As the UNDC sees a third day without an agenda…

by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Tuesday morning, the Turkish delegation pondered how the Commission used to function, back when it actually managed to agree not just to an agenda but to recommendations for the General Assembly. It concluded that member states back then understood that the UNDC is a deliberative body not meant for negotiating binding texts. The Swedish delegation likewise argued that the UNDC was never meant to be a negotiating forum but that the way it has been working as not reflected this basic fact. Mr. Kvarnström noted that the UNDC has been described as the “think tank” of the disarmament machinery, “but such a description presupposes that some constructive thinking ought to actually emerge from our deliberations.”

The deliberative character of the UNDC should indeed give it the freedom to engage in discussions about anything. Yet, as High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane noted, “The greatest obstacles to progress in disarmament have long been the lack of trust or confidence in proposed initiatives due to uncertainties or suspicions about their true motivations.”

The aversion to agreeing to anything, whether procedural or substantive, binding or non-binding, has plagued all of the disarmament machinery for more than a decade. And this new cycle of the UNDC has been no different. Wednesday marked the third day of ongoing consultations to reach agreement on the agenda for the current UNDC cycle.

Proposed agenda

On the table is the Chair’s proposed compromise for the agenda, which indicates that the two agenda items would be “recommendations for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures to achieve the objective of a nuclear weapons free world” and “practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons”. The compromise also indicated that during general debate states could conduct discussions, in informal meetings, on working methods of the UNDC and on elements for a declaration of the fourth disarmament decade. For both issues, friends of the Chair would distribute draft outcome documents in order to engage in further informal consultations in order to reach consensus. The final decision on these documents would be taken by consensus in a plenary meeting.

Many delegations have expressed disappointment with this proposed compromise, which still only has vague and unspecific agenda items while priority items were left to plenary discussions. The EU had wanted working methods of the UNDC to be an agenda item while the NAM had wanted the declaration as an agenda item. However, most recognized that it was better than not adopting an agenda at all and many states indicated their flexibility in order to move forward.

However, France, supported by Russia and the United States, insisted that the proposed agenda item on nuclear disarmament be amended to only address “creating the conditions” for a “world without nuclear weapons” (rather than a world “free” from nuclear weapons—suggesting that they don’t see nuclear weapons as “bad things” of which the world needs to free itself). This continuing refusal on the part of the nuclear weapon states to concretely discuss nuclear disarmament is unacceptable to many other states, leading to an impasse.

In between rounds of consultations, the Chair has allowed member states to deliver general statements, which has led to some substantive discussion on working methods and the role of the UNDC.

Specific suggestions for moving forward

Poland’s delegation noted that all sessions of the UNDC have considered ways and means to enhance its functioning and suggested that the recommendations adopted during those sessions should serve as a basis for overcoming the current stalemate. To this end, it submitted a working paper to the Commission, which includes the following three recommendations:

1. Poland’s working paper urges that the current UND cycle should seriously consider including a joint statement or Chair’s summary that reflects the views or positions of different delegations in the UNDC’s report if consensus cannot be reached on specific agenda items, in accordance with a decision made by the UNDC in 1990.

2. The working paper also encourages interaction with experts, which should also be reflected in the Chair’s summary.

3. Finally, the paper urges states to make every effort to ensure that Chair’s of subsidiary bodies are elected during the organizational session, which would allow them to conduct informal consultations on the subjects of these bodies before the beginning of the substantive session.

Some delegations had other specific suggestions. The Swiss delegation proposed that the UNDC adopt a single agenda item, because in the current formulation, an impasse in one area impedes progress in the other. Mr. Bavaud of Switzerland also suggested the UNDC open its proceedings to exchanges with representatives from the academic world and civil society and that it submit a report to the General Assembly that reflects the substantive discussion in the UNDC, such as through a Chair’s summary.

