26 October 2009

Operationalising the vision for a nuclear weapon free world

Presented by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will, at the UNGA First Committee, 23 October 2009

For more than sixty years, civil society has been calling on governments to take action to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons. US President Obama’s pledge in Prague to seek “a world free of nuclear weapons” brought the hope of billions of people to the highest levels of international responsibility.

We have chosen in this statement not to comment in detail on specific resolutions that the First Committee has before it, but to talk about how nuclear disarmament interconnects with other weapons and security challenges in today’s complex security environment and to put forward a few concrete ideas toward operationalising the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.

First, some interconnections.

At the DPI/NGO conference in Mexico City in September, 1300 participants representing over 340 NGOs from more than 55 countries endorsed a final declaration recognising that security, peace, disarmament, human rights, gender equality, and development are closely interconnected at the local national, regional, and global levels.

One important element underscoring all of these issues is military spending. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, global military expenditure in 2008 is estimated to have totaled $1464 billion. This represents an increase of 45 per cent in the past ten years. The US military expenditure has reached the highest level in real terms since World War II. It is now responsible for at least 40 per cent of total global military spending.

Nuclear weapons, and the wider global military-industrial complex, consume vast resources that could be put to better use.

Consider just one example. The head of the UN Climate Change Secretariat Yvo De Boer estimated recently that the annual cost of cutting global emissions of greenhouse gases will be $200 billion. It will cost another US$100 billion per year to cope with the effects of climate change. This means that just one-fifth of annual global military spending budget can help reduce the scale and worldwide consequences of climate change.

Nuclear weapons cannot help us address climate change, poverty, child mortality, or injustice. Instead, they act as an existential threat to humanity and life on this planet. They also maintain the structural inequalities between the nuclear-armed powers and the great majority of states, and incite some states to seek nuclear weapons. They support establishments and institutions that see their interests as being well served by a mode of military dominance ultimately underwritten by nuclear weapons. They do not provide security for the citizens of the world.

Civil society groups and many states have long recognised the need to develop more effective resources and tools for security, defence, and conflict resolution than weapons. We advocate pursuit of human security, through the advancement of the interconnected issues above. However, none of the interconnecting issues should be treated as preconditions for nuclear disarmament. In fact, there is no basis for demanding general and complete disarmament or a settlement of all regional disputes as preconditions for eliminating nuclear weapons. The pursuit of nuclear disarmament and achievement of a legally-binding regime that eliminates and prohibits nuclear weapons will greatly facilitate global security and efforts to build peace.

Which leads us to a few suggestions on how to operationalise the vision for a world free of nuclear weapons.

There are many resolutions before you on various aspects of nuclear weapons. We join in supporting many of these efforts, including bringing the CTBT into force, reinforcing the existing nuclear weapon free zones and promoting the establishment of additional zones in Europe and the Arctic as well as the Middle East and North-East Asia, reducing and eliminating strategic and non-strategic arsenals, and fulfilling the NPT disarmament commitments undertaken in 1995 and 2000.

The common factor preventing progress on all these issues is that some governments continue to place high value on nuclear weapons, whether for security, status, or power projection.

When leaders come to the UN General Assembly and Security Council and say they want a nuclear weapon free world, we have to ask how they are changing their policies and doctrines to make this possible. The most conducive path to such a world is for all of the nuclear weapon states to marginalise the role of nuclear weapons in concrete ways, such as by:

  • agreeing to legally-binding security assurances not to attack non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons;

  • committing not to use nuclear weapons as a tool for “pre-emptive strike”;

  • rejecting counterforce and countervalue doctrines; and

  • excluding “extended deterrence” arrangements in their doctrines;

  • declaring that as a matter of national policy they will not design, develop, or produce new design nuclear warheads or modernise existing warheads.

Trading some arms control agreements or arsenal reduction for modernised nuclear weapons research and production facilities capable of building the nuclear threat anew is not disarmament. If the danger of nuclear war is to be eliminated, ceasing to plan and build for an eternal nuclear threat must come early, not late, in the process. The “nuclear danger” does not come from without, but from within. To seek to “hedge” against the nuclear threat only perpetuates it, sustaining the global climate of fear and distrust that makes real disarmament progress always a receding goal.

