Package deal

by Dr. Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War

Day two of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) began with informal discussions regarding the Chair's revised proposal for an agenda to guide the UNDC's deliberations.

One major discussion dealt with the possibility of having single plenary sessions rather than parallel 'working' ones. There are always valid concerns involving the burdens on smaller missions of long meetings, though it is not clear how dividing into morning and afternoon sessions will require more issue attentiveness from delegations or how larger, plenary sessions will relieve pressure. In addition, there was debate about how to 'handle' discussions on working methods and on proposals for elements for a disarmament decade as well as concerns regarding the most appropriate issues to be adopted for the next three-year cycle.

For other disarmament stakeholders beyond the delegations, including civil society, these are all important concerns. Practical and concrete guidance from the UNDC on these matters would benefit all of our work, and would solidify the function of the UN as a 'norm setter' on disarmament matters. As the Chair reminded delegates as he distributed his ‘Compromise Proposal,’ 'negotiation' is not a part of the UNDC's mandate. Both agenda items and General Debate discussion topics would benefit from open deliberations by delegations, but fears of precedent-setting appear to be prevalent (if unacknowledged) in some quarters.

By accepting the Chair's compromise, as Norway reminded those in the room, no delegation is close to crossing a 'dangerous line.' There is simply no linkage of consequence binding these deliberations and the content of future negotiations. Indeed, a failure to agree on principles for deliberation sends a familiar, chilling message to the international community regarding prospects for future negotiation on real arms control and disarmament measures – an intensely difficult task and high bar to set.

For those states still requiring assurances, the Chair has indicated his willingness to compromise on all matters related to the agenda, including working methods. But of course, assurances offered are not always assurances received. The unspoken trust issues in the room might be related to individual items such as a repositioning of the 'decade' idea, but are likely related more to what we feel is a deeper concern for precedent setting. Where trust is insufficiently present, suspicions invade every crevice of possibility such that perceived misgivings behind even the most straightforward of proposals derail the process. Furthermore, even though there is no clear or direct line between non-binding deliberations in the UNDC and more-binding negotiations, the line seems visible to some delegations nonetheless. And the more disappointment is experienced in bodies such as the UNDC, the more substantial the connecting line seems to become.

The 'package deal' referred to by Iran and Cuba is an apt metaphor to describe the interconnected aspects of the UNDC's work insofar as delegations should view the ‘package’ of the items to be deliberated upon as a collection of issues that is representative of widespread compromise. At the same time, it should be understood by all delegations that the specific contents of this 'package' are flexible and that the fine print on the package label is for purposes of providing guidelines, not binding legislation.