Since the UNDC is not the only piece of the UN disarmament machinery suffering from stalemate, the Swiss delegation also suggested that the UNDC could examine the respective roles of the various organs of the machinery, their interaction, and the way it could possibly be improved. In the framework of this approach, the UNDC “could also examine the processes that would be required to carry out a reform of the existing machinery and ways of creating the conditions that would make this exercise possible.”

Political will or working methods?

The Republic of Korea, expressing frustration with the UN disarmament machinery as a whole, called the UNDC’s attention to the message of the UN Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament in January 2012, “when he made it clear that the General Assembly is ready to consider other options to move the disarmament agenda forward.” Ambassador Shin argued that it “is now time for the disarmament machinery to act and to halt its endless debate.” He argued that member states need to come to grips with the “very rationale of the UNDC and its working methods” and called for more focused topics for deliberation.

Brazil’s delegation also called for focused discussions, noting that the debate during the last UNDC cycle “was excessively general and ambitious, making it more difficult to have concrete results.” Kazakhstan called for a “fresh perspective” for this cycle of UNDC, steering clear of the stalemate of the last cycle. Benin’s delegation suggested adopting a “small steps” agenda so that the Commission can begin work on specific priorities on which it can actually reach agreement. The Benin delegate emphasized that making progress is vital because the status quo poses a danger to all states, leading inexorably as it does to the continuation of a world in which the arms race is ongoing and in which resources are being gobbled up by weapons. Cuba’s delegation likewise highlighted the growing expenditure on nuclear and other weapons, arguing that it is unacceptable that more money is spent on waging war than promoting development.

Despite general dissatisfaction with the working methods of the UNDC, many delegations see the lack of political will and flexibility as the main impediment to progress. Cuba’s delegation argued that while the working methods could be improved, they are not the real obstacles to progress. Likewise, the Egyptian delegation argued that the discussions on methods of work in 2006 and 2009 “did not yield sufficient measures” and instead confirmed that the stalemate is mainly caused by lack of political will to achieve progress on nuclear disarmament.

The Swiss delegation agreed that political will is often lacking or ineffectively capitalized upon, but also argued that lack of progress “is just as much due to causes that are institutional in nature.”Mr. Bavaud noted that the disarmament fora “no longer appear capable of providing answers to the challenges they face because many of the nations involved give precedence to questions of national security, to the detriment of global considerations.”

Norway’s delegation’s argued that it may be that the current standstill in disarmament multilateralism is due to lack of political will, but that this “would make it even more imperative to fully make use of the Commission to deliberate on matters where the views of member states differ, and consider ways to overcome these differences.” Mr. Langeland also noted that there has been progress lately, though there is growing impatience on how to eliminate nuclear weapons. He suggested that since UN member states have agreed on the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, they should make use of UNDC to deliberate on how to achieve this objective.

Likewise, the Australian delegation argued that the UNDC can play a key role in fostering the right environment, clarifying context, and sharing approaches for implementation of past commitments, such as the 2010 NPT action plan. Ms. Elias also noted that the UNDC’s discussions can also look at other complimentary measures to create a world free of nuclear weapons and suggested that they do this regardless of the language on specific agenda items.

Indeed, Brazil’s delegation called on states to “refrain from entering into blame games about who has caused this state of affairs” and to instead “engage in constructive discussions to find again the common ground needed to productive substantive and effective results in the area of disarmament.”

Regardless of what is on the UNDC’s agenda, “action has become a necessity,” as Mr. Bavaud of Switzerland said. “Restrictive approaches are no longer appropriate,” he argued, “because in today’s world, national interests and security in a global sense can no longer be separated. In this situation, we feel it is becoming increasingly difficult to deny the need for an in-depth review of the whole disarmament machinery, or of a new approach in this area.

The question is whether the multilateral disarmament bodies “will be able to translate the political will by an overwhelming majority of UN member states in advancing disarmament goals,” argued Mr. Langeland of Norway. “The alternative is continuing the process of making these two bodies even more marginalized. Lack of action in these two bodies will only increase the determination to consider other avenues in order to move forward.”