To this end, it is good that the United States and Russian Federation have returned to the negotiating table to replace START. The NPT Review Conference should include commitment to further bilateral reductions. In the next round, the United States and Russian Federation should each cut their deployed and stored nuclear weapons and delivery systems to at least the low hundreds. This would facilitate multilateral negotiations on elimination. They should also cut their nuclear weapon budgets in half and commit to zero funding for any modernisation or refurbishment programmes.

Furthermore, it is important not to be mesmerised by negotiations, which can be derailed by domestic or international developments. The United States and Russia, and other states with nuclear weapons, can and should undertake unilateral reductions, as the 13 Practical Steps provide.

Many non-nuclear weapon states also have a role to play. Thirty non-nuclear weapon states shelter under the US nuclear umbrella. Citizens in NATO countries, Australia, South Korea, and Japan have long advocated for their countries to let go of the cold war nuclear umbrellas and forge more independent and balanced relationships for national, regional, and international security. Now key legislators from all these countries are joining the call. We urge governments to heed these calls and act to denuclearise their alliances and relations with other states. Many proponents of retaining nuclear weapons in the United States espouse “extended deterrence” as their justification. Public statements from governments under the US nuclear umbrella stating that they believe their security commitments will still be viable without nuclear weapons would thus remove a key obstacle to deeper reductions in the US nuclear arsenal. Removing nuclear sharing from NATO’s Strategic Concept, combined with removal of nuclear weapons from Europe, would be an important confidence-building measure and would likely facilitate bilateral dialogue that could lead to much deeper cuts in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals.

Like many of you, we welcomed that the UN Security Council held a special session this September on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. While Resolution 1887 included concrete operational commitments to help prevent nuclear proliferation and other kinds of nuclear insecurity, it failed to include similarly concrete measures to advance disarmament. Disarmament cannot take a back seat to non-proliferation, nor can measures undertaken to prevent proliferation be considered acts of disarmament.

We hope that the cooperation forged among the P5 in the drafting of this resolution will continue and grow to engage non-nuclear weapon states, and that the P5 and other nuclear weapon possessors will find similar unity of purpose in implementing specific disarmament measures.

To this end, all states interested in serious nuclear disarmament should, inter alia:

  • Oppose conditioning approval of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on deals for entrenching and expanding weapons complexes, on retaining the option of designing and manufacturing modified or new-design warheads, or on modernizing delivery systems. They should also call for the closure of all nuclear test sites.

  • Negotiate for a fissile materials treaty that comprehensively prevents use of existing materials outside military programs for weapons acquisition and that facilitates disarmament.

  • Immediately and forcefully convey to nuclear weapon possessors that they must reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines and in international relations.

  • Support UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s call, in his five-point plan for nuclear disarmament, for the possession of any weapon of mass destruction to be considered a ‘global taboo’.

  • Emphasise that it would be a crime against humanity if anyone were to use nuclear weapons, anywhere in the world, for any purpose whatsoever. In this context, we applaud the decision of the International Committee of the Red Cross to speak out on nuclear weapons during this First Committee session.

  • Commit to the objective of a Nuclear Weapons Convention and begin the process that will lead towards this objective. Those that are states parties to the NPT should put this commitment into their statements and papers to the 2010 Review Conference and push for it to be included in any final documents.

Civil society experts developed a model Nuclear Weapons Convention some years ago as a resource and guide, with suggestions and options for how to prohibit, reduce, and eliminate nuclear weapons safely and securely, while providing insurance against future break-outs. This model Convention has been circulated by the Secretary-General as an official UN document.

There are some who say that it is premature to consider a Nuclear Weapons Convention at this time. Work on a Nuclear Weapons Convention will ensure full implementation of the NPT and help facilitate nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation steps.

Abolishing nuclear weapons will help move the world away from a system of competing nation-states seeking military advantage and open the way to putting real, equitable, environmentally sustainable, human security interests at the centre of national policies.

Victor Hugo wrote that: “More powerful than the march of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come.” The idea whose time has come is that the abolition of nuclear weapons is not only desirable, but possible, achievable, practical, and urgently necessary.

