Reaching Critical Will

UN General Assembly plenary on the CD

2011-07-29T15:46:00.001-04:00

The UN General Assembly plenary meetings indicate that while the international diplomatic community is frustrated over the continued deadlock, the majority of countries—including many of those in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and most of permanent five members of the UN Security Council (P5)—appear unwilling to consider actions that could potentially disrupt the status quo.

Judging by their statements to the plenary meetings, neither the majority of NAM countries (assuming that the NAM statement delivered on 27 July reflects the position of most NAM countries) nor most of the P5 (with the exception of the United States) have signaled willingness to start negotiations on any of the CD’s four core issues outside of the CD. At the same time, most of the NAM and at least two of the P5 (China and Russia) are also opposed to reforming the CD’s working methods or rules of procedure.

(Note: Despite issuing a collective statement on this topic that indicated unwillingness to reform or circumvent the CD, the NAM’s position on this matter cannot be considered uniform. Several members of the Movement spoke in their individual capacity with remarks contradictory to this position, including Chile, Colombia, the Philippines, and South Africa. Based on this sample, it could be concluded that other NAM states may also disagree with the umbrella NAM statement.)

Most countries argue that the problem with the CD is not procedural but political. They’re not wrong. The CD has, in the past, managed to negotiate international disarmament and arms control treaties, with the same working methods it operates under today. Furthermore, with all nuclear weapon-possessors currently undertaking or planning modernization programmes for their nuclear weapon arsenals, delivery systems, and related facilities, it is clear that genuine political will to achieve nuclear disarmament is a missing key ingredient.

However, the solution of continuing to call for “more political will,” after fifteen years without negotiations, is like calling for another bucket of water to put out a fire that’s been blazing for months. What is needed is a massive downpour, a change in climate—or in the case of the CD, a fundamental shift of governmental thinking around disarmament, arms control, and national security.

Many of the states delivering statements to the plenary meetings recognize this. The Costa Rican and Swiss delegations in particular emphasized the need for a new approach to these critical topics.

“We are living in a global, interdependent world that faces as a community a multitude of disarmament and non-proliferation challenges,” said Swiss Counsellor Serge Bavaud. “It is important to move from one-dimensional approaches to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation to more holistic approaches.” He also noted, “It is critical to recognize that disarmament and nonproliferation affect numerous areas of concern to the international community besides peace and security, notably human security and human rights, development, the environment and health to name just a few. Only if we further include these aspects will we be able to confront the challenges we are facing.”

Similarly, Costa Rica’s Ambassador Eduardo Ulibarri said that “disarmament is not an isolated event of an exclusively militaristic nature. It is an organic process that interests and affects us all, and in which we must constantly advance through productive negotiations.”Arguing that “an essentially militaristic approach on security and disarmament could bring us closer to arms regulation and the control of international arsenals, but never to global disarmament,” he urged that “any action taken in the process of revitalization and restructuring of the multilateral disarmament negotiations must prioritize a focus on human security.”

Highlighting the relationship between human rights, international law, and disarmament and arms control, Ambassador Ulibarri also suggested that the CD “could begin to interact and cooperate with the bodies in charge of the promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law, with the goal of carrying out a more effective follow up to the fulfillment of the States’ duties in those subjects in light of their commitments to disarmament.” For example, “the fulfillment of the agreements on disarmament [should] be incorporated as a variable to the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council.”

The NAM itself recognized the need for a paradigm shift, arguing that part of realizing a world free of nuclear weapons will require the “colossal global expenditures and energies” devoted by nuclear weapon-possessors to the “possession, development and modernization of nuclear weapons” to instead be “used to further global development and peace.”

Yet for the most part, discussions related to the substantive work of the CD continue to be firmly predicated on a narrow, traditional view of “national security”.

At the plenary meeting, as it has before, Pakistan’s delegation stated, “No treaty can be negotiated in the CD which is contrary to the security interests of any of its member states.”

Indeed, this has been held as a truism in the CD—and not just by Pakistan. The US delegation is single-handedly blocking negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and during the Bush administration, it blocked negotiations on an FMCT because of the inclusion of verification in the negotiating mandate. The US and Pakistani administrations both relied on the argument that such treaties would undermine their security interests.

However, how can a government possibly know this before negotiations even begin, let alone conclude? Pakistan is not the only country with concerns about negotiating a fissile material treaty that does not include stocks. However, those others are willing to engage in negotiations and to insist on the inclusion of stocks in due course. If the treaty does not, in the end, include stocks, delegations can walk away from negotiations at any time, or refuse to ratify the resulting treaty. But stating that a treaty that does not yet exist undermines one’s national security in fact undermines the principles of good faith, multilateralism, and collective security. Furthermore, blocking negotiations of treaties on such critical matters as disarmament and non-proliferation threatens the national security interests of the majority of the countries in the world, especially since, as Ireland’s delegation noted, small states that depend on the rule of law and international treaties to ensure their security.

Pakistan’s delegation is not wrong that the FMCT sought by the majority of nuclear weapon-possessors is indeed “cost free” for those that already possess major stocks of fissile materials. This makes it all the more important to negotiate the treaty in a multilateral forum where the interests of all states, including those that do not possess any fissile materials at all, are on the table.

Pakistan’s delegation is also not wrong that the US, which is now open to options outside the CD for negotiating the FMCT, at one time firmly rejected taking any issues outside the CD when it was the sole obstacle to progress in that forum. But just as the United States was incorrect in 2005, in saying that taking the issues of the CD will “retard the very international non-proliferation and disarmament objectives that [those countries] want to advance,” Pakistan is likewise incorrect about that now.

Ambassador Ulibarri of Costa Rica described the CD as “going through the ‘illusion of disarmament’,” arguing, “It is the illusion that destroying certain weapons signifies an advance, despite their being immediately replaced by more powerful ones; it is the illusion of proscribing certain weapons because the strategic advantage they may have is exponentially inferior to the one offered by newer and more advanced ones; it is the illusion of fulfilling the requirements of civil society, when the only result is a paralyzed and paralyzing process.”

The states that are most actively seeking to break this status quo of illusion and paralysis do not want to “circumvent” the CD so that they can “get their way”. These states are also not pursuing action simply for the sake of negotiating an FMCT—most of them actually probably prefer negotiations directly on nuclear disarmament. Rather, these states seek to break through the rigid conception of national security and pursue collective security, human security in a multilateral forum that respects the views and concerns of all states but does not allow the interests of the few to outweigh the interests of the many.

Mr. Bavaud of the Swiss delegation argued, “Our institutions should not be based upon, and continuously favor, a clearly outdated conception of an all-prevailing national security paradigm.” Instead, he called for “institutions that are designed to produce results and do not favor the preservation of the status quo. They must be both responsive and preventive and thus be able to produce the instruments needed to address current as well as future challenges.”

Furthermore, those that seek to reform the CD and/or go outside the body to begin negotiations do believe that political will is essential. They do not assume that taking up negotiations in a different venue will magically eliminate the political problems faced by the CD. However, as Ambassador Alexander Kmentt, Austria’s Director for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, argued, “political will can also be created through process.” That is, “by starting to address the issues that have been stuck on the CD agenda for all these years,” states that are resistant to engage can be encouraged to join in by the reality of the international community moving along without them. This has been seen in other negotiation process and with treaty ratifications. Furthermore, a different negotiating environment or under different working methods could enable states to find new compromises and overcome some of the political difficulties currently facing the CD.

Before the plenary meetings, Reaching Critical Will and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy drafted a possible formulation to advance multilateral disarmament negotiations. We suggest that the UN General Assembly establish two open-ended working groups: one on nuclear disarmament and the other on prevention of an arms race in outer space. The open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament could have three main committees: a convention or framework agreement on nuclear disarmament; fissile materials; and negative security assurances and the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons.

In addition to cutting off future production for weapons purposes, we argue that an agreement on fissile materials must prevent the use of existing materials, civilian and military, in weapons, and contribute directly to irreversible disarmament. Its negotiation must not be treated as a step to be completed before negotiations on elimination of nuclear forces are commenced. A convention or framework agreement on nuclear disarmament could have a protocol on fissile materials, or provide for its subsequent negotiation. The policy of sequentialism, which has not proved to be an efficient way to achieve nuclear disarmament, must be abandoned, and a policy of integration and parallelism adopted.

As many delegations have pointed out over the years, the FMCT is not the only item “ripe” for negotiation. The majority of CD member states appear ready to work on any of the other core issues of the CD’s agenda—very few would block the commencement of negotiation on any particular issue, even if they might prefer one over another.

There are also actions that can be undertaken while the international community establishes some sort of negotiating framework. As the European Union urged, all nuclear weapon possessors should declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. In our joint paper, RCW and LCNP suggest that until a fissile material treaty is negotiated, all nuclear weapon possessors should act as if it is already in force, as they do with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. All states possessing nuclear weapons should also engage in collaborative transparency and verification measures regarding their fissile material production facilities and stockpiles in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Furthermore, as the Costa Rican delegation suggested, “To build trust and signal good intentions in order to achieve the commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament or a parallel process, nuclear weapons States should drop their plans for modernization, replacement, refurnishing and upgrading of these arsenals and their facilities, amongst others.” Ambassador Ulibarri argued, small reductions of nuclear weapons are not conducive to disarmament when they “command robust resources towards the research and modernization of facilities capable of maintaining or multiplying these threats.”

The question now is what happens next. Almost every single delegation taking the floor at the plenary meetings said they wanted to revitalize the CD. It is unclear what this means to those delegations that do not wish to reform its working methods or rules of procedure. Unfortunately, many of the delegations participating on the plenary meetings did not offer concrete proposals for moving forward, leaving uncertainty about what will be tried—and what will succeed—at the UN General Assembly in a few months time. The US and UK indicated that the P5 would be engaging in consultations ahead of the next UNGA, and it’s clear that many non-nuclear weapon states are interested in pursuing something concrete during First Committee in October. But if a decision is not made before the end of year about what should happen with the CD and with multilateral disarmament negotiations, are we doomed to waste another year in 2012? There seems to be very little to be done in terms of “revitalization” if states are unwilling to change the way the CD operates or to consider creative, alternative methods and venue of work. It is the sincere hope of civil society that the states take a bold step this year by taking a concrete decision at the General Assembly’s upcoming session to begin multilateral negotiations with an integrated approach that links disarmament and non-proliferation to human security.

Spin cycle

2011-04-26T11:07:00.002-04:00

by Dr. Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War

The end of three weeks of Disarmament Commission deliberations on April 21 also represented the end of a three year cycle of discussions focused on nuclear disarmament, a fourth disarmament decade, and confidence building on conventional weapons. The final 2011 session, one of the few during these three weeks where NGOs were allowed to participate, was full of compliments for the chair and co-chairs, secretariat facilitators and translators as well as acknowledgment of the helpful content of some of the smaller working group discussions. At the same time, there was subtle, critical language regarding the outcomes of a lengthy process that used up much time, energy and resources of diplomats and the entire UN system.

A much less subtle critique was offered by Mexico, which spoke of the “same predictable results” that offered no surprises. Mexico also noted the “sad atmosphere” of the meetings, punctuated by low levels of participation that seem to mirror the low expectations of delegations.

Delegations following Mexico generally supported the tone, if not the specifics, of the Mexican remarks. Disappointments were palpable, but largely muted, as though delegations were more pleased to arrive at the closing session than dismayed by anything specific that happened en route.

Nobody was “surprised” by the DC results perhaps, but there are repercussions that follow from participating in long sessions that yield little tangible agreement. Delegates are, for the most part, sincerely interested in pushing forward key disarmament agendas, and many did comment on the value of some of the working group discussions, reminding us that a lack of consensus does not necessarily indicate a lack of value.