Package deal

by Dr. Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War

Day two of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) began with informal discussions regarding the Chair's revised proposal for an agenda to guide the UNDC's deliberations.

One major discussion dealt with the possibility of having single plenary sessions rather than parallel 'working' ones. There are always valid concerns involving the burdens on smaller missions of long meetings, though it is not clear how dividing into morning and afternoon sessions will require more issue attentiveness from delegations or how larger, plenary sessions will relieve pressure. In addition, there was debate about how to 'handle' discussions on working methods and on proposals for elements for a disarmament decade as well as concerns regarding the most appropriate issues to be adopted for the next three-year cycle.

For other disarmament stakeholders beyond the delegations, including civil society, these are all important concerns. Practical and concrete guidance from the UNDC on these matters would benefit all of our work, and would solidify the function of the UN as a 'norm setter' on disarmament matters. As the Chair reminded delegates as he distributed his ‘Compromise Proposal,’ 'negotiation' is not a part of the UNDC's mandate. Both agenda items and General Debate discussion topics would benefit from open deliberations by delegations, but fears of precedent-setting appear to be prevalent (if unacknowledged) in some quarters.

By accepting the Chair's compromise, as Norway reminded those in the room, no delegation is close to crossing a 'dangerous line.' There is simply no linkage of consequence binding these deliberations and the content of future negotiations. Indeed, a failure to agree on principles for deliberation sends a familiar, chilling message to the international community regarding prospects for future negotiation on real arms control and disarmament measures – an intensely difficult task and high bar to set.

For those states still requiring assurances, the Chair has indicated his willingness to compromise on all matters related to the agenda, including working methods. But of course, assurances offered are not always assurances received. The unspoken trust issues in the room might be related to individual items such as a repositioning of the 'decade' idea, but are likely related more to what we feel is a deeper concern for precedent setting. Where trust is insufficiently present, suspicions invade every crevice of possibility such that perceived misgivings behind even the most straightforward of proposals derail the process. Furthermore, even though there is no clear or direct line between non-binding deliberations in the UNDC and more-binding negotiations, the line seems visible to some delegations nonetheless. And the more disappointment is experienced in bodies such as the UNDC, the more substantial the connecting line seems to become.

The 'package deal' referred to by Iran and Cuba is an apt metaphor to describe the interconnected aspects of the UNDC's work insofar as delegations should view the ‘package’ of the items to be deliberated upon as a collection of issues that is representative of widespread compromise. At the same time, it should be understood by all delegations that the specific contents of this 'package' are flexible and that the fine print on the package label is for purposes of providing guidelines, not binding legislation.

Opening remarks and deliberating on the agenda

by Katherine Prizeman, Global Action to Prevent War

The President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, and the new High Representative for Disarmament Affairs addressed the opening of the 2012 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission (DC), all of whom expressed concerns over the lack of progress made in formulating and adopting consensus recommendations, guidelines, and proposals in the DC over the past twelve years. While there was affirmation that the DC plays an important role in the overall UN disarmament machinery as it provides a forum for deliberating on specific disarmament-related agenda items, the current impasse has contributed to growing frustrations related to a lack of political will, inadequate working methods, and a general and growing resistance to compromise. With each year that concludes without any consensus recommendations, progress will become more challenging and delegations will become even less engaged as frustration will grow over the lack of concrete results.

High Representative Angela Kane noted in her opening remarks that “fresh thinking and new ideas are needed.” She referred specifically to the Chairman’s proposal from the 2008 session on procedural and organizational changes, such as the possible participation of experts in the work of the DC. The Chairman of this year’s session, Ambassador Enrique Roman-Morey of Peru, has agreed to submit a Chairman’s summary documenting the exchange of views from the general debate, including discussion related to working methods. He has made clear that he does not intend to include working methods as a stand-alone agenda item. In whichever form, such discussions on working methods must be taken seriously as the workings of the DC over the last decade have been at best lackluster and at worse irrelevant.

