Nuclear disarmament panorama: an assessment

by Sergio Duarte

A familiar pattern seen in multilateral disarmament efforts, prevalent since the mid 1990s, also seems to have established itself in the review process of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Commenting on the result of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT 2015 Review Conference, last May, an assiduous and perceptive observer wrote: “This is a typical outcome of NPT meetings, because the review cycle is a process that favors the status quo by pit­ting possible forward momentum against maintaining the ‘stability’ of the ‘regime’. But this status quo is seen as increasingly untenable to the majority of states parties”. A similar assessment can be made about the multilateral nuclear disarmament process as a whole. 
 

Indeed, for nearly twenty years agreement in multilateral disarmament matters has proven elusive, just as the NPT—the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime—has been recurring crises. Many of its Parties perceive fundamental flaws that increasingly undermine its credibility and effectiveness.

The first of the Treaty’s objectives—to curb the spread of nuclear weapons—has been met only in part. The Treaty did not achieve universality: four Member States of the United Nations are not Party to it. Two of these States acquired atomic arsenals and one is widely believed to have done the same; one former Party withdrew and now boasts of its own atomic arsenal. On the positive side, a number of States that either already possessed atomic weapons or later acquired the necessary technology to produce such weapons or devices at relatively short notice decided to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS). Over the years, however, questions have surfaced about the real intentions behind the civilian nuclear programs of a small number of NNWS. In at least one of these situations, convincing explanation is still required. Lacking both universality and credibility to contain proliferation, the effectiveness of the NPT will continue to be doubted.

The second objective—the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, recognized as an inalienable right of all Parties—has also been only partially attained. That right is subject to the treaty provision that requires NNWS to develop their civilian nuclear programs in such a way as not to contravene the prohibition to acquire atomic weapons or a nuclear explosive capability. Paradoxically, alongside growing restrictions on technical assistance provided to NNWS Party to the NPT, special treatment has been granted to one non-Party nuclear-weapon State, generating complaints from bona fide members of the non-proliferation regime. Moreover, proposed intrusive additional verification procedures are not accepted by several NNWS that possess more advanced civilian nuclear industries, exacerbating discrimination, eroding trust in the verification system provided for in the NPT and provoking unresolved tensions among its Parties and between some of them and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

But it is mainly the perceived failure to achieve meaningful results in the third goal —nuclear disarmament—that mostly and increasingly threatens the credibility and the stability of the NPT. The lack of progress on that count and the slow, random pace of reductions in existing arsenals are generally ascribed to the unwillingness of the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) to accept multilaterally negotiated, legally binding and irreversible obligations to reduce and finally eliminate their arsenals under agreed time-lines and effective international verification. Some useful unilateral or bilateral steps have been taken, such as elimination of intermediate range weapons, caps on the overall number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons and missiles, curbs in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and shut-down of production facilities. Such steps, however, have been typically unlinked to the main objective of achieving nuclear disarmament.

It is estimated that some 20.000 nuclear weapons still exist in the world, the large majority of which in the arsenals of two States. Large budgets continue to be devoted to their maintenance and “modernization”, and the military doctrines espoused by the possessor States explicitly contemplate the possibility of their use even against non-nuclear States. No specific legislative or organizational structures exist in the NWS to deal with the nuclear disarmament requirements emanating from the international instruments they subscribed. Justifications provided for the retention of nuclear arsenals range from deterrence of aggression to protection of sovereignty or even simply to the stated need for an “insurance policy” against unforeseen or unspecified future circumstances. NWS seem to regard the NPT as providing legitimization to their arsenals and feel entitled to keep them for as long as they see fit. At the same time, they deny vehemently the same right to other States. At the annual NATO Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Pro­liferation on 6 May 2013, Angela Kane, United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, warned, “Nobody should assume that any regime structured on a have/have-not principle can be sustained forever.” Similar criticism had already been voiced at the time of the discussions on the draft NPT at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, in 1966 and 1967 and continued to be repeated since.