But diplomats and observers were also conscious of the time and resources expended on an arduous process and unfulfilled agenda. And to the extent that the proceedings of the DC attract public or media interest, however unlikely that might be, the lack of urgent action and apparent 'waste' of resources would surely rankle many in the global public. Whether the issue is the CD or the DC, how do we explain to people the structural issues and institutional costs that strain delegations, frustrate observers, and impede action on issues that so many people see as urgent to the survival of our species? Until we can create a more flexible disarmament structure that empowers as much as it restrains, we need to work harder to create a narrative that explains to wary constituents why bodies like the DC remain a good investment. What are we learning about how to do this better? What is the value in the DC that offers hope for genuine movement on critical issues? In which ways are we moving closer to breakthroughs on disarmament and how do we communicate this?

This narrative must at all costs avoid 'spin.' It must rather represent an honest assessment of progress and an honest willingness to confront and overcome impediments. We all have the right to make mistakes and fall short of goals. We don't have as much right to make the same mistakes over and over, or to accept falling short as inevitable.

Even with all the empty seats in the room, there was more than enough skill, commitment and energy in the DC to forge a more urgent and robust path. We welcome the opportunity to work with delegations to help the DC become (and communicate the fruits of) a more functional, positive and cost-effective conduit for genuine progress on disarmament.

Disarmament Commission fails for 12th consecutive year

2011-04-21T14:44:00.001-04:00

On Thursday, 21 April 2011, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) held its final plenary meeting of the 2011 session, which also marked the final meeting of the latest three year cycle. For the twelfth year in a row, as noted by the European Union in its closing remarks, the Commission was unable to agree to substantive recommendations on any of its three topics.

Member states adopted the final report of the Commission along with the reports of the three working groups: nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, a declaration of the 2010s as the next disarmament decade, and confidence-building measures around conventional weapons. All three reports end with the note that the working group was unable to achieve consensus.

In their closing remarks, several delegations, including Cuba, Mexico, Norway, Spain, and Sweden, expressed concern with the lack of substantive results from the UNDC. While many praised the deliberative nature of the Commission’s work, they also criticized its failure to fulfill its whole mandate, which includes adopting recommendations. The Mexican delegation argued that this paralysis is “inadmissible” when the world is “threatened by nuclear weapons and excessive accumulation of destabilizing conventional weapons.” It concluded that the only tangible consequence of the UNDC has been the expenditure of resources provided by taxpayers around the world.

Law’s Imperative for the Urgent Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

2011-04-15T12:34:00.002-04:00

by Dr. John Burroughs, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

Released March 23 by The Simons Foundation and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) and signed by eminent experts in international law and diplomacy, the Vancouver Declaration affirms that nuclear weapons are incompatible with international humanitarian law (IHL). The declaration observes that with their uncontrollable blast, heat, and radiation effects, nuclear weapons are indeed weapons of mass destruction that by their nature cannot comply with fundamental rules forbidding the infliction of indiscriminate and disproportionate harm.

The declaration builds upon the 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmation “of the need for all states at all times to comply with applicable international law, including [IHL],” as well as other developments since the 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on nuclear weapons. They include the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the achievement of treaty bans on landmines and cluster munitions.

In connection with already banned weapons, the declaration observes: “Reasons advanced for the continuing existence of nuclear weapons, including military necessity and case-by-case analysis, were once used to justify other inhumane weapons. But elementary considerations of humanity persuaded the world community that such arguments were outweighed by the need to eliminate them. This principle must now be applied to nuclear weapons, which pose an infinitely greater risk to humanity.” (Emphasis supplied.) The ICJ had made clear the link between illegality and humanitarian values, stating that the broad participation in Hague and Geneva treaties is “undoubtedly” because “a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person and ‘elementary considerations of humanity’.”

The many signatories include Christopher G. Weeramantry, former Vice President of the ICJ and current President of IALANA; Mohammed Bedjaoui, who was ICJ President when it handed down its advisory opinion on nuclear weapons; Louise Doswald-Beck, Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, and co-author of a major International Committee of the Red Cross study of IHL; and Gareth Evans, QC, former Foreign Minister of Australia who recently served as Co-Chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.

Especially in view of its endorsement by former ICJ judges and leading international law scholars, it is noteworthy that the declaration resolves issues the ICJ left for another day. It affirms the universally binding character of the prohibition of reprisals against civilian populations, vindicating the position taken by Mexico before the ICJ: “Torture is not a permissible response to torture. Nor is mass rape acceptable retaliation to mass rape. Just as unacceptable is retaliatory deterrence—‘You have burnt my city, I will burn yours.’” The declaration similarly affirms the mandatory nature of the prohibition of the infliction of widespread, severe, and long-term damage to the natural environment. It also unreservedly states the unlawfulness of both specific signals of intent to use nuclear weapons and general policies (“deterrence”) declaring a readiness to resort to nuclear weapons when vital interests are at stake.

On his blog disarmingconflict.ca, analyst Ernie Regehr observes that the international community “has been unforgivably slow in fully facing the profound legal questions raised by the possession and threatened use of nuclear weapons,” and praises the Vancouver Declaration for succinctly demonstrating that nuclear disarmament is “not only an urgent political objective and moral imperative, but also an unambiguous legal requirement.” That requirement should now more than ever be central to deliberations of the Disarmament Commission and other governmental bodies charged with achieving peace and security through disarmament.

An urgent decade

2011-04-08T16:26:00.002-04:00

by Dr. Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War

The opening sessions of the UN Disarmament Commission were punctuated by procedural issues, a few misplaced comments from 2010, and many expressions of urgency that the DC conduct its work more effectively and build, as France's delegation noted, “a safer world for all.”

Many delegations raised the urgency issue in the early days of the DC: in the context of addressing nuclear weapons; of revitalizing disarmament structure; and of fulfilling commitments on disarmament to an anxious world.

In English, when we think of ‘urgency’ two things come to mind. The first usually occurs in relation to some situation in the world requiring immediate attention. With relevance to the DC we can cite the multi-lateral bodies which, as India noted, are running out of time; to the elimination of weapons that continue to threaten populations, drain resources, and exacerbate development crises; to the energies and resources of UN officials and member states which are being deployed in challenging and sometimes frustrating circumstances.

The second and related sense of ‘urgent’ has to do less with objective circumstances and more with our own responsibilities. The ‘facts’ of a militarized world, including unregulated transfers, unmanaged stockpiles and unbridled spending, create objective conditions for urgency. But so do the expectations of families, friends, neighbors, constituents and more. The public sense that it is high time – even past time – to move together resolutely towards general and complete disarmament weighs heavily on many in the diplomatic community.

There is urgency from within as well as from without that motivates the language that we use to define our most challenging disarmament tasks.

To many observers, the ‘decade’ question in the DC might appear to be a classic example of ‘low-hanging fruit.’ Absent concrete benchmarks on negative security assurances, WMD-free zones, the regulation of arms transfers, or key provisions of the PoA, the ‘decade’ would seem (especially to those who have lived through previous iterations) to be as much a substitute for movement on weapons as an inspiration for that movement. This characterization may not be fair, but it is relevant to how the DC is perceived, and it is something that we all have power to change.

Of the many synonyms conjured up for the English term ‘urgency,’ the two that seem most relevant are ‘compelling’ and ‘burning.’ The compelling part is related to the millions of weapons – so many of them unregulated -- that threaten our security and even our very existence. The burning part is related more to us – the sense that we have the skill and the will to do more in the name of that ‘safer world’ that so many people in our countries and communities clamor for. This is the urgency of responsibility which diplomats – and those of us who seek to support their disarmament work – must be more mindful of.

Urgency is an important dimension of disarmament efforts and the diplomats were wise to raise it. The reminder is that it is public expectation and not only objective circumstance that drives these challenging efforts. Whatever number and title we eventually give to a resolution on this ‘decade,’ it is most assuredly an urgent one.

The next open meeting of the UNDC will be on Friday, 22 April and a final post will be published then to report on the Commission's work this year.

UNDC Day Three: Work on the draft declaration begins

2011-04-06T21:06:00.001-04:00

by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On the third day of the UN Disarmament Commission’s 2011 session, Working Group II (the only working group with a Chair, and hence, the only working group currently able to convene), started its work on elements of a draft declaration for the fourth disarmament decade.

Armed with a compilation of a Chair’s draft from 2009 and amendments from 2010, the delegations present for the meetings today started going through the proposed elements paragraph by paragraph. The text offered options between elements proposed in 2009 and amendments proposed in 2010 and also welcomed the introduction of new text. Work advanced slowly as delegates tried to reach consensus on precise wording. While for the most part suggestions were limited to minor tweaks, there were a few substantive areas of disagreement.

Most notable was the French’s delegations efforts to eliminate specific references to nuclear disarmament from the principles and objectives portion of the declaration as well as from the section on weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

For example, in the section on principles and objectives, the French delegation argued strongly against any specific reference to nuclear disarmament (1.2a and 1.2b), while most other delegates argued that it is a not only a priority for most member states but is also timely, given the increased attention to the issue over the last few years. Further, in the section on WMD, the French delegations suggested that instead of reaffirming and mobilizing efforts to translate into reality the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and other WMD within a specified timeframe (2.1.a), the declaration should use much vaguer, non-committal language, such as, “to seek a safer world for all and to create conditions a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the NPT, in a way that promotes international stability, based on the principle of undiminished security for all....” The UK delegation supported this proposal, while most others who commented on it emphasized their preference for maintaining the language proposed in 2010 (2.1.a).

Overall, it appears there are major substantive differences over what delegations want this declaration to say. The vast majority, however, seemed to agree with Brazil’s representative, who argued that the declaration needs to be something that government’s can show their publics, to demonstrate that they are in fact discussing nuclear disarmament seriously, and that they are moving forward on the issue, without necessarily getting into detail. The Chair and several other delegations emphasized the importance of producing a concise text that conveys a general spirit of progress on disarmament issues rather than one that hashes out precise approaches or commits states to a particular path—as the Norwegian delegation reminded everyone, there are other working groups in this very Commission that are mandated to develop more specific recommendations on nuclear and conventional weapon issues.

Working Group II will resume its discussion on the draft elements on Friday. Tomorrow, Working Group I, on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, will begin its work.

UNDC Day Two: Laying the groundwork for consensus

2011-04-05T16:43:00.001-04:00

by Katherine Prizeman, Global Action to Prevent War

The second day of General Debate at the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) was characterized by another broad discussion on the three agenda items for the 2011 session—nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the draft elements for the fourth disarmament decade, and confidence-building measures in the field conventional weapons—with heavy emphasis, once again, on the nuclear issue. The delegations of Egypt, Nepal, Indonesia, Switzerland, India, France, Cuba, Russia, Liechtenstein, and Mexico offered statements.

In terms of nuclear weapons, Egypt’s delegation expressed concern over the lack of progress on disarmament made by the five nuclear weapon states. The Egyptian delegate called for a greater synergy between the twin pillars of non-proliferation and disarmament. Nepal’s delegation addressed the lack of economic and social progress, notably the failure to abate extreme poverty, as the context for its own call for disarmament. Likewise, the Cuban delegation underscored the annual accelerated growth of military expenditures, which compromise economic and social development. Liechtenstein’s representative highlighted the connection between disarmament, non-proliferation, international human rights, and humanitarian law, declaring that the ultimate goal of disarmament is to ‘prevent human suffering.’

The adoption of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by the two states with the largest nuclear arsenals was also praised by several delegations, including Indonesia. Russia, however, made it known that it and the US should not shoulder all the burden of nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, Russia’s delegation argued that in order to discuss further nuclear reductions, there must be a ‘favorable international environment’ for such negotiations.

Emphasis on the nuclear issue was shared by India whose delegate declared that nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority for the Non-Aligned Movement as well as for its own national policy. The Indian delegate lamented that the international community is nowhere near achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament and no closer than it was in 1988 when the then-Indian Prime Minister presented an Action Plan for a Nuclear Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World Order.

Comments on the draft elements for a fourth disarmament decade (the 2010s) were varied and included calls for convening the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-IV) as well as calls to emphasize the priority of nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. Nonetheless, there was general consensus that there should be substantive discussions on the revised draft from the previous year and renewed efforts to reach consensus on elements that provide elusive in 2010. Other delegations gave cursory reference to the disarmament decade, such as Cuba’s, which called for a declaration that mobilizes general efforts to face current disarmament challenges.