The Chair has made clear in various forums that “business as usual” will not suffice. Inclusion of expert panels would surely contribute to more robust discussions on the substantive agenda items. Additional technical and conceptual expertise could buttress the formulation of recommendations for adoption by consensus. Injection of new perspectives and information by experts would be a welcome addition to the often generic statements delivered by delegations on the same agenda items carried over from year to year. For example, there is little argument among member states that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is an international security priority. As recommendations for achieving this goal do not enjoy the same consensus, the DC should be used as a forum for deliberating on (not negotiating) specific proposals and recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly on precisely this issue. The DC should not serve as just another forum for reaffirming general support for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Ambassador Roman-Morey has argued that the argument of “lack of political will” is not valid for the DC given its deliberative nature, as opposed to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that functions as the negotiating body for disarmament matters. Ambassador Roman-Morey has concluded that the role of this DC is in part to break the current deadlock by identifying recommendations that may contribute to solving the CD stalemate. It would be wise to use the DC as a means forward in helping to lay the conceptual groundwork for future multilateral agreements to be considered in the CD and related fora. Nonetheless, if the obstacle to progress in the DC is not, in fact, the lack of political will as expressed by the Chair, it would follow then that flaws in working methods of the DC must be responsible, to some degree, for its lack of consensus outcomes and be one of the primary factors contributing to its failures over the last twelve years. If this argument is correct, and the problem is primarily structural rather than political, then clearly the operative methods of deliberating in the DC are not lending themselves to adequate consensus building and, therefore, must be altered, reinvigorated, or otherwise addressed.

In moving towards an adopted Programme of Work, the Chairman has offered his suggestions for two substantive agenda items. He has recommended, in addition to the item on nuclear disarmament that is required, to include one on conventional weapons rather than on the disarmament decade or a fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD IV). Ambassador Roman-Morey has indicated that the decade and SSOD IV are not likely to garner the same consensus as nuclear or conventional weapons and, for the sake of much needed progress in the DC this year, delegations should adopt items that are more likely to find consensus. The Chair’s intention is to create two working groups focused on the two primary agenda items with a third open-ended group to discuss agenda items for the next cycle.

Chair’s recommendations:

1) Nuclear disarmament

a. Recommendations for establishing the necessary framework to achieve a world without nuclear weapons

b. Recommendations on lessons learned and the legacy of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones

c. Recommendations on the role of the DC in addressing security challenges of the 21^st century and reducing nuclear risks

2) Conventional weapons

a. Recommendations on strengthening and improving the effectiveness of the UN regional disarmament centers

b. Recommendations on effective confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons

Arguably even more important than the individual agenda items, the DC must find a way to achieve consensus on recommendations this year as it begins a new cycle of work and also celebrates its 60^th anniversary. In the absence of clear recommendations, the DC’s path towards irrelevance will become harder and harder to divert. And while the DC’s role has been obscured by years of inaction, diplomats still understand the value added of the DC is its ability to put forth general guidelines and recommendations on points of agreement among member states that can lay the groundwork for fruitful resolutions in the General Assembly and even negotiations in the CD. In order for progress to ensue, it is essential to maintain a clear perspective on the function of the DC. It is intended as a forum for introducing new proposals and suggested pathways forward, not a formal negotiating body – a flexible mandate that makes it possible for the DC to exceed expectations, not only disappoint them.

2012 Substantive Session of the Disarmament Commission: Eager for Consensus

by Katherine Prizeman, Global Action to Prevent War

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is hailed as the 'sole, multilateral deliberative body' mandated to make recommendations on two or three specific issues related to disarmament, one of which must pertain to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. At the 2011 session the US delegation referred to the UNDC as a "deliberative think tank on arms control". The UNDC, universal in its representation—a significant characteristic to note in contrast to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which does not include the participation of all member states—is tasked to formulate consensus-based recommendations to be delivered to the General Assembly prior to the start of the First Committee. These recommendations are then to be considered and integrated as part of the Committee's agenda of work.

