on nuclear-related transfers.

There is also additional language on the IAEA, including a call for affirmation of “the need for full cooperation with the [IAEA] to resolve any outstanding verification issues,” which follows a new paragraph on the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. CRP.4/Rev.1 also recommends the RevCon “[r]eaffirm the importance of acceptance of the Agency’s full-scope safeguards,” and welcome the IAEA’s efforts to “increase the Agency’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activity” rather than just welcoming the IAEA’s efforts to strengthen safeguards.

Nuclear energy
Section 4 of CRP.4 covered nuclear energy, safety, and security. In CRP.4/Rev.1, ways to “advance peaceful uses of nuclear energy” has been given its own action plan and “ways and means to strengthen nuclear safety and security” is now a separate section.

The action plan on nuclear energy “notes” rather than “welcomes” the “growing applications” of nuclear technology, though it still reaffirms the “inalienable right” to nuclear energy of states parties.

Rather than stressing “the need to intensify consideration of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle,” the new version recommends stressing “the importance of extensive and transparent consultations in the consideration of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.” The rest of the language in this paragraph is the same as in the original.

Another paragraph has been added to include language on cooperation programmes to assist new-nuclear energy states develop adequate infrastructures.

Section 3. Nuclear safety and security
Maintaining much of the original language, the revised recommendations do not include the note that acquisition of nuclear materials by non-state actors “could potentially jeopardize the Treaty.” This section also no longer includes a recommendation to urge “careful consideration of measures of control and monitoring of global stocks” of weapon- usable materials “and the capacity to produce such materials” or to support efforts to “enhance the security of stockpiles” of such materials or to minimize their use in the civilian nuclear sector.

Section 4. Regional initiatives
Most of the language on nuclear weapon free zones remains the same, though in the new version the new Central Asian NWFZ is “noted” rather than welcomed. The new version adds a recommendation noting the importance of the UNDC’s guidelines for NWFZ, but it takes away the recommendation to “[n]ote the existence of strong support for the creating of a [NWFZ] in the Southern Hemisphere,” replacing it with a call to consider establishment of new zones “in regions with nuclear facilities and materials” and to note the importance of establishing WMDFZs.

Section 5. Middle East
Previously folded into the section on regional initiatives, the Middle East resolution now has its own section. Rather than describing the 1995 resolution as being “integrally linked” to the extension of the NPT, it is now “an essential element” of the decision to extend the Treaty.

The new version does continue to recommend consideration of a conference on implementing the resolution, though it no longer specifies the nuclear weapon states as the potential convenors. The rest of the section goes much further than the original language, adding a recommendation to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II at the RevCon “to consider practical steps to promote the earliest implementation” of the resolution and to consider appointing a special coordinator to hold consultations with the countries in the region and report to the review process, which has been suggested by Egypt and supported by other delegations, including the Russian Federation.

Section 6. Withdrawal
The two short paragraphs on withdrawal remain identical to the originals.

Section 7. Strengthening the review process
The new version eliminates the recommendation for consideration establishment of a “uniform, practical and cost-efficient reporting system for the implementation of the Treaty.” This section otherwise remains the same.

Section 8. Civil society; education
The new version significantly diminishes the recommendations on both subjects. It only recommends “noting” rather than “considering” the proposals for enhanced participation of NGOs in the review process. It also recommends “consideration” of the UN Secretary-General’s recommendations on disarmament and non-proliferation education rather than “encouraging” states to implement them, for which the original text called.

13 May 2009

Revised recommendations

After facilitating informal consultations between delegations on Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday morning, the PrepCom Chair released, at 5:45 PM on Wednesday, a revised version of his draft recommendations to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Analysis is forthcoming.