The implementation of the UN Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (UNPoA) also received attention by several delegations. There were several calls for using this existing UN framework more robustly to deal with illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. Switzerland made particular reference to the link between illegal and uncontrolled trafficking in conventional arms and armed conflict, which in turn leads to a lack of human security and peace. The Swiss delegate explained that the existing disarmament bodies do not seem to be able to find answers to these challenges. According to the Swiss delegation, such ‘deadlocks’ must be addressed, perhaps through a revitalization and re-organization of the UNDC or of the disarmament machinery as a whole.

Despite Switzerland’s disappointment with the current disarmament machinery, there were some positive assessments of the potential of existing UN disarmament structure. The French delegate expressed support for the upcoming Meeting of Governmental Experts in May 2011 on the themes of marking, tracking, and registering of small arms and light weapons as part of implementation of the UNPoA. Russia also declared support for the UN Register of Conventional Arms as the ‘only global instrument of transparency to keep close watch on destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms.’ Liechtenstein identified transparency as one of the most important confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons. In this light, reporting to the UN Register was strongly encouraged by Liechtenstein.

The last two days have offered a glimpse into the wide variety of perspectives on disarmament among delegations. Member states are using the opportunity provided by the UNDC to underscore the areas of disarmament they feel most committed to and outline their vision of what the UNDC could and should accomplish. However, as the General Debate comes to a close, the real work begins towards consensus on recommendations to be sent in advance to the First Committee. The three Working Groups must take seriously their deliberations with a view towards clear, practical, and concrete recommendations relevant to the three agenda items, rather than engaging in repetitive musings on general issues of peace and security.

UNDC: The state of deliberate deliberations

2011-04-04T17:49:00.002-04:00

Written by Katherine Prizeman, Global Action to Prevent War

On April 4, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) opened its 2011 session under the leadership of Ambassador Hamid al-Bayati of Iraq. The Chairman of the UNDC and the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Sergio Duarte offered opening statements for the 2011 session, which is the final session of its three-year issue cycle. High Representative Duarte noted that the UNDC must be utilized as an opportunity to open new possibilitiesfor addressing threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and from conventional weapons rather than merely devolve into a ‘desperate pursuit of security through self-help.’

The programme of work will span three weeks and will be composed of three working groups to deliberate on three specific agenda items: recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, elements on a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade, and practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons. The General Debate will last through Tuesday evening at which point the item-specific working groups will convene. Discussions today were wide in breadth as delegations covered nuclear and conventional weapons on the whole with references to landmines and cluster munitions, an arms trade treaty, negative security assurances (NSAs), the Fissile Cut-Off Material Treaty (FMCT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs), and small arms and light weapons (SALWs)—among other more general disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control concerns.

Several r egional blocs delivered statements during the first morning session including the European Union (Hungary), the Rio Group (Chile), the Non-Aligned Movement, (Indonesia) and the African Group (Nigeria). In addition, Australia, Senegal, Japan, Brazil, Pakistan, Kenya, Tanzania, Algeria, Sweden, Republic of Korea, United States, Montenegro, The Democratic Republic of Korea, Lichtenstein, Russia, China, and Bangladesh offered opinions during the first General Debate of the plenary.

Each delegation, in some capacity, highlighted the nuclear issue and the importance of reaching agreement on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament whether through a focus on strengthening the NPT regime, providing NSAs for non-nuclear states, supporting entry-into-force of the CTBT, or negotiation of an FMCT. Several states, including Indonesia, Japan, Brazil, Tanzania, and Australia explicitly committed themselves to a world free of nuclear weapons. The representative of Kazakhstan underscored the significance of FMCT negotiations and a commitment to NWFZs. The United States also expressed concern over the failure of the FMCT negotiations. China highlighted the special responsibility of states with the largest nuclear arsenals to contribute to nuclear disarmament through reductions. Pakistan, which focused almost exclusively on the nuclear agenda item, expressed concern over what it considers ‘recent negative developments' in the movement towards nuclear disarmament. The Pakistani representative declared that nuclear weapon states do not appear ready to give up nuclear weapons or even take up the issue in multilateral fora. The Pakistani delegation also reiterated that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is a consensus-based body that provides for the ‘equal security of all states’ and, thus, the right to dissent. The Republic of Korea also focused exclusively on the nuclear agenda item and encouraged the entry-into-force of the CTBT.

Conventional weapons also received attention, albeit less attention than the nuclear issue. Australia commented on the current opportunity to create a legally-binding arms trade treaty (ATT) as well as support for the full implementation of the UN Programme of Action (UNPoA) on SALWs. Nigeria, representing the African Group, focused on regulating the illicit movement of arms. Kenya also expressed support for the 2012 Conference on an ATT as well as the negotiations for a NWFZ in the Middle East. The EU gave a detailed statement on the importance of the UNDC in providing adequate attention to conventional weapons through regulation of weapons transfers, the formulation and adoption of an ATT, the full implementation of the UNPoA via support for the upcoming Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts (MGE) in May 2011, and the 2012 Review Conference of the UNPoA. Montenegro also expressed strong support for an ATT and next month's MGE.

As the UNDC begins its 2011 substantive session, it is important to understand how it fits into the context of the wider UN system. Due to the complexities of global disarmament, there are multiple tools in the UN disarmament toolbox—the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the First Committee of the General Assembly, Special Sessions on disarmament issues such as Arms Trade, and the Disarmament Commission. The UNDC is part of the disarmament machinery that seeks to address impediments to achieving adequate and practical global disarmament that can provide security assurances to states at the least possible level of armament. However, like the CD in Geneva that has failed to agree on an agenda of work for more than a decade, the UNDC has not been able to provide substantial recommendations on its agenda items since 2000 when it began its work.

Nonetheless, as was pointed out by several delegations, the UNDC is considered the most ‘specialized, deliberative body for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues.’ The United States referred to the UNDC as the ‘deliberative think tank on arms control.’ However, no matter how ‘deliberate’ the discussions on very specific disarmament-related issues, concrete recommendations must be formulated and submitted to the General Assembly for consideration prior to the First Committee in order to make the ‘deliberate’ nature of such negotiations manifest in policy. As the Swedish delegate stated, ‘If the negotiations are not moving us forward through concrete recommendation, they fail to add much value to discussion elsewhere, such as those that take place in the First Committee.’ The Kenya delegate poignantly remarked that the lack of consensus on recommendations at the conclusion of the 2010 UNDC session should not lead to despair, but rather, delegations should take the time and space provided by the UNDC to move forward towards substantive recommendations. With its deliberative nature and universal membership, the DC is an ideal vehicle to formulate recommendations for movement forward on issues of global disarmament.

Follow our updates on Twitter @DisarmDialogues.

Disarmament Commission urged to complete declaration for disarmament decade

2011-04-04T16:45:00.001-04:00

Written by Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director, Western States Legal Foundation and Executive Advisor, Mayors for Peace

Two years into the fourth United Nations Disarmament Decade, 2010–2020, there is still no Declaration for the Decade. At the 2006 session of the UN General Assembly, a resolution entitled, “Declaration of a fourth disarmament decade,” introduced by Sierra Leone, was overwhelmingly adopted by a vote of 123 to one, with 52 abstentions. Only the United States voted no. The resolution recognized “the role that a fourth disarmament decade could play in the mobilization of… global efforts to meet current and emerging challenges in the area of arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and international security,” and directed the Disarmament Commission at its 2009 session to prepare elements of a draft “Declaration of the 2010s as the Fourth Disarmament Decade” for consideration by the General Assembly later that year.

Following the new US President Barak Obama’s Prague speech, hope was in the air when the Disarmament Commission met in 2009 and the US did not block adoption of its agenda.

Mayors for Peace sent an Open Letter from Capital Cities to the UN Disarmament Commission, signed by the mayors of Amsterdam, Budapest, Berlin, Dar es Salaam, Freetown, Kathmandu, La Paz, London, Luxembourg, Montevideo, Rome, Roseau, and Sarajevo. In their letter, the mayors declared: “In terms of progress on disarmament, the first decade of the new millennium has been a serious disappointment; the world must resolve to do much better in the coming decade. We, therefore, take heart from the United Nation’s plans for an International Decade for Disarmament.”

The mayors requested that, “as you prepare the elements of the Declaration of the Decade… you include the role cities can play in promoting disarmament…. it is our sincere hope that the engagement of local authorities will contribute to the success of this new Decade.”

However, even in the new environment the UNDC was unable to make progress on a Declaration, and the item was carried over to its 2010 session, where agreement could not be reached on a very long draft declaration infested with brackets. It would appear that, frustrated by the lack of progress in other fora, the non-nuclear weapon states attempted to use the drafting process for the Declaration as a substitute mechanism for extracting substantive timebound disarmament commitments from the nuclear weapon states. And, true to form, the nuclear weapon states are not biting.

The 2011 session of the Disarmament Commission—the final session in this three-year cycle—will be the make-or-break point for the fourth United Nations Decade for Disarmament. In the wake of what is widely considered to be a successful 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and under the leadership of a skilled and determined new President, Ambassador Hamid Al Bayati of Iraq, the onus is on the UNDC participants to fulfil in good faith the mandate of the 2006 General Assembly. As the Mayors’ 2009 letter urgently concluded: “[P]lease, take up the task assigned to you by the UN General Assembly in a spirit of unity and with determination to set the world on course for a productive International Decade for Disarmament.”

Mayors worldwide are campaigning for the global elimination of nuclear weapons by 2020. What more fitting climax could there be to the fourth Decade for Disarmament?

The UN Disarmament Commission 2011

2011-04-04T10:22:00.003-04:00

Reaching Critical Will and Global Action to Prevent War are monitoring the UNDC this session.

As the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) heads into the final session of its three year cycle, one can’t help but remember the finale to its previous cycle, in 2008. At that time, the UNDC was considering two of the very same agenda items it has been considering in this cycle: recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; and practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons. It failed to reach agreement on recommendations for either item.

In fact, the UNDC has essentially been considering these two agenda items for the past 11 years—from 2000–2003, the Commission’s agenda was: ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament; and practical confidence-building measures in conventional weapons. In 2004 and 2005, the UNDC was unable to agree on an agenda and did not hold any substantive sessions. But then it resumed considering of these issues in the 2006–2008 cycle and the 2009–2011 cycle, the last of which added a third agenda item, preparing elements for a draft declaration for a Fourth Disarmament Decade.

Why hasn’t the UNDC, after more than a decade of work, been able to produce anything substantial on these items?

Is it related to the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), where delegations have also not engaged in substantive work in more than a decade? It is often said that the CD has de facto replaced the functions of the Disarmament Commission; the CD is now a talk shop rather than a negotiating body, leaving very little for the UNDC to do.

Is it because the agenda items are not specific enough? They are indeed broad enough to incorporate discussion on an infinite range of issues—which often means that everything and nothing is discussed.

Is it the working methods of the Commission? For the last decade the UN disarmament machinery has been criticized for having failed to adapt to the 21st century. Indeed, the Chair of the 2008 session, Ambassador Piet de Klerk of the Netherlands, tried to urge reform of the working methods of the Commission. He suggested inviting experts from specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, research institutes, and think-tanks to participate in the UNDC. This plan was rejected then and has still not gained traction throughout the latest cycle.

It is probably a combination of the above three issues that have hampered productive work at the UNDC over the past decade. But it is also due to a reluctance of governments, especially those of the nuclear weapon states, to commit. We saw this at the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May 2010, when the nuclear weapon states forcefully excised any timebound commitments to nuclear disarmament from the outcome document. Of course, it should be noted that nothing is binding at the Disarmament Commission. It simply adopts recommendations that are forward to the UN General Assembly, which itself produces non-legally-binding resolutions. Yet some governments don’t seem to like things being put in ink, especially if it suggests that others expect them to do something in the future.

This fear of commitment is a problem not just at the Disarmament Commission—it is even more apparent at the CD, where governments have fought since 1998 to even commit to a programme of work. But it is definitely something that needs to be overcome, and fast. This is the last year in the cycle, the year that the Commission needs to produce something, on paper, that can be delivered to the General Assembly. Failure to do so does not just mark the end of another wasted three years. It marks a failure of good faith and of multilateral diplomacy.