05 October 2009

First Committee 2009 opens

This year's UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security will run from 5 October-3 November 2009. Check out the Reaching Critical Will website for all statements, resolutions, reports, and other information. Also subscribe to RCW's First Committee Monitor for full NGO reporting coverage of all topics.

Heading into another session of the First Committee, the situation looks a little more positive than last year. Issues related to disarmament—from nuclear weapons to cluster bombs—have received increasing attention throughout 2009 from governments, the media, and the general public. Many high-profile individuals have called for a nuclear weapon free world; many governments have ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Civil society has continued campaigning around these weapons and others—small arms, antipersonnel landmines, depleted uranium weapons, space weapons—to prevent their development, modernisation, production, trade, and stockpiling.

There is a new administration in Washington that appears interested in active multilateralism. The United States fully participated in EU3+3 talks with Iran for the first time. Russian and US officials have been talking about reducing their arsenals further. The UN Security Council held a presidential Summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on 24 October, coinciding with the sixth Entry Into Force conference of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—which 150 states have now ratified. Disarmament was a central theme for many high-level delegates speaking to the UN General Assembly’s general debate in September, with 80 countries speaking about disarmament—up from 19 in 2008.

The heightened awareness and activity around disarmament is encouraging. However, those concerned with concrete movement toward a more secure and equitable world order with less armaments and reduced military expenditure need to take the time to separate the rhetoric from the reality. Now is the time for action, but it is equally crucial to ensure that the actions taken in the name of disarmament actually achieve that goal.

With the change in administration in the United States, the US government and several of its allies have adopted a new rhetoric on nuclear disarmament. They have begun to espouse policies for a “nuclear weapon free world” that do not actually include specific or time-bound steps for disarmament. In fact, these measures have focused nearly exclusively on strengthening or demanding new nuclear non-proliferation measures and commitments from non-nuclear weapon states, while at the same time maintaining the status quo (i.e. no progress) on nuclear disarmament.

The process toward an Arms Trade Treaty faces similar dangers of co-option by the powerful few who have interests at stake other than peace, justice, and security. Civil society and most governments want the ATT to reduce the human costs associated with the proliferation of conventional arms. However, thus far discussions have reached a lowest common denominator consensus only on dealing with illicit trade. Whether or not states will be able to agree to a treaty that has any real benefit to human security, by applying humanitarian and human rights standards to arms transfer decisions, is far from assured.

Civil society and concerned governments need to ensure that discussions and actions around disarmament and non-proliferation are clear and balanced. We also need to shift the language of the debate away from that which focuses on so-called “national security”—which in reality is the economic security only of the elite, technologically proficient classes of the state—to that which focuses on human security. To a large extent this is already happening in the Arms Trade Treaty process. For nuclear weapons, it has hardly happened at all outside of particular segments of civil society.

John Borrie, who works for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, has looked closely at the initiatives to ban cluster munitions and landmines for lessons that could potentially be applied to the elimination of nuclear weapons. He notes that those working to abolish cluster munitions and antipersonnel landmines reframed the discourse and acceptability of these weapons in broader terms than before. Campaigners focused on the human impacts of the weapons alongside their purported military advantages and consciously shifted the burden of proof for the continued acceptability of a weapon onto users and producers. In the case of nuclear weapons, this means forcing those who want to keep them to try to make a convincing case for their acceptability in humanitarian terms, regardless of their purported military advantage.

Reaching Critical Will asks all delegations to the First Committee to take the time this year to debate the humanitarian merits of nuclear weapons. During the thematic debate on nuclear weapons, it would be extremely useful if delegations would address the values, perceptions, and interests of nuclear weapon possession and abolition. Getting away from Cold War deterrence theories, we are interested in hearing a debate on the moral, legal, and humanitarian justifications for the retention or elimination of nuclear weapons.

The First Committee is the place for this debate. All UN member states can participate. It makes recommendations to the General Assembly through resolutions related to all issues of disarmament and international security. Its work feeds into other disarmament machinery, including the Conference on Disarmament and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The time is ripe—we are coming out of the UN Security Council Summit on nuclear issues and heading into the NPT Review Conference. Having a frank discussion about the reality of nuclear weapons, without all the rhetoric, would be instrumental to actually making concrete steps toward true disarmament and stronger non-proliferation.

25 September 2009

UN Security Council: Working toward a nuclear weapon free world?

