Spin cycle

by Dr. Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War

The end of three weeks of Disarmament Commission deliberations on April 21 also represented the end of a three year cycle of discussions focused on nuclear disarmament, a fourth disarmament decade, and confidence building on conventional weapons. The final 2011 session, one of the few during these three weeks where NGOs were allowed to participate, was full of compliments for the chair and co-chairs, secretariat facilitators and translators as well as acknowledgment of the helpful content of some of the smaller working group discussions. At the same time, there was subtle, critical language regarding the outcomes of a lengthy process that used up much time, energy and resources of diplomats and the entire UN system.

A much less subtle critique was offered by Mexico, which spoke of the “same predictable results” that offered no surprises. Mexico also noted the “sad atmosphere” of the meetings, punctuated by low levels of participation that seem to mirror the low expectations of delegations.

Delegations following Mexico generally supported the tone, if not the specifics, of the Mexican remarks. Disappointments were palpable, but largely muted, as though delegations were more pleased to arrive at the closing session than dismayed by anything specific that happened en route.

Nobody was “surprised” by the DC results perhaps, but there are repercussions that follow from participating in long sessions that yield little tangible agreement. Delegates are, for the most part, sincerely interested in pushing forward key disarmament agendas, and many did comment on the value of some of the working group discussions, reminding us that a lack of consensus does not necessarily indicate a lack of value.

But diplomats and observers were also conscious of the time and resources expended on an arduous process and unfulfilled agenda. And to the extent that the proceedings of the DC attract public or media interest, however unlikely that might be, the lack of urgent action and apparent 'waste' of resources would surely rankle many in the global public. Whether the issue is the CD or the DC, how do we explain to people the structural issues and institutional costs that strain delegations, frustrate observers, and impede action on issues that so many people see as urgent to the survival of our species? Until we can create a more flexible disarmament structure that empowers as much as it restrains, we need to work harder to create a narrative that explains to wary constituents why bodies like the DC remain a good investment. What are we learning about how to do this better? What is the value in the DC that offers hope for genuine movement on critical issues? In which ways are we moving closer to breakthroughs on disarmament and how do we communicate this?

This narrative must at all costs avoid 'spin.' It must rather represent an honest assessment of progress and an honest willingness to confront and overcome impediments. We all have the right to make mistakes and fall short of goals. We don't have as much right to make the same mistakes over and over, or to accept falling short as inevitable.

Even with all the empty seats in the room, there was more than enough skill, commitment and energy in the DC to forge a more urgent and robust path. We welcome the opportunity to work with delegations to help the DC become (and communicate the fruits of) a more functional, positive and cost-effective conduit for genuine progress on disarmament.