New START: Arms Affirmation Treaty

2010-11-03T13:42:00.000-04:00

http://www.fpif.org/articles/start_arms_affirmation_treaty

The New START treaty should at best be called an “arms affirmation treaty,” confirming that expensive weapons systems, which include the nation's nuclear arsenal, remain a national priority. Like the earlier Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, New START insulates nuclear weapons spending, as well as large budgets for other weapons systems.

Thus far, the ratification debate in the U.S. Senate has assured funding for multi-billion-dollar missile defense and prompt global strike weapons systems, and has undermined the possibility of political opposition. Campaign contribution and lobbying disclosure data help explain why corporate contractors, with vested interests, have been able to influence both Republican and Democratic Senators throughout the ratification debate.

WILPF Statement on the UN Summit on the Millennium Development Goals

2010-09-21T16:25:00.004-04:00

With only five years left until the 2015 deadline to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has called on world leaders to attend a summit in New York on 20–22 September to accelerate progress towards the MDGs. The 2010 MDG Report, produced by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, notes that “unmet commitments, inadequate resources, lack of focus and accountability, and insufficient dedication to sustainable development have created shortfalls in many areas.” Some of these shortfalls, the report explains, were aggravated by the global food, climate, economic, and financial crises as well as armed conflict. The report estimates that poverty rates will continue to increase throughout the world as a result of the persisting global economic crisis.

However, upon releasing its 2010 Yearbook, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute noted, “The financial crisis and economic recession that have affected most of the globe appeared to have little effect on levels of military expenditure, arms production or arms transfers.” In 2009, worldwide military expenditure totaled an estimated 1531 billion USD, which is an increase of 5.9% in real terms compared to 2008 and an increase of 49% since 2000. Of those countries for which data was available, 65% increased their military spending in real terms in 2009.

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom emphasizes the links between military expenditure, the arms trade, violent conflict, and the reduction of available resources for social and economic development. Governments that spend excessive financial, technological, and human resources on their militaries divert resources from economic, social, and environmental programmes. The military-industrial-academic complex—composed of a state’s armed forces, the government, suppliers of weapons systems and services (corporations), and academic institutions that conduct research on weapon systems and designs—absorbs vast amounts of funding that could otherwise be spent on human security, including the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, funds reserved for development initiatives are increasingly spent on emergency relief and rehabilitation operations to clean up after violent conflict.

While military expenditures increase every year, investment in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and development lags far behind. As SIPRI notes in the release of its 2010 Yearbook, while the financial crisis did not seem to affect military spending, it “probably did undermine the willingness and ability of major governments and multilateral institutions to invest other, non-military resources to address the challenges and instabilities that threaten societies and individuals around the world.”

Since the end of the Cold War, militarism has been growing in response to an increasingly unstable world, propelling the world even further into tension and war. Armed conflict—and the constant threat of war or terrorism—has become both the cause of and response to this growing militarism. War and the threat of war destroy lives, infrastructure, and well-being, creating a culture of fear, violence, and instability. This impedes development by upsetting social programmes, education, transportation, business, and tourism, which prevents economic stability, mental well-being, and sustainable livelihoods. The manufacture and use of weapons also prevents sustainable ecological development and preservation, creating unequal access to resources and further impeding poverty reduction initiatives.

The continued investment in militarism does not make the world safer. Weapons cannot address the main threats people all over the world are facing today, such as natural disasters, increased food prices, and lack of adequate health care, education, and a clean environment. Yet these threats are aggravating arms races and weapons development. SIPRI has warned that growing competition for natural resources “may lead to increased military spending as a means of protecting resources from internal or external threats, while resource revenues are often a source of funding for arms purchases.” Therefore, in the context of the 2010 UN Summit on the Millennium Development Goals, WILPF urges UN member states and civil society to consider, what would you rather pay for:

One year of the world’s military spending, or over 24 years of the additional foreign aid required to reach the MDGs by 2015?

One year of the world’s military spending, or 700 years of the UN regular budget?

One year of the world’s military spending, or 2928 years of the new UN women’s agency?

Article 26 of the UN Charter mandates the UN Security Council with formulating a plan to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources. The Security Council has entirely neglected this responsibility and its permanent members have instead engaged in weapons profiteering and arms races, resulting in crises of international, national, and human security and of sustainable development.

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom calls on all governments to:

reduce military spending and redirect that expenditure to meet human and environmental needs, including fulfilling the MDGs;
report on military spending and arms trade through the established UN mechanisms;
support a robust legally-binding arms trade treaty that prevents arms transfers where there is a risk of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law and that acknowledges the impact of the arms trade on socio-economic development; and
call on the UN Security Council to report on progress made towards a plan to reduce the human and economic resources spent on armaments and indicate an intention to evaluate the Security Council’s performance and initiatives towards advancing article 26 in the next General Assembly session.

WILPF also calls on civil society to push their governments to meet these goals and to make the reduction of militarism a global norm by reframing the concept of security with a premium on universal human and ecological security, multilateralism, and a commitment to cooperative, nonviolent means of conflict resolution. We urge all governments present in New York this week to commit to making their MDG policies and strategies consistent with their obligations under Article 26 of the UN Charter and to remember that establishing peace and security for all humans is not separate from actions to fight poverty—it is central to these efforts.

Resources and further reading

The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010, United Nations, New York, 2010.
“Media Background—Military expenditure,” SIPRI Yearbook 2010, 2 June 2010.
“You get what you pay for!” Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 2009.

Sequel?

2010-07-29T17:34:00.004-04:00

Over-arching themes presented in Countdown to Zero bear little difference from those in the 2004 film Team America: World Police. The major difference appears to be that the producers of CTZ didn't understand the sardonic nature of Team America's presentation. Instead CTZ has run full steam ahead with an Islamophobic and reactionary film that demonizes North Korea, Iran, and others, while mostly extolling the US as a responsible nation, the fount of progress.

Check out these two clips. Note symbols and imagery used to depict Muslims and non-European peoples in each? [double click on the links to view in new window, full size.]

2010-07-22T19:11:00.004-04:00

I posted an essay today on the new film, Countdown to Zero, only to find that another critic has basically reached the same conclusion: it's dangerous, fear mongering, Islamophobic propaganda. It focuses only on a select few "nuclear threats," ones that allow for a more aggressive set of US policies against Iran and other nations.

Nevertheless, rational responses to Countdown based on its likely political effects and the ways it will be used to both legitimate US nuclear weapons and attack other nations that might acquire them will probably be drowned out in most discussions about the film. This isn't going to foster more informed public debates about the role of American power in the world. Instead, it's going to whip up fear and enable those who would further enable American nuclear-armed empire.

For those who go see it, I urge you to recognize (1) what's not discussed in the film, (2) how the "nuclear threat" is defined and framed, (3) which nations aren't criticized, or how criticisms differ, and (4) what kinds of solutions are proposed.

Mostly I urge people to boycott the film and educate others about its flaws.

Small Arms Monitor

2010-06-14T11:23:00.002-04:00

Reaching Critical Will, in cooperation with Global Action to Prevent War, the International Action Network on Small Arms, and Oxfam International, will be reporting on the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms and Light Weapons through a blog site, Small Arms Monitor. Please be sure to check it out and share the link with colleagues.

Disarmament Commission 2010: facing the “guillotine of redundancy”?

2010-03-29T18:19:00.001-04:00

The United Nations Disarmament Commission opened its 2010 session today. This deliberative body, mandated to make recommendations on issues related to disarmament, is in the second year of its current three year cycle. It struggled to adopt its agenda last year, but did eventually agree to work on three issues: 1) recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; 2) elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade; and 3) practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons. It began work on the first of these two items last year, which it will continue this year.

Monday consisted of general debate statements. There is little to report from today’s meeting. Most delegations reiterated the importance of the Commission to get to work, noting that it has failed to produce anything for more than a decade. A few states commented on process. Pakistan’s Ambassador Haroon, responding to murmurs of abandoning the stalemated Conference on Disarmament in favour of an alternative negotiating process, argued that the current UN disarmament machinery cannot work if its members “try to bury, obfuscate or side-step genuine security concerns to push through a mirage of disarmament and non-proliferation related progress” and that it is important to prevent elements of the machinery from being put “under the guillotine of redundancy” just because not all member states “subscribe to certain world views”.

In terms of substance, most delegations mentioned current and upcoming initiatives to be supported, such as the preparatory process for the arms trade treaty negotiations, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and the usual list of arms control and non-proliferation measures such as CTBT, FMCT, etc. One speaker, Ambassador Davide, Jr of the Philippines, voiced his delegation’s support for the establishment of “an international conference that will set the parameters for the elimination of nuclear weapons and prohibit their production, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and provide for the destruction of such weapons.” He noted that his delegation “gives much importance to having a specified time frame for the destruction of such weapons and the negotiation of Nuclear Weapons Convention.”

General debate will continue tomorrow. On Wednesday, the Commission will break into informal meetings to discuss the substance of two of the three working groups. Civil society will not be permitted to attend these meetings but will rejoin the Commission on 16 April when it reconvenes to adopt its reports.

President Obama's Nuclear "Surge"

2010-02-01T13:46:00.005-05:00

The Obama administration released its budget for FY 2011 today.

The centerpiece of the budget's National Nuclear Security Administration section is a "surge."

You can read about president Obama's $5 billion dollar nuke spending hike by downloading the NNSA budget. According to the administration they are boosting spending on nuclear weapons by 9.8% this year, with larger increases in outyears, so as to "take steps toward achieving a world without nuclear weapons" (p. 7).

Here's an excerpt (emphases added):

"Weapons Activities: The request for this appropriation is $7.0 billion, an increase of 9.8 percent over the FY 2010 appropriated level. This level is sustained and increased in the later outyears. Increased funding is requested for programs in direct support of the nuclear weapon stockpile, for scientific, technical and engineering activities related to maintenance assessment and certification capabilities for the stockpile, and for critical infrastructure improvements" (p. 9).

By "critical infrastructure improvements" the administration means the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Faciltiy planned for Los Alamos Lab, and the Uranium Processing Facility being built at Y-12 in Tennessee. The first is essentially a plutonium pit factory costing several billion. The second will provide uranium for US nuclear weapons programs, also at a cost of several billion. Neither facility is needed to "maintain" the stockpile, especially if the US is poised to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Both of these projects are necessary to lock-in nuclear weapons spending at the labs for many decades, and fully commit the US to nuclear weapons, regardless of how well international treaty discussions might go.

The importance of these facilities is emphasized in the NNSA's budget request:

"The President’s Request includes funding to complete the design and begin construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement (CMRR) nuclear facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. This facility conducts plutonium research and development and provides analytical capabilities in support of pit surveillance and production. Current planning would have this facility fully operational by 2022. A related project is requested to increase pit production capacity and capability at the adjoining PF-4 facility that is part of the main plutonium facility at Los Alamos to demonstrate pit reuse by 2017 and production by 2018-2020. The budget request also includes funding to complete the design and begin construction of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex to support production and surveillance of highly-enriched uranium components. This facility is also planned to achieve full operations by 2022" (p. 11).

The Obama administration's budget also appears to be easing the way for design efforts of new weapons at the laboratories, something that was resisted under the Bush White House's tenure. The NNSA budget states that;

"The President’s Request provides funding necessary to protect and advance the scientific capabilities at the U.S. national security laboratories — including the ability to design nuclear warheads as well as development and engineering expertise and capabilities— through a stockpile stewardship program that fully exercises these capabilities" (p. 10).

More spending for more disarmament?

2010-01-20T14:10:00.007-05:00

In a third op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, the “four horsemen”—Schultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn (SPKN)—advocate for increased spending on nuclear weapons. Surprised? You shouldn’t be. As others have pointed out, “their work reflects a pragmatic strategy to maintain U.S. military and economic dominance well into the 21st century, resulting in the formation of a new intellectual paradigm perhaps best described as ‘anti-nuclear imperialism.’” The institutional loyalties of SPKN and their larger political agendas reflect a political economy that is not only fundamentally at odds with nuclear abolition, but is anathema to peace and justice.