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Yesterday, US President Obama chaired a UN Security Council meeting on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It was a great opportunity for the five permanent members and nuclear weapon states—China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States—to make concrete commitments to nuclear disarmament and lay out the steps toward a nuclear weapon free world.

Unfortunately, these governments instead used the Summit to lay out their vision for stricter requirements for non-nuclear weapon states to prove they are not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. As UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown said during his General Assembly statement: “Britain will insist that the onus on non-nuclear states is that in future it is for them to prove they are not developing nuclear weapons.”

Yet despite rhetoric to the contrary, the five permanent members did not extend any new commitments for themselves to eliminate nuclear weapons in compliance with their legal obligation to do so.
  • The Summit resolution emphasised non-proliferation over disarmament, requesting new requirements for non-nuclear weapon states to prove their status and intent.

  • Most of the nuclear weapon states did not reference their previous commitments to steps toward nuclear disarmament nor set out new ones.

  • The Summit promoted nuclear power as a safe, clean, source of energy that will help combat climate change.

However, many of the non-permanent members of the Council recognised the problem with this approach to non-proliferation and disarmament and outlined several concrete proposals
to advance both agendas in a balanced manner
.

Read Reaching Critical Will’s report on the Summit for details of these suggestions!

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom released a statement before the meeting, calling on the UN Security Council members to make serious commitments to disarmament along with their requests on non-proliferation. WILPF continues to call upon Council members—and all other members of the United Nations—to work toward a nuclear free world through real, concrete actions and commitments. For example:

1. The UN Security Council should call for a halt to development, production, design, modernization, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

2. It should also fulfill its commitment to formulate a plan for disarmament with the least diversion of the world’s human and economic resources toward weapons, as it is instructed to do in Article 26 of the UN Charter.

3. The context of all non-proliferation measures should be designed as steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, not toward their indefinite possession by an elite group of states.

4. The UN Security Council should urge governments to accelerate and enlarge their support for development of commercially viable renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy and to phase-out nuclear power, as a measure strengthening both non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

23 September 2009

Disarmament at the General Assembly

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

This morning the UN General Assembly began its general debate, with heads of state and foreign ministers delivering statements on their policies and priorities on a broad range of issues for the year ahead. Reaching Critical Will will be monitoring these statements and creating an index of all references made to issues of disarmament, peace, and security. As the debate continues, please keep an eye on the index, which is searchable both by country and by topic.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon opened the session morning; here are his remarks related to disarmament:

“...let this be the year that nations united to free our world of nuclear weapons. For too long, this great cause has lain dormant. That is why, last October, I proposed a 5-point plan for putting disarmament back on the global agenda. And now the international climate is changing. The Russian Federation and the United States have pledged to cut their nuclear arsenals. This coming May, at the UN Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, we have opportunity to push for real progress.

Tomorrow’s historic Security Council summit—chaired by the President of the United States, with us for the first time—offers a fresh start. With action now, we can get the ratifications to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into force. Together, let us make this the year we agreed to banish the bomb.”

US President Obama also delivered his remarks, much of which had to do with disarmament and related issues:


I have outlined a comprehensive agenda to seek the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. In Moscow, the United States and Russia announced that we would pursue substantial reductions in our strategic warheads and launchers.”

And we address our priorities here, in this institution—for instance, through the Security Council meeting that I will chair tomorrow on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.”

Today, I put forward four pillars that are fundamental to the future that we want for our children: non-proliferation and disarmament; the promotion of peace and security; the preservation of our planet; and a global economy that advances opportunity for all people.”

First, we must stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and seek the goal of a world without them. This institution was founded at the dawn of the atomic age, in part because man’s capacity to kill had to be contained. For decades, we averted disaster, even under the shadow of a super-power stand-off. But today, the threat of proliferation is growing in scope and complexity. If we fail to act, we will invite nuclear arms races in every region, and the prospect of wars and acts of terror on a scale that we can hardly imagine.

A fragile consensus stands in the way of this frightening outcome – the basic bargain that shapes the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. It says that all nations have the right to peaceful nuclear energy; that nations with nuclear weapons have the responsibility to move toward disarmament; and those without them have the responsibility to forsake them. The next twelve months could be pivotal in determining whether this compact will be strengthened or will slowly dissolve.