While NWS insist on a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, mostly consisting of non-proliferation proposals, for many years NNWS have been demanding the adoption of concrete measures to that end, with binding commitments and clear timelines, including the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The two sides do not seem to be listening to each other. The continuing frustration at the current state of affairs was recently expressed in the following terms by the Non-Aligned Movement: “The Group expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty, and remains concerned by the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and the lack of transparency in the nuclear weapons programs of Nuclear-Weapon States.”“The Group deeply regrets the continued inflexible positions of some NWS that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.” “The indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime”. NWS, for their part, express growing impatience for the lack of effectiveness in the multilateral disarmament machinery and call attention to the risks of proliferation and acquisition of nuclear capability by non-State actors, which, in their view, constitutes the most serious and urgent threats to international peace and security.

The protracted inability of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to agree on a programme of work also causes grave concern. Some States have indicated that they are prepared to look for alternative forums for the negotiation of new agreements, including outside the aegis of the United Nations. Others disagree, arguing that the CD must be preserved as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Some advocate changes in its rules of procedure, a move strongly opposed by others. The 2012 Session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted three resolutions aimed at finding ways to unblock that situation, including by establishing an open-ended working group and calling for a high-level special meeting on 26 September 2013. The voting pattern at the 2012 General Assembly on those resolutions clearly reflects the same deep conceptual divergences between NWS and NNWS that have plagued the NPT review process.

Recommendations agreed by conferences in the field of disarmament usually do not go beyond reaffirming general commitments already undertaken or calling for actions that are all but ignored soon after adoption. At best, these are promoted on a selective basis. The “13 Steps” for nuclear disarmament agreed by consensus in 2000 provide the most glaring example. One can only hope that the result of the discussions of the open-ended working group and of the high level meeting on 26 September provide a much needed basis for progress.

At present, disagreement encompasses all areas. Proposals for the negotiation of a convention prohibiting the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons have been dismissed by the NWS as being “premature”, despite the fact that over seventy years have passed since proliferation started with the first detonation of an atomic bomb. The same goes for the adoption of stronger, multilaterally negotiated assurances against the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States, pending nuclear disarmament. Conversely, many NNWS have rejected collateral measures aiming at increasing restrictions on civilian nuclear activities unless such measures are organically linked to concrete disarmament steps. Prospects for implementation of the decisions on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East—a long-standing goal and one of the main elements of the 1995 understanding that made possible the indefinite extension—became dimmer due to lack of agreement even on preparatory work for that end. NNWS argue that a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes should encompass existing stocks, without which it would become, in their view, a redundant non-proliferation measure or, worse, a back-door attempt to impose new curbs on peaceful nuclear activities. NWS, for their part, consider a cut-off in future production as a logical and practical next step and a useful “partial measure” in the path to international nuclear discipline, together with tighter controls on nuclear materials worldwide.

Divergences have increased over the years and continue to prevent progress in the wider field of disarmament and international security. Inflexible positions threaten the endurance and long-term authority of existing global norms in this field, in particular the NPT itself. Many Parties believe that the enhanced review mechanism adopted in 1995 did not live up to expectations and needs to be revisited. No wonder that in 2005 a member of the Non-Aligned Movement voiced his country’s “regret” to have accepted the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

Diagnosing the situation and identifying roadblocks is necessary and useful, but will not by themselves break the current impasse. States should be aware of the increasing risks that the perpetuation of this situation creates for the durability of and respect for the existing international regimes and take decisive action. It is primarily the duty and responsibility of the nuclear-armed States—and also in their best interest—to take the lead in order to avert further erosion and a possible unraveling of the whole structure that allowed for the establishment of a treaty-based system to face the very real prospects of nuclear confrontation or nuclear anarchy. Mere procedural or organizational changes in the disarmament organs will not be enough to improve the current system. It is imperative to make a determined effort to find solutions that take into account the legitimate security concerns of all States. Civil society can assist by providing impetus, energy and ideas.

The international community agrees on the need to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. The continued existence of such weapons is incompatible with that goal. This makes the situation simply unacceptable. All States must work together to overcome the present impasses and ensure the effectiveness of the multilateral disarmament structure. A new Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament would be the proper forum for this common endeavor.

Sergio Duarte is an Ambassador of Brazil and the former United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.