Further evidence of this can be found in their 19 January 2010 op-ed, wherein they argue that as we “work to realize the vision of a world without nuclear weapons,” significant investments “are urgently needed to undo the adverse consequences of deep reductions over the past five years in the laboratories’ budgets for the science, technology and engineering programs that support and underwrite the nation’s nuclear deterrent.”

This misleading claim ignores the fact that while the US nuclear weapons budget has been reduced by about $1 billion over the past five years, this followed an increase over a decade (1995–2005) of about $3 billion. Instead, SPKN aim to support their friends at the labs in the expected request for increased funding for nuclear weapons in the FY 2011 budget. Indeed, SPKN argue, “The United States must continue to attract, develop and retain the outstanding scientists, engineers, designers and technicians we will need to maintain our nuclear arsenal, whatever its size, for as long as the nation’s security requires it.”

This statement assumes a lot. It assumes that the United States relies on, and will indefinitely continue to rely on, nuclear weapons for its security. It does not explain whose security nuclear weapons protect in the United States. Its citizens? Or its technocratic elite—the same people who work at the labs that SPKN and others who are part of that elite structure so vigorously defend? “National security,” as it is typically invoked in this sense, does not refer to the well-being of the general population but of those managing the military-industrial-academic complex.

The above statement also assumes that those who design, build, and maintain nuclear weapons have a right to continue doing this work—and what does that say about the possibilities for ever eliminating nuclear weapons throughout the world?

Andrew Lichterman of the Western States Legal Foundation has written extensively about the US nuclear weapon labs. In a recent article, he argues:

The constellation of organizations that constitute the nuclear weapons complex sits close to the apex of global power and privilege, and the upper echelon inhabitants of those organizations are quite determined to hold on to what they have. Nuclear weapons establishments, in fact, are preeminent manifestations of how far those in power will go to preserve it—they will play dice with all humanity, even all life on earth. The nature of the institutions ultimately can not be separated from the purposes and practices that have shaped them since their inception. Born in secrecy and sequestered throughout their existence within the least accountable sector of American government, the nuclear weapons laboratories and the broader nuclear weapons complex have become powerful institutions in their own right. They have done so by using all the tools that the powerful have developed in this society for staving off democracy—control of information and technologies, propaganda, and alliances with other huge organizations in common strategies aimed at extracting a steady and expanding stream of wealth from the rest of the economy. There is no way to provide the upper level denizens of the nuclear weapons establishment—the scientists and engineers, the technocrats, bureaucrats, and propagandists—with some other pursuit that gives them a similarly “rewarding” position in society, unless we can come up with some other set of “missions” that can assure them of an equally comfortable, secure, and largely unaccountable place in the upper few percent of a national and global economy characterized by stark disparities in wealth. And why should we want to do that?

Finally, SPKN frame their call for increased weapons spending in the context of disarmament—if we want to achieve a nuclear weapon free world, we need to make sure that our nuclear weapons are “safe, secure, and reliable” (that they remain an “effective deterrent” to others) until we achieve that world. This is outrageously circular logic. Modernized or “refurbished” nuclear weapons research and production facilities capable of building the nuclear threat anew, as a trade-off for arms control treaties or arsenal reductions, is not disarmament. If the danger of nuclear war is to be eliminated, ceasing to plan and build for an eternal nuclear threat must come early, not late, in the process. The “nuclear danger” does not come from without, but from within. To seek to “hedge” against the nuclear threat only perpetuates it, sustaining the global climate of fear and distrust that makes real disarmament progress always a receding goal.

Nuclear Newspeak

2009-12-05T12:30:00.004-05:00

"Orwellian" was a popular description of the Bush administration's tendency to name policies in ways diametrically opposite to their results. There were the "clear skies," and "healthy forests" initiatives of the Interior Dept. which resulted in increased pollution, weakened regulation, and stepped up logging of public and private lands. The administration named military missions and labor reforms in similar ways, ramming through rapacious and belligerent directives under the guise of happy, democratic, and sustainable sounding monikers.

Many voters hoped for a change under the Obama administration. It seems, however, that the Obama White House subscribes to a similar political philosophy - say one thing, do the other. The recent troop surge announced for the war and occupation of Afghanistan is a case in point; the antiwar president who was elected largely because of the antiwar movement, who has talked a good talk about ending the war in Iraq, closing Guantanamo, banning torture, and other horrors of the "war on terror," is turning into quite the war president. The mission in Iraq is moving ahead par course with the Bush team's original goals, Guantanamo is still open (as are the dozens of other secret prisons in the CIA's network, even though we've been told they're closing), and now Obama is sending 30,000 Marines and GIs to Central Asia. And yet Obama won the Nobel Peace Prize and continues to project an image of peaceful intent. "War is peace."

Nowhere is this Orwellian modus —"ignorance is strength"— more refined than in the formulation of US nuclear weapons policies. Whether with respect to Sec. Clinton's maneuverings against Iran, N. Korea and other states, or current US nuclear weapons complex schemes to boost funding and build billion dollar infrastructure for weapons research, design and production far into the future, the message is, following Obama and a litany of big-whigs, "a world free of nuclear weapons," but the substance is money and authorization for "nukes forever."

In this month's Z Magazine Will Parrish, Nick Robinson and I have written up a small part of this story.

Operationalising the vision for a nuclear weapon free world

2009-10-26T10:03:00.003-04:00

Presented by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will, at the UNGA First Committee, 23 October 2009

For more than sixty years, civil society has been calling on governments to take action to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons. US President Obama’s pledge in Prague to seek “a world free of nuclear weapons” brought the hope of billions of people to the highest levels of international responsibility.

We have chosen in this statement not to comment in detail on specific resolutions that the First Committee has before it, but to talk about how nuclear disarmament interconnects with other weapons and security challenges in today’s complex security environment and to put forward a few concrete ideas toward operationalising the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.

First, some interconnections.

At the DPI/NGO conference in Mexico City in September, 1300 participants representing over 340 NGOs from more than 55 countries endorsed a final declaration recognising that security, peace, disarmament, human rights, gender equality, and development are closely interconnected at the local national, regional, and global levels.

One important element underscoring all of these issues is military spending. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, global military expenditure in 2008 is estimated to have totaled $1464 billion. This represents an increase of 45 per cent in the past ten years. The US military expenditure has reached the highest level in real terms since World War II. It is now responsible for at least 40 per cent of total global military spending.

Nuclear weapons, and the wider global military-industrial complex, consume vast resources that could be put to better use.

Consider just one example. The head of the UN Climate Change Secretariat Yvo De Boer estimated recently that the annual cost of cutting global emissions of greenhouse gases will be $200 billion. It will cost another US$100 billion per year to cope with the effects of climate change. This means that just one-fifth of annual global military spending budget can help reduce the scale and worldwide consequences of climate change.

Nuclear weapons cannot help us address climate change, poverty, child mortality, or injustice. Instead, they act as an existential threat to humanity and life on this planet. They also maintain the structural inequalities between the nuclear-armed powers and the great majority of states, and incite some states to seek nuclear weapons. They support establishments and institutions that see their interests as being well served by a mode of military dominance ultimately underwritten by nuclear weapons. They do not provide security for the citizens of the world.

Civil society groups and many states have long recognised the need to develop more effective resources and tools for security, defence, and conflict resolution than weapons. We advocate pursuit of human security, through the advancement of the interconnected issues above. However, none of the interconnecting issues should be treated as preconditions for nuclear disarmament. In fact, there is no basis for demanding general and complete disarmament or a settlement of all regional disputes as preconditions for eliminating nuclear weapons. The pursuit of nuclear disarmament and achievement of a legally-binding regime that eliminates and prohibits nuclear weapons will greatly facilitate global security and efforts to build peace.

Which leads us to a few suggestions on how to operationalise the vision for a world free of nuclear weapons.

There are many resolutions before you on various aspects of nuclear weapons. We join in supporting many of these efforts, including bringing the CTBT into force, reinforcing the existing nuclear weapon free zones and promoting the establishment of additional zones in Europe and the Arctic as well as the Middle East and North-East Asia, reducing and eliminating strategic and non-strategic arsenals, and fulfilling the NPT disarmament commitments undertaken in 1995 and 2000.

The common factor preventing progress on all these issues is that some governments continue to place high value on nuclear weapons, whether for security, status, or power projection.

When leaders come to the UN General Assembly and Security Council and say they want a nuclear weapon free world, we have to ask how they are changing their policies and doctrines to make this possible. The most conducive path to such a world is for all of the nuclear weapon states to marginalise the role of nuclear weapons in concrete ways, such as by:

agreeing to legally-binding security assurances not to attack non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons;
committing not to use nuclear weapons as a tool for “pre-emptive strike”;
rejecting counterforce and countervalue doctrines; and
excluding “extended deterrence” arrangements in their doctrines;
declaring that as a matter of national policy they will not design, develop, or produce new design nuclear warheads or modernise existing warheads.

Trading some arms control agreements or arsenal reduction for modernised nuclear weapons research and production facilities capable of building the nuclear threat anew is not disarmament. If the danger of nuclear war is to be eliminated, ceasing to plan and build for an eternal nuclear threat must come early, not late, in the process. The “nuclear danger” does not come from without, but from within. To seek to “hedge” against the nuclear threat only perpetuates it, sustaining the global climate of fear and distrust that makes real disarmament progress always a receding goal.

To this end, it is good that the United States and Russian Federation have returned to the negotiating table to replace START. The NPT Review Conference should include commitment to further bilateral reductions. In the next round, the United States and Russian Federation should each cut their deployed and stored nuclear weapons and delivery systems to at least the low hundreds. This would facilitate multilateral negotiations on elimination. They should also cut their nuclear weapon budgets in half and commit to zero funding for any modernisation or refurbishment programmes.

Furthermore, it is important not to be mesmerised by negotiations, which can be derailed by domestic or international developments. The United States and Russia, and other states with nuclear weapons, can and should undertake unilateral reductions, as the 13 Practical Steps provide.

Many non-nuclear weapon states also have a role to play. Thirty non-nuclear weapon states shelter under the US nuclear umbrella. Citizens in NATO countries, Australia, South Korea, and Japan have long advocated for their countries to let go of the cold war nuclear umbrellas and forge more independent and balanced relationships for national, regional, and international security. Now key legislators from all these countries are joining the call. We urge governments to heed these calls and act to denuclearise their alliances and relations with other states. Many proponents of retaining nuclear weapons in the United States espouse “extended deterrence” as their justification. Public statements from governments under the US nuclear umbrella stating that they believe their security commitments will still be viable without nuclear weapons would thus remove a key obstacle to deeper reductions in the US nuclear arsenal. Removing nuclear sharing from NATO’s Strategic Concept, combined with removal of nuclear weapons from Europe, would be an important confidence-building measure and would likely facilitate bilateral dialogue that could lead to much deeper cuts in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals.

Like many of you, we welcomed that the UN Security Council held a special session this September on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. While Resolution 1887 included concrete operational commitments to help prevent nuclear proliferation and other kinds of nuclear insecurity, it failed to include similarly concrete measures to advance disarmament. Disarmament cannot take a back seat to non-proliferation, nor can measures undertaken to prevent proliferation be considered acts of disarmament.

We hope that the cooperation forged among the P5 in the drafting of this resolution will continue and grow to engage non-nuclear weapon states, and that the P5 and other nuclear weapon possessors will find similar unity of purpose in implementing specific disarmament measures.

To this end, all states interested in serious nuclear disarmament should, inter alia:

Oppose conditioning approval of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on deals for entrenching and expanding weapons complexes, on retaining the option of designing and manufacturing modified or new-design warheads, or on modernizing delivery systems. They should also call for the closure of all nuclear test sites.
Negotiate for a fissile materials treaty that comprehensively prevents use of existing materials outside military programs for weapons acquisition and that facilitates disarmament.
Immediately and forcefully convey to nuclear weapon possessors that they must reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines and in international relations.
Support UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s call, in his five-point plan for nuclear disarmament, for the possession of any weapon of mass destruction to be considered a ‘global taboo’.
Emphasise that it would be a crime against humanity if anyone were to use nuclear weapons, anywhere in the world, for any purpose whatsoever. In this context, we applaud the decision of the International Committee of the Red Cross to speak out on nuclear weapons during this First Committee session.
Commit to the objective of a Nuclear Weapons Convention and begin the process that will lead towards this objective. Those that are states parties to the NPT should put this commitment into their statements and papers to the 2010 Review Conference and push for it to be included in any final documents.