America will keep our end of the bargain. We will pursue a new agreement with Russia to substantially reduce our strategic warheads and launchers.”

We will complete a Nuclear Posture Review that opens the door to deeper cuts, and reduces the role of nuclear weapons.”

Nuclear Testing: “We will move forward with ratification of the Test Ban Treaty, and work with others to bring the Treaty into force so that nuclear testing is permanently prohibited.”

Fissile Materials: “And we will call upon countries to begin negotiations in January on a treaty to end the production of fissile material for weapons.”

Nuclear Terrorism: “I will also host a Summit next April that reaffirms each nation’s responsibility to secure nuclear material on its territory, and to help those who can’t – because we must never allow a single nuclear device to fall into the hands of a violent extremist. And we will work to strengthen the institutions and initiatives that combat nuclear smuggling and theft.”

Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programmes: “All of this must support efforts to strengthen the NPT. Those nations that refuse to live up to their obligations must face consequences. This is not about singling out individual nations – it is about standing up for the rights of all nations that do live up to their responsibilities. Because a world in which IAEA inspections are avoided and the United Nation’s demands are ignored will leave all people less safe, and all nations less secure. In their actions to date, the governments of North Korea and Iran threaten to take us down this dangerous slope. We respect their rights as members of the community of nations. I am committed to diplomacy that opens a path to greater prosperity and a more secure peace for both nations if they live up to their obligations.

But if the governments of Iran and North Korea choose to ignore international standards; if they put the pursuit of nuclear weapons ahead of regional stability and the security and opportunity of their own people; if they are oblivious to the dangers of escalating nuclear arms races in both East Asia and the Middle East – then they must be held accountable. The world must stand together to demonstrate that international law is not an empty promise, and that Treaties will be enforced. We must insist that the future not belong to fear.”

Fissile Materials: “At the Conference on Disarmament, we agreed on a work plan to negotiate an end to the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.”

Nuclear Testing: “And this week, my Secretary of State will become the first senior American representative to the annual Members Conference of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”

He also had some good remarks on multilateralism:

Now is the time for all of us to take our share of responsibility for a global response to global challenges.

Responsibility and leadership in the 21st century demand more. In an era when our destiny is shared, power is no longer a zero sum game. No one nation can or should try to dominate another nation. No world order that elevates one nation or group of people over another will succeed. No balance of power among nations will hold. The traditional division between nations of the south and north makes no sense in an interconnected world. Nor do alignments of nations rooted in the cleavages of a long gone Cold War.

The time has come to realize that the old habits and arguments are irrelevant to the challenges faced by our people. They lead nations to act in opposition to the very goals that they claim to pursue, and to vote – often in this body – against the interests of their own people. They build up walls between us and the future that our people seek, and the time has come for those walls to come down. Together, we must build new coalitions that bridge old divides – coalitions of different faiths and creeds; of north and south, east and west; black, white, and brown.”


Keeping checking the RCW Disarmament Index for more.

21 September 2009

WILPF Statement to the UN Security Council in anticipation of its 24 September 2009 meeting on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) welcomes the UN Security Council Summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament to be held on 24 September 2009. We urge the UN Security Council to use this opportunity to constructively contribute to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by taking steps toward a nuclear weapon free world and the promotion of collective human security and security for all life on this planet.

Ahead of the summit, the US government released a draft resolution for the UN Security Council to consider as an outcome document, which was then consolidated into a revised draft with input from other Council members. WILPF is encouraged by the scope of the document, which covers a wide range of important issues. In particular, WILPF welcomes its recognition of the importance of negative security assurances and nuclear weapon free zone treaties and its commitment to supporting the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency on non-proliferation and safeguards. We are especially pleased with the addition of a preambular paragraph in the revised version that the welcomes and encourages “the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament” (PP23).

However, both versions of the draft resolution focus nearly exclusively on strengthening existing non-proliferation measures and advocating new, more stringent requirements, while at the same time maintaining the status quo (i.e. no progress) on nuclear disarmament.