Unfortunately, the UNDC has been unable to agree upon and subsequently adopt any recommendations in more than a decade's time. The conclusion of the 2011 session, without adoption of any substantive recommendations, marked the twelfth year of no agreement on any of the agenda items—nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, a declaration of the 2010s as the next disarmament decade, and confidence-building measures around conventional weapons. After three weeks of plenary meetings and working groups, many delegations were outspoken about their discontent, disappointment, and frustration. The Mexican delegation noted that this continued failure is unacceptable when the world is “threatened by nuclear weapons and excessive accumulation of destabilizing conventional weapons” stating that the only tangible result of the UNDC has been the expenditure of resources by taxpayers.

Frustration around the multilateral disarmament fora is not unique to the UNDC. The other obvious point of contention and frustration is, of course, the CD that has fought since 1998 to agree on a programme of work. The seemingly intractable stalemate in the Geneva-based body has become an alarming concern for member states, civil society, and the Secretary-General himself who has publicly stated that the CD is “no longer living up to expectations.” Proposals for working outside of the CD have come to bear among delegations, particularly in terms of negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

Nonetheless, arms control and disarmament are not without their elements of optimism. The forthcoming Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) negotiations, although wrought with its own set of complexities and challenges, represent a majority opinion that arms transfers should be regulated by a set of common international standards. There is little doubt that such a treaty should exist, although the strength and scope of the future treaty remain unclear. Similarly, the Programme of Action on small arms (UNPoA) is a consensus-based framework, adopted by all member states in 2001, for national, regional, and international provisions for preventing and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs). Implementation of the UNPoA has had a mixed record overall, but the review process has nonetheless had marked success and continues to seek ways of strengthening implementation, most recently with last week's Preparatory Committee for the August Review Conference. The PrepCom was able to achieve its goals of setting an agenda of work, adopting rules of procedure, and endorsing a Chair for the Review Conference (Ambassador Ogwu of Nigeria).

The 2012 session of the UNDC will begin a new three-year cycle and will meet for three weeks in both plenary and working group sessions chaired by Ambassador Enrique Roman-Morey of Peru. Consensus on its provisional agenda remains elusive. Some delegations have expressed interest in including an agenda item that includes an "introspective look" at the Commission's role in the broader disarmament machinery and examines its working methods. However, there is no consensus on this point as some member states contend that the obstacle to adopting recommendations is not in the working methods, but rather the political will of states. There have also been calls for more specific subjects to be vetted rather than the generic and repetitive discussions often held in the UNDC rendering it irrelevant to the wider international security discourse.

The UNDC has the unique opportunity to deliberate disarmament and arms control issues in a universal forum prior to the start of the First Committee in the fall. Recommendations offered from the UNDC could help streamline and focus the vast spread of issues that need to be covered in the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) as well as underscore issues that are most important to member states. Moreover, whereas the CD has garnered much of the attention of the international community, albeit exclusively negative attention because of its current state of stalemate, the UNDC has the flexibility to arguably work with less politicization, and "fly under the radar" of sorts, while enjoying universal participation.

The UNDC must use this new cycle as a point of departure from the methods and habits of the last decade (such as generic statements of support for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament) to tackle the obstacles to consensus that have prevented the formulation of any principles, guidelines, or recommendations. In order to do so, it is important that member states address both the political will and the working methods issues. The stalemate is surely due in part to the lack of will of governments to commit to recommendations (even non-binding ones as they are). Likewise, the work of the UNDC has also been impeded by its methods insofar as member states continue to discuss the same issues in the same manner, ultimately leading to the same results year after y ear. It would be logical to explore alternative methods of work. It would be worthwhile to explore other ways of deliberating, such as inclusion of expert panels, NGO statements, or other specialized presentations that could contribute to the conversation.

Many member states identify disarmament and arms control, related to both weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, as among the most pressing priorities on the international agenda. As such, the UNDC's path towards irrelevance must be altered if these priorities are to be genuinely addressed in all forums available to the international community.