Civil society experts developed a model Nuclear Weapons Convention some years ago as a resource and guide, with suggestions and options for how to prohibit, reduce, and eliminate nuclear weapons safely and securely, while providing insurance against future break-outs. This model Convention has been circulated by the Secretary-General as an official UN document.

There are some who say that it is premature to consider a Nuclear Weapons Convention at this time. Work on a Nuclear Weapons Convention will ensure full implementation of the NPT and help facilitate nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation steps.

Abolishing nuclear weapons will help move the world away from a system of competing nation-states seeking military advantage and open the way to putting real, equitable, environmentally sustainable, human security interests at the centre of national policies.

Victor Hugo wrote that: “More powerful than the march of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come.” The idea whose time has come is that the abolition of nuclear weapons is not only desirable, but possible, achievable, practical, and urgently necessary.

First Committee 2009 opens

2009-10-05T17:35:00.003-04:00

This year's UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security will run from 5 October-3 November 2009. Check out the Reaching Critical Will website for all statements, resolutions, reports, and other information. Also subscribe to RCW's First Committee Monitor for full NGO reporting coverage of all topics.

Heading into another session of the First Committee, the situation looks a little more positive than last year. Issues related to disarmament—from nuclear weapons to cluster bombs—have received increasing attention throughout 2009 from governments, the media, and the general public. Many high-profile individuals have called for a nuclear weapon free world; many governments have ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Civil society has continued campaigning around these weapons and others—small arms, antipersonnel landmines, depleted uranium weapons, space weapons—to prevent their development, modernisation, production, trade, and stockpiling.

There is a new administration in Washington that appears interested in active multilateralism. The United States fully participated in EU3+3 talks with Iran for the first time. Russian and US officials have been talking about reducing their arsenals further. The UN Security Council held a presidential Summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on 24 October, coinciding with the sixth Entry Into Force conference of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—which 150 states have now ratified. Disarmament was a central theme for many high-level delegates speaking to the UN General Assembly’s general debate in September, with 80 countries speaking about disarmament—up from 19 in 2008.

The heightened awareness and activity around disarmament is encouraging. However, those concerned with concrete movement toward a more secure and equitable world order with less armaments and reduced military expenditure need to take the time to separate the rhetoric from the reality. Now is the time for action, but it is equally crucial to ensure that the actions taken in the name of disarmament actually achieve that goal.

With the change in administration in the United States, the US government and several of its allies have adopted a new rhetoric on nuclear disarmament. They have begun to espouse policies for a “nuclear weapon free world” that do not actually include specific or time-bound steps for disarmament. In fact, these measures have focused nearly exclusively on strengthening or demanding new nuclear non-proliferation measures and commitments from non-nuclear weapon states, while at the same time maintaining the status quo (i.e. no progress) on nuclear disarmament.

The process toward an Arms Trade Treaty faces similar dangers of co-option by the powerful few who have interests at stake other than peace, justice, and security. Civil society and most governments want the ATT to reduce the human costs associated with the proliferation of conventional arms. However, thus far discussions have reached a lowest common denominator consensus only on dealing with illicit trade. Whether or not states will be able to agree to a treaty that has any real benefit to human security, by applying humanitarian and human rights standards to arms transfer decisions, is far from assured.

Civil society and concerned governments need to ensure that discussions and actions around disarmament and non-proliferation are clear and balanced. We also need to shift the language of the debate away from that which focuses on so-called “national security”—which in reality is the economic security only of the elite, technologically proficient classes of the state—to that which focuses on human security. To a large extent this is already happening in the Arms Trade Treaty process. For nuclear weapons, it has hardly happened at all outside of particular segments of civil society.

John Borrie, who works for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, has looked closely at the initiatives to ban cluster munitions and landmines for lessons that could potentially be applied to the elimination of nuclear weapons. He notes that those working to abolish cluster munitions and antipersonnel landmines reframed the discourse and acceptability of these weapons in broader terms than before. Campaigners focused on the human impacts of the weapons alongside their purported military advantages and consciously shifted the burden of proof for the continued acceptability of a weapon onto users and producers. In the case of nuclear weapons, this means forcing those who want to keep them to try to make a convincing case for their acceptability in humanitarian terms, regardless of their purported military advantage.

Reaching Critical Will asks all delegations to the First Committee to take the time this year to debate the humanitarian merits of nuclear weapons. During the thematic debate on nuclear weapons, it would be extremely useful if delegations would address the values, perceptions, and interests of nuclear weapon possession and abolition. Getting away from Cold War deterrence theories, we are interested in hearing a debate on the moral, legal, and humanitarian justifications for the retention or elimination of nuclear weapons.

The First Committee is the place for this debate. All UN member states can participate. It makes recommendations to the General Assembly through resolutions related to all issues of disarmament and international security. Its work feeds into other disarmament machinery, including the Conference on Disarmament and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The time is ripe—we are coming out of the UN Security Council Summit on nuclear issues and heading into the NPT Review Conference. Having a frank discussion about the reality of nuclear weapons, without all the rhetoric, would be instrumental to actually making concrete steps toward true disarmament and stronger non-proliferation.

UN Security Council: Working toward a nuclear weapon free world?

2009-09-25T22:40:00.002-04:00

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Full report and other materials available online

Yesterday, US President Obama chaired a UN Security Council meeting on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It was a great opportunity for the five permanent members and nuclear weapon states—China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States—to make concrete commitments to nuclear disarmament and lay out the steps toward a nuclear weapon free world.

Unfortunately, these governments instead used the Summit to lay out their vision for stricter requirements for non-nuclear weapon states to prove they are not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. As UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown said during his General Assembly statement: “Britain will insist that the onus on non-nuclear states is that in future it is for them to prove they are not developing nuclear weapons.”

Yet despite rhetoric to the contrary, the five permanent members did not extend any new commitments for themselves to eliminate nuclear weapons in compliance with their legal obligation to do so.

The Summit resolution emphasised non-proliferation over disarmament, requesting new requirements for non-nuclear weapon states to prove their status and intent.

Most of the nuclear weapon states did not reference their previous commitments to steps toward nuclear disarmament nor set out new ones.

The Summit promoted nuclear power as a safe, clean, source of energy that will help combat climate change.

However, many of the non-permanent members of the Council recognised the problem with this approach to non-proliferation and disarmament and outlined several concrete proposals
to advance both agendas in a balanced manner.

Read Reaching Critical Will’s report on the Summit for details of these suggestions!

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom released a statement before the meeting, calling on the UN Security Council members to make serious commitments to disarmament along with their requests on non-proliferation. WILPF continues to call upon Council members—and all other members of the United Nations—to work toward a nuclear free world through real, concrete actions and commitments. For example:

1. The UN Security Council should call for a halt to development, production, design, modernization, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

2. It should also fulfill its commitment to formulate a plan for disarmament with the least diversion of the world’s human and economic resources toward weapons, as it is instructed to do in Article 26 of the UN Charter.

3. The context of all non-proliferation measures should be designed as steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, not toward their indefinite possession by an elite group of states.

4. The UN Security Council should urge governments to accelerate and enlarge their support for development of commercially viable renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy and to phase-out nuclear power, as a measure strengthening both non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

Disarmament at the General Assembly

2009-09-23T12:11:00.003-04:00

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

This morning the UN General Assembly began its general debate, with heads of state and foreign ministers delivering statements on their policies and priorities on a broad range of issues for the year ahead. Reaching Critical Will will be monitoring these statements and creating an index of all references made to issues of disarmament, peace, and security. As the debate continues, please keep an eye on the index, which is searchable both by country and by topic.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon opened the session morning; here are his remarks related to disarmament:

“...let this be the year that nations united to free our world of nuclear weapons. For too long, this great cause has lain dormant. That is why, last October, I proposed a 5-point plan for putting disarmament back on the global agenda. And now the international climate is changing. The Russian Federation and the United States have pledged to cut their nuclear arsenals. This coming May, at the UN Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, we have opportunity to push for real progress.

Tomorrow’s historic Security Council summit—chaired by the President of the United States, with us for the first time—offers a fresh start. With action now, we can get the ratifications to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into force. Together, let us make this the year we agreed to banish the bomb.”

US President Obama also delivered his remarks, much of which had to do with disarmament and related issues:

“I have outlined a comprehensive agenda to seek the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. In Moscow, the United States and Russia announced that we would pursue substantial reductions in our strategic warheads and launchers.”

“And we address our priorities here, in this institution—for instance, through the Security Council meeting that I will chair tomorrow on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.”

“Today, I put forward four pillars that are fundamental to the future that we want for our children: non-proliferation and disarmament; the promotion of peace and security; the preservation of our planet; and a global economy that advances opportunity for all people.”

“First, we must stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and seek the goal of a world without them. This institution was founded at the dawn of the atomic age, in part because man’s capacity to kill had to be contained. For decades, we averted disaster, even under the shadow of a super-power stand-off. But today, the threat of proliferation is growing in scope and complexity. If we fail to act, we will invite nuclear arms races in every region, and the prospect of wars and acts of terror on a scale that we can hardly imagine.

“A fragile consensus stands in the way of this frightening outcome – the basic bargain that shapes the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. It says that all nations have the right to peaceful nuclear energy; that nations with nuclear weapons have the responsibility to move toward disarmament; and those without them have the responsibility to forsake them. The next twelve months could be pivotal in determining whether this compact will be strengthened or will slowly dissolve.

“America will keep our end of the bargain. We will pursue a new agreement with Russia to substantially reduce our strategic warheads and launchers.”

“We will complete a Nuclear Posture Review that opens the door to deeper cuts, and reduces the role of nuclear weapons.”

Nuclear Testing: “We will move forward with ratification of the Test Ban Treaty, and work with others to bring the Treaty into force so that nuclear testing is permanently prohibited.”

Fissile Materials: “And we will call upon countries to begin negotiations in January on a treaty to end the production of fissile material for weapons.”

Nuclear Terrorism: “I will also host a Summit next April that reaffirms each nation’s responsibility to secure nuclear material on its territory, and to help those who can’t – because we must never allow a single nuclear device to fall into the hands of a violent extremist. And we will work to strengthen the institutions and initiatives that combat nuclear smuggling and theft.”

Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programmes: “All of this must support efforts to strengthen the NPT. Those nations that refuse to live up to their obligations must face consequences. This is not about singling out individual nations – it is about standing up for the rights of all nations that do live up to their responsibilities. Because a world in which IAEA inspections are avoided and the United Nation’s demands are ignored will leave all people less safe, and all nations less secure. In their actions to date, the governments of North Korea and Iran threaten to take us down this dangerous slope. We respect their rights as members of the community of nations. I am committed to diplomacy that opens a path to greater prosperity and a more secure peace for both nations if they live up to their obligations.

“But if the governments of Iran and North Korea choose to ignore international standards; if they put the pursuit of nuclear weapons ahead of regional stability and the security and opportunity of their own people; if they are oblivious to the dangers of escalating nuclear arms races in both East Asia and the Middle East – then they must be held accountable. The world must stand together to demonstrate that international law is not an empty promise, and that Treaties will be enforced. We must insist that the future not belong to fear.”

Fissile Materials: “At the Conference on Disarmament, we agreed on a work plan to negotiate an end to the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.”

Nuclear Testing: “And this week, my Secretary of State will become the first senior American representative to the annual Members Conference of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”

He also had some good remarks on multilateralism:

“Now is the time for all of us to take our share of responsibility for a global response to global challenges.”