The only reference to disarmament in the operative paragraphs of the resolution simply reiterates Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (OP4—all references are to the revised version of the resolution, dated 18 September 2009). The references to nuclear weapon free zone treaties (PP13 and PP14), negative security assurances (PP15), and “the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament” (PP11) in the preamble are not accompanied by concrete actions in the operative paragraphs. Neither draft mentions the thirteen practical steps toward nuclear disarmament that was unanimously agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, nor any other nuclear disarmament proposal, such as the UN Secretary-General’s five-point plan for disarmament or an international Nuclear Weapons Convention or framework agreement. In addition, the only reference in the resolution to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is to “monitor closely any situations” involving their proliferation (OP25).

Meanwhile, the draft goes far beyond non-proliferation commitments outlined in the NPT, calling for UN Security Council consideration of all “situations of noncompliance with nonproliferation commitments” (OP1), encouraging states to consider the Additional Protocol a new standard when making nuclear export decisions (OP17), and urging states “to require as a condition of nuclear exports” that IAEA safeguards continue even if the state withdraws from its safeguards agreement (OP16). The first of these demands does not indicate how determinations of non-compliance will be made, or by whom, or which non-proliferation obligations are included in the scope of this demand. In addition, there has of yet been no agreement in the NPT or IAEA frameworks about where or by which methods situations of non-compliance should be dealt with. It is traditionally up to the relevant treaty or organisation to determine these conditions, not external bodies. Furthermore, the resolution does not refer cases of non-compliance with disarmament obligations to the UN Security Council.

The other two non-proliferation examples given above—and several others in the resolution—have been brought up in the NPT context before and have been met with opposition by many non-nuclear weapons states. These measures could indeed be beneficial to strengthening non-proliferation, but they cannot be extended without reciprocal commitments to disarmament.

The obfuscation of several paragraphs in the resolution is also problematic. OP7 “deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.” It is unclear which resolutions are being referred to in this paragraph. None of the UN Security Council resolutions on Iran’s nuclear programme determine that the programme constitutes a “threat to international peace and security.” However, these resolutions are reaffirmed in PP17 of the draft.

PP11 fails to acknowledge that some of the recognised nuclear weapon states have not ratified relevant protocols of some nuclear weapon free zone treaties. In addition, the encouragement of “efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy” in OP9 does not acknowledge the extreme environmental risks of nuclear power or the nuclear fuel cycle or the problems posed by both for the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world.

In order to achieve a meaningful outcome that advances an equitable and secure nuclear weapon free world, WILPF encourages the UN Security Council to call for concrete actions and commitments to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

On disarmament, the UN Security Council should:

  • Call for a halt to development, production, design, modernization, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and for the establishment of international controls on delivery systems and anti-missile systems;

  • Call for transparency regarding the size and status of nuclear weapon forces;

  • Refer to the International Court of Justice’s 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons;

  • Call for concrete actions on the 1995 and 2000 NPT decisions and commitments;

  • Fulfill its commitment to formulate a plan for nuclear disarmament with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, pursuant to Article 26 of the UN Charter;

  • Call upon the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations of a fissile material treaty in 2010 on the basis of the Shannon Mandate and to address the factors that have complicated the negotiation process in the interim months; and

  • Call on all nuclear weapon states to drop their reservations to relevant protocols of nuclear weapon free zone treaties and ratify all such treaties.

On non-proliferation, the UN Security Council should ensure that its related requirements and commitments do not exhort the current imbalance between “nuclear have’s and have not’s” by demanding tighter restrictions on the behaviour of non-nuclear weapon states while promising disarmament by the nuclear weapon states as an “ultimate” goal in the distant future. The context of all non-proliferation measures should designed as steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, not toward their indefinite possession by an elite group of states.

On nuclear energy, the UN Security Council should urge governments to accelerate and enlarge their support for development of commercially viable renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy and to phase-out nuclear power, as a measure strengthening both non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

17 September 2009

Conference on Disarmament concludes, without conducting substantive work

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Thursday, 17 September, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) met for its final plenary meeting of 2009. It adopted its report to the General Assembly, with a few amendments, and the delegations of Japan, the Netherlands, and Canada submitted the International Panel on Fissile Materials’ draft fissile materials treaty to the CD as an official document. But the fact that the Conference was unable to implement its programme of work, adopted back in May, overshadowed the closing meeting.