“Responsibility and leadership in the 21st century demand more. In an era when our destiny is shared, power is no longer a zero sum game. No one nation can or should try to dominate another nation. No world order that elevates one nation or group of people over another will succeed. No balance of power among nations will hold. The traditional division between nations of the south and north makes no sense in an interconnected world. Nor do alignments of nations rooted in the cleavages of a long gone Cold War.

“The time has come to realize that the old habits and arguments are irrelevant to the challenges faced by our people. They lead nations to act in opposition to the very goals that they claim to pursue, and to vote – often in this body – against the interests of their own people. They build up walls between us and the future that our people seek, and the time has come for those walls to come down. Together, we must build new coalitions that bridge old divides – coalitions of different faiths and creeds; of north and south, east and west; black, white, and brown.”

Keeping checking the RCW Disarmament Index for more.

WILPF Statement to the UN Security Council in anticipation of its 24 September 2009 meeting on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

2009-09-21T13:46:00.004-04:00

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) welcomes the UN Security Council Summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament to be held on 24 September 2009. We urge the UN Security Council to use this opportunity to constructively contribute to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by taking steps toward a nuclear weapon free world and the promotion of collective human security and security for all life on this planet.

Ahead of the summit, the US government released a draft resolution for the UN Security Council to consider as an outcome document, which was then consolidated into a revised draft with input from other Council members. WILPF is encouraged by the scope of the document, which covers a wide range of important issues. In particular, WILPF welcomes its recognition of the importance of negative security assurances and nuclear weapon free zone treaties and its commitment to supporting the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency on non-proliferation and safeguards. We are especially pleased with the addition of a preambular paragraph in the revised version that the welcomes and encourages “the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament” (PP23).

However, both versions of the draft resolution focus nearly exclusively on strengthening existing non-proliferation measures and advocating new, more stringent requirements, while at the same time maintaining the status quo (i.e. no progress) on nuclear disarmament.

The only reference to disarmament in the operative paragraphs of the resolution simply reiterates Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (OP4—all references are to the revised version of the resolution, dated 18 September 2009). The references to nuclear weapon free zone treaties (PP13 and PP14), negative security assurances (PP15), and “the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament” (PP11) in the preamble are not accompanied by concrete actions in the operative paragraphs. Neither draft mentions the thirteen practical steps toward nuclear disarmament that was unanimously agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, nor any other nuclear disarmament proposal, such as the UN Secretary-General’s five-point plan for disarmament or an international Nuclear Weapons Convention or framework agreement. In addition, the only reference in the resolution to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is to “monitor closely any situations” involving their proliferation (OP25).

Meanwhile, the draft goes far beyond non-proliferation commitments outlined in the NPT, calling for UN Security Council consideration of all “situations of noncompliance with nonproliferation commitments” (OP1), encouraging states to consider the Additional Protocol a new standard when making nuclear export decisions (OP17), and urging states “to require as a condition of nuclear exports” that IAEA safeguards continue even if the state withdraws from its safeguards agreement (OP16). The first of these demands does not indicate how determinations of non-compliance will be made, or by whom, or which non-proliferation obligations are included in the scope of this demand. In addition, there has of yet been no agreement in the NPT or IAEA frameworks about where or by which methods situations of non-compliance should be dealt with. It is traditionally up to the relevant treaty or organisation to determine these conditions, not external bodies. Furthermore, the resolution does not refer cases of non-compliance with disarmament obligations to the UN Security Council.

The other two non-proliferation examples given above—and several others in the resolution—have been brought up in the NPT context before and have been met with opposition by many non-nuclear weapons states. These measures could indeed be beneficial to strengthening non-proliferation, but they cannot be extended without reciprocal commitments to disarmament.

The obfuscation of several paragraphs in the resolution is also problematic. OP7 “deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.” It is unclear which resolutions are being referred to in this paragraph. None of the UN Security Council resolutions on Iran’s nuclear programme determine that the programme constitutes a “threat to international peace and security.” However, these resolutions are reaffirmed in PP17 of the draft.

PP11 fails to acknowledge that some of the recognised nuclear weapon states have not ratified relevant protocols of some nuclear weapon free zone treaties. In addition, the encouragement of “efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy” in OP9 does not acknowledge the extreme environmental risks of nuclear power or the nuclear fuel cycle or the problems posed by both for the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world.

In order to achieve a meaningful outcome that advances an equitable and secure nuclear weapon free world, WILPF encourages the UN Security Council to call for concrete actions and commitments to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

On disarmament, the UN Security Council should:

Call for a halt to development, production, design, modernization, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and for the establishment of international controls on delivery systems and anti-missile systems;
Call for transparency regarding the size and status of nuclear weapon forces;
Refer to the International Court of Justice’s 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons;
Call for concrete actions on the 1995 and 2000 NPT decisions and commitments;
Fulfill its commitment to formulate a plan for nuclear disarmament with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, pursuant to Article 26 of the UN Charter;
Call upon the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations of a fissile material treaty in 2010 on the basis of the Shannon Mandate and to address the factors that have complicated the negotiation process in the interim months; and
Call on all nuclear weapon states to drop their reservations to relevant protocols of nuclear weapon free zone treaties and ratify all such treaties.

On non-proliferation, the UN Security Council should ensure that its related requirements and commitments do not exhort the current imbalance between “nuclear have’s and have not’s” by demanding tighter restrictions on the behaviour of non-nuclear weapon states while promising disarmament by the nuclear weapon states as an “ultimate” goal in the distant future. The context of all non-proliferation measures should designed as steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, not toward their indefinite possession by an elite group of states.

On nuclear energy, the UN Security Council should urge governments to accelerate and enlarge their support for development of commercially viable renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy and to phase-out nuclear power, as a measure strengthening both non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

Conference on Disarmament concludes, without conducting substantive work

2009-09-17T21:34:00.004-04:00

Posted by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Thursday, 17 September, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) met for its final plenary meeting of 2009. It adopted its report to the General Assembly, with a few amendments, and the delegations of Japan, the Netherlands, and Canada submitted the International Panel on Fissile Materials’ draft fissile materials treaty to the CD as an official document. But the fact that the Conference was unable to implement its programme of work, adopted back in May, overshadowed the closing meeting.

Many delegations expressed frustration that despite all best attempts to move forward with concrete action, the CD remained in deadlock for its twelfth year in a row. Mexico’s Ambassador Gómez-Oliver lamented that the CD, whose “very mandate would oblige it to be a main role player,” is not only on the margins but is actually blocking concrete action. She called on the CD to seek every means possible to transcend its difficulties, examine its methods of work, reflect on its mandate, and reestablish its credibility.

The CD’s failure to reach consensus on implementing its programme of work reflects the deeply entrenched obstacles in the path of abolishing nuclear weapons. These obstacles are by no means intractable; the differences in delegate positions and concerns are certainly not impassable.

However, with only four months until the start of the 2010 session, CD member states have some intense intersessional consultations ahead of them to bridge the gaps between positions, or more importantly, resolve underlying concerns. The commitment of this year’s and next year’s P6 members to work together during these months is encouraging.

Some of the work toward consensus, however, can only be accomplished through the good faith relations between states in the international community at large. The impasse in the CD is a product of poor international relations, characterized by double-standards, discrimination, mistrust, and regional and international power imbalances. These issues deserve serious attention in the intervening months and should be considered in the context of moving toward an equitable nuclear weapon free world that enhances human security and the security for all life on the planet.

WILPF Statement on the 64th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

2009-08-06T14:31:00.000-04:00

On 6 and 9 August 1945, the United States dropped two nuclear weapons on two Japanese cities—one on Hiroshima and the other on Nagasaki. These acts killed 200,000 civilians by the end of 1945 and many more in the years that followed. The development, manufacture, testing, deployment, and sharing of nuclear weapons continues affecting the Earth and its people today. The threat of the use of these weapons still exists. The arms race is not yet over.

While the United States and Russia are currently engaged in talks to reduce their stockpiles, the proposed agreement does not affect warheads held in reserve, “non-strategic” weapons, or the size of the total stockpile, nor does it require dismantlement of any nuclear warheads.^¹ Meanwhile, both countries have plans to modernize their nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

A US plan for the development of a missile “defence” system in Europe has also increased tensions between the two countries. Meanwhile, China continues to modernize and expand its arsenal. The United Kingdom decided to renew its nuclear system last year. France’s president, while promising to reduce his country’s stockpile, also promised that he will retain the possibility to “send a nuclear warning” to underscore France’s “resolve” to protect its interests.^²

There are also four countries that possess nuclear explosive devices but are not recognized as nuclear weapon states by the primary nuclear treaty regime, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—and are thus not bound by its rules. India, Pakistan, and Israel are still making materials for use in nuclear weapons, while North Korea has threatened to resume production. Pakistan and India are both building new reactors to increase their capacity to make plutonium for nuclear weapons. Both are actively developing and testing ballistic and cruise missiles to carry nuclear weapons.^³

Despite the end of the Cold War, despite supposed “thawing of tensions” between the major powers, and despite the reality of an interconnected, interdependent world order, the mythical ideal of the power of the bomb persists. It continues to influence national security doctrines, international relations, and multilateral negotiations, subsequently undermining international law, human security, and our ability to build resilience to the converging climate, peak oil, food, water, and financial crises we face.

WILPF urges all governments and citizens to consider our options for the future. It encourages everyone to support and work for the elimination of nuclear weapons and for the redirection of nuclear weapon expenditures to meet environmental, social, health, housing, food, and economic needs. We need to creatively build resilience into our international system that does not rely on violence or military power but rather promotes cooperation, ingenuity, and human security. As a first step toward this end, WILPF calls on all nuclear weapon possessors to cease modernizing their arsenals as a step toward the good faith pursuit of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear weapon free world.

For more information about WILPF’s work on nuclear disarmament, please go to www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

1Hans Kristensen, “START Follow-On: What SORT of Agreement?” Federation of American Scientists, Strategic Security Blog, 8 July 2009, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/start.php?pfstyle=wp.

2For more on the nuclear programmes of the five NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states, see Rhetoric vs. Reality: Elite Disarmament Proposals and Real Disarmament Prospects, Information Briefing, Western States Legal Foundation, May 2009, http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/rhetoricvreality.pdf.

3Zia Mian, “Pushing South Asia Toward the Brink,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 27 July 2009, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/6295.

CD adopts a programme of work!

2009-05-29T12:36:00.003-04:00

On Friday, 29 May, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) adopted a programme of work for the first time in ten years.

Before bringing the decision to the floor, Ambassador Jazaïry of Algeria, current president of the CD, explained that the six presidents (P6) of the 2009 session were inspired by the “new momentum” for disarmament, expressed in US President Obama’s Prague speech, the announcements of further US-Russian bilateral nuclear reductions, etc. After consultations with member states, they reached the conclusion that: they had the “historic responsibility” to not pass up the opportunity to relaunch the work of the CD and that they had to go beyond pre-established positions “and allow ourselves to be guided only by the manifest community of our shared interest in this matter; that the programme of work should be tackled in a comprehensive and balanced manner; and that consensus should be sought “part and parcel of a process refining previous efforts to overcome” the stumbling blocks of recent years.

Intercessional consultations on a draft programme by all members of the P6 were met with expressions at support in a variety of fora outside the UN system, so the presidents decided to introduce their proposal to the CD on 19 May. Ambassador Jazaïry argued, the programme is not perfect but “is a compromise which provides a delicate balance” and “in no way establishes a hierarchy in terms of priority,” but rather establishes a basis of compromise to launch negotiations.

He then asked if there was any objection to the adoption of CD/1863 by consensus. There was none. The gavel dropped and the room burst into applause.

Before the programme was adopted,a few delegations spoke about CD/1863, including Ukraine, Iran, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Morocco. After the adoption, a great number of delegations delivered interventions, voicing their support for the programme of work. Two, India and Pakistan, elaborated their positions on negotiating a fissile materials treaty.

Much work remains to be done before negotiations and other substantive work can begin. But at least, for the first time in a decade, the CD has a plan.

For details, please see Reaching Critical Will’s CD Report for 29 May.