Many delegations expressed frustration that despite all best attempts to move forward with concrete action, the CD remained in deadlock for its twelfth year in a row. Mexico’s Ambassador Gómez-Oliver lamented that the CD, whose “very mandate would oblige it to be a main role player,” is not only on the margins but is actually blocking concrete action. She called on the CD to seek every means possible to transcend its difficulties, examine its methods of work, reflect on its mandate, and reestablish its credibility.

The CD’s failure to reach consensus on implementing its programme of work reflects the deeply entrenched obstacles in the path of abolishing nuclear weapons. These obstacles are by no means intractable; the differences in delegate positions and concerns are certainly not impassable.

However, with only four months until the start of the 2010 session, CD member states have some intense intersessional consultations ahead of them to bridge the gaps between positions, or more importantly, resolve underlying concerns. The commitment of this year’s and next year’s P6 members to work together during these months is encouraging.

Some of the work toward consensus, however, can only be accomplished through the good faith relations between states in the international community at large. The impasse in the CD is a product of poor international relations, characterized by double-standards, discrimination, mistrust, and regional and international power imbalances. These issues deserve serious attention in the intervening months and should be considered in the context of moving toward an equitable nuclear weapon free world that enhances human security and the security for all life on the planet.

06 August 2009

WILPF Statement on the 64th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

On 6 and 9 August 1945, the United States dropped two nuclear weapons on two Japanese cities—one on Hiroshima and the other on Nagasaki. These acts killed 200,000 civilians by the end of 1945 and many more in the years that followed. The development, manufacture, testing, deployment, and sharing of nuclear weapons continues affecting the Earth and its people today. The threat of the use of these weapons still exists. The arms race is not yet over.

While the United States and Russia are currently engaged in talks to reduce their stockpiles, the proposed agreement does not affect warheads held in reserve, “non-strategic” weapons, or the size of the total stockpile, nor does it require dismantlement of any nuclear warheads.1 Meanwhile, both countries have plans to modernize their nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

A US plan for the development of a missile “defence” system in Europe has also increased tensions between the two countries. Meanwhile, China continues to modernize and expand its arsenal. The United Kingdom decided to renew its nuclear system last year. France’s president, while promising to reduce his country’s stockpile, also promised that he will retain the possibility to “send a nuclear warning” to underscore France’s “resolve” to protect its interests.2

There are also four countries that possess nuclear explosive devices but are not recognized as nuclear weapon states by the primary nuclear treaty regime, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—and are thus not bound by its rules. India, Pakistan, and Israel are still making materials for use in nuclear weapons, while North Korea has threatened to resume production. Pakistan and India are both building new reactors to increase their capacity to make plutonium for nuclear weapons. Both are actively developing and testing ballistic and cruise missiles to carry nuclear weapons.3

Despite the end of the Cold War, despite supposed “thawing of tensions” between the major powers, and despite the reality of an interconnected, interdependent world order, the mythical ideal of the power of the bomb persists. It continues to influence national security doctrines, international relations, and multilateral negotiations, subsequently undermining international law, human security, and our ability to build resilience to the converging climate, peak oil, food, water, and financial crises we face.

WILPF urges all governments and citizens to consider our options for the future. It encourages everyone to support and work for the elimination of nuclear weapons and for the redirection of nuclear weapon expenditures to meet environmental, social, health, housing, food, and economic needs. We need to creatively build resilience into our international system that does not rely on violence or military power but rather promotes cooperation, ingenuity, and human security. As a first step toward this end, WILPF calls on all nuclear weapon possessors to cease modernizing their arsenals as a step toward the good faith pursuit of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear weapon free world.

For more information about WILPF’s work on nuclear disarmament, please go to www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

1Hans Kristensen, “START Follow-On: What SORT of Agreement?” Federation of American Scientists, Strategic Security Blog, 8 July 2009, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/start.php?pfstyle=wp.

2For more on the nuclear programmes of the five NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states, see Rhetoric vs. Reality: Elite Disarmament Proposals and Real Disarmament Prospects, Information Briefing, Western States Legal Foundation, May 2009, http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/rhetoricvreality.pdf.

3Zia Mian, “Pushing South Asia Toward the Brink,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 27 July 2009, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/6295.