North Korea conducts a second nuclear test

2009-05-26T15:52:00.005-04:00

On 25 May, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducted what it claims to be a second nuclear test. According to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, the International Monitoring System’s (IMS) seismic stations registered a seismic event at 41.2896 degrees North and 129.0480 degrees East at 00:54:43 GMT (09:54 local time). The signal’s area of origin is largely identical with the 2006 DPRK nuclear test. The event’s magnitude is slightly higher than in 2006, measuring 4.52 on the Richter scale, while in 2006 it was 4.1. Those doing the calculations at ArmsControlWonk.com suggest the yield of the nuclear explosive device was likely around 4 KT.

WILPF issued a statement in response to the DPRK test, over which it expresses deep concern. However, WILPF remains equally concerned about previous nuclear tests of other states and their continued possession of nuclear weapons. In its formal response to the test, WILPF called on all states outside of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to ratify it without delay or conditions and called on all states possessing nuclear weapons to immediately shut down their nuclear test facilities and to acknowledge and compensate the victims of their testing programmes.

In this statement, WILPF also noted that if the CTBT were in force, the Treaty would give greater legitimacy to international responses. Its member states could adopt sanctions against the DPRK for violating international law. Currently, the task of coordinating an international response falls to the UN Security Council, a body not entitled to enforce international norms per se, but an unrepresentative political body dominated by the interests of its five permanent, veto-wielding members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, two of whom (China and the US) have yet to ratify the CTBT themselves.

Keep an eye on the CTBTO website for news about the test.

Pakistan supports new proposed programme of work at the CD

2009-05-22T16:23:00.004-04:00

On Friday morning at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Ambassador Zamir Khan formally announced Pakistan’s support for “the initiation of work” in the CD on the basis of CD/1863 (the new proposed programme of work for the Conference). For the past two years, Pakistan has been considered the key holdout from adopting a programme of work in the CD. This endorsement is expected to pave the way for the long-awaited commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials treaty and the resumption of meaningful work by the Conference.

For details on CD/1863 and other endorsements of it, please read/subscribe to Reaching Critical Will’s CD Reports.

New programme of work introduced to the CD

2009-05-19T14:53:00.002-04:00

During the first plenary meeting of the second part of the Conference on Disarmament’s 2009 session, the current president of the CD, Ambassador Idriss Jazaïry, formally submitted CD/1863, a new proposed programme of work on behalf of the six presidents.

The new proposal differs substantially from those of 2008 and 2007. It establishes working groups on the four core issues and special coordinators on the other three agenda items. It calls, inter alia, for negotiation of a fissile materials treaty on the basis of the 1995 Shannon Mandate, for recommendations for dealing with negative security assurances, and for an “exchange of views and information on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of their elimination, including on approaches toward potential future work of multilateral character.” (For more details, see Reaching Critical Will's 19 May 2009 CD Report.)

Coming merely a few days after the qualified success of the third nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee for the 2010 review cycle, the introduction of a more balanced programme of work for the CD not only maintains the positive spirit but increases its momentum. The call for fissile material treaty negotiations on the basis of the Shannon Mandate, while effectively winding back the clock almost fifteen years, is a substantial step forward from other recent attempts to formulate a programme of work. In addition, the significantly enhanced mandates for discussions on nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances are progressively forward-looking and will surely go a long way to alleviating non-nuclear weapon states’ concerns about the imbalanced nature of previous proposed programmes of work.

Consensus is near. Current president Ambassador Jazaïry noted that consultations are still ongoing, but the majority of delegations seem to assume that CD/1863 will be adopted very soon. After twelve years without substantive work and ten years without even a programme of work, the adoption of this document cannot come a moment too soon. Ambassador Jazaïry expressed hope that, if adopted, CD/1863 would extend beyond the current year, providing a framework for future negotiations. This is particularly important since most CD member states do not currently have the capacity at their Geneva missions to engage in negotiations. It would likely take until the beginning of the CD’s 2010 session before working group two could seriously get to work. Hopefully, the Conference will not have to worry about developing a new programme of work at that time but can rely on CD/1863 to carry forward the momentum.

High-level support for the proposed programme of work
The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addressed the CD plenary meeting, as did Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey and Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci. They all urged the CD to rapidly adopt CD/1863 as its programme of work for the year. For details, please see Reaching Critical Will's 19 May 2009 CD Report.

A qualified success

2009-05-19T00:28:00.002-04:00

Lead editorial from the final edition of the NPT News in Review, written by Michael Spies and Ray Acheson:

By the abysmal standards that have typified the preparatory process—instituted in 1995—leading up to each five year review of the NPT, the third and final Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting before the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) must certainly be considered a success. The PrepCom was able to agree to an agenda for the RevCon, on its third day, no less, amid a chorus of accolades for what many described as a new, positive atmosphere in multilateral disarmament, stemming entirely from US President Obama’s 5 April speech in Prague.

However, it did not surprise many delegates—most of whom are veterans of the so-called decade of deadlock that had accompanied the Bush administration’s allergy to multilateralism—that the PrepCom would become snagged once it attempted to work through matters of substance.

The PrepCom’s failure to adopt substantive recommendations for the RevCon, a feat no previous PrepCom had ever accomplished, may have temporarily tainted the atmosphere, but was not unforeseen. During his opening remarks to the PrepCom, its Chair, Ambassador Chidyausiku of Zimbabwe, cautioned that despite recent signs of progress, in many areas the positions of states had actually grown further apart rather than closer.

With this note of caution, on Monday, 11 May, the Chair circulated a clever and concise first draft of recommendations, intended to capture specific proposals that identify concrete practical actions on implementing the Treaty, stand a reasonable chance of gaining consensus, and build upon earlier decision. Its strongest provisions dealt with moving the disarmament agenda forward and even included consideration of a nuclear weapons convention (see NPT News in Review, No. 6).

It must be noted that the vast majority of states could have accepted the first draft, including many members of NATO, with little or no modifications. Following consultations, and in particular input from the nuclear weapon states, on Wednesday, 13 May, the Chair put forward a revised set of recommendations that significantly weakened the sections on disarmament, civil society participation, and education, but bolstered those on implementing the 1995 Middle East resolution and on non-proliferation.

For some, the second draft proved to be a bridge too far. As the conference moved into its final hours, it devolved into a tense blame game that pitted western delegations against the Non-Aligned Movement and some of its more outspoken members, most notably Cuba, Egypt, and Iran. On Thursday, 14 May, the Chair advised states let the recommendations go, as to not to ruin the spirit of cooperation. Despite the Chair’s judgment that the differences in position were too vast, a large number of delegations urged the Chair to continue the process of seeking consensus (see NPT News in Review, No. 10).

The breakdown of the recommendations process
Despite the positive atmosphere, disarmament rhetoric of the US and UK administrations, and the quick adoption of the agenda, the PrepCom delegates did not find enough common ground—or at least, enough common rhetoric—to agree to a set of non-binding recommendations for next year. Breaking with the recent past, the Chair decided not to forward the recommendations to the RevCon as a working paper.

The Chair had introduced a newly revised draft recommendations on Friday, 15 May. Delegations consulted with their regional groups before resuming an informal meeting of the PrepCom. During this last attempt to reach consensus on the draft recommendations, the Chair determined that the Committee did not have a sufficient amount of time to reach agreement. Later, at a press briefing, he said the “differences were very minor; with time, we could have done it.”

The differences, as laid out by delegations during Thursday’s plenary discussion on the draft recommendations, did not seem very minor (see NPT News in Review, No. 10), though the revisions in the third draft were quite minimal. The additional changes brought on board an additional caveat to the already thoroughly conditioned preambular paragraph, further emphasized its non-binding character and marginally indicative character—a change insisted upon by the UK. Other amendments made minor changes to the sections on universality, disarmament, non-proliferation, regional initiatives, and education.

Despite the lack of time to make additional major changes to the text (delegations would have needed to consult with their capitals had the second draft text been heavily amended), western and non-aligned delegations traded blame for the impasse. Since the first draft was not agreeable to a few western states and the second was not agreeable to a few NAM states, it would be cynical and insincere to place“blame” on any particular group or delegation. Instead, the experience only serves to further illuminate the wide gulfs between states’ positions.

Paradoxically on the surface, this result came as a relief to many delegations. While the vast majority of states parties seemed ready to accept either the first or second drafts, no one was entirely content with either. Rather than becoming stuck with an imperfect text, delegations will have the freedom in 2010 to negotiate and reach agreement with a clean slate on the many fraught issues facing the NPT regime.

PrepCom finale

2009-05-15T13:50:00.002-04:00

After a short informal session Friday morning, during which states parties started going through the track change suggestions in the newly revised draft recommendations, the Chair declared that the Commmittee did not have a sufficient amount of time to reach agreement. The formal meeting resumed and the Committee adopted the draft final report (an entirely procedural report) and heard a few brief closing statements, ending the PrepCom by 1:00 PM. The recommendations will not be forwarded to the Review Conference as a working paper or a Chair's paper.

Still searching for consensus

2009-05-15T11:00:00.003-04:00

On Friday morning, the Chair called for an informal meeting to discuss a few slight changes to the revised draft recommendations. Delegations asked for 20 minutes to look over the new document, after which they will resume informals to look at the changed paragraphs. Civil society will not be allowed back into the room until after this process is completed.

For an overview of the discussions on the recommendations from Thursday's plenary meeting, indicative of what some of the changes in the new text are, see the editorial from the NPT News in Review No. 10 (reprinted below):

Searching for consensus
Front page article from the NPT News in Review, 15 May 2009

On Thursday, consensus on Chair’s draft recommendations continued to elude delegations. After another morning of consultations and regional group meetings, the Chair opened the plenary meeting lamenting that he had not been able to garner consensus on his draft recommendations. Expressing the belief that it would be best not to ruin the spirit of cooperation that had been demonstrated thus far at the PrepCom by continuing to fight over the recommendations, he opened the floor for comments on ways to move forward.

Of the 25 delegations that spoke, most expressed disappointment that consensus on the document could not be met. Many, including those of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and South Africa, said they would be willing to agree to the revised text. Most of these delegations said they would have agreed to the original text as well and reiterated their understanding that the recommendations are not binding and do not prejudge the outcome of the RevCon.

Only a few delegations took the initiative to be transparent about their positions. The UK ambassador said that while the revised text contains four policy issues that the United Kingdom has opposed on public record, the only remaining problem for his delegation was two letters in the preambular paragraph. Sources suggested the UK wanted to alter the sentence explaining that the recommendations identify “areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future” to “could be sought in the future.”

The Egyptian delegation expressed very clearly that it is dissatisfied with large portions of the revised recommendations. The Egyptian ambassador listed several specific examples. He questioned the title of Section 1, “Universality of the treaty, and of principles of disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,” arguing that this could lead one to believe that the rights related to nuclear energy granted to NPT states parties under article IV of the Treaty are to be universally applied. He also criticized the revised disarmament action plan for recommending only some but not all of the 13 practical steps from the 2000 RevCon, arguing that only partially citing previous decisions undermines them. Further, while noting that some of the recommendations in the Middle East section have been improved, he objected to the use of the word “consider,” arguing that the PrepCom must be more assertive in recommending the RevCon take action on things.

The Cuban delegation said it would have supported the original draft but that the watering down of practical disarmament measures moved the Committee further away from consensus. It expressed belief that some states parties seem to not really be “in a position to produce substantive recommendations at present time that would help us to truly move forward in applying three pillars.”

Despite these discrepancies, many delegations—including those of the African Group, Chile, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States—encouraged the Chair not to give up just yet. The US delegation argued the Committee was “closer than is apparent” to reaching agreement and asked for more time to “work out the small differences” between delegations. However, the Iranian delegation expressed disbelief that any consensus could be reached and urged the Chair to close consideration of this issue and move on. The Iranian ambassador argued that the states insisting that consensus could be reached were simply trying to ensure they would not be blamed for the stalemate.

Many of the most drastic revisions to the draft recommendations, particular those relating to disarmament, are now more in line with nuclear weapon state positions—for example, the elimination of a recommendation to examine ways and means to commence negotiations “on a convention or framework of agreements to achieve global nuclear disarmament,” and another to identify “refraining from the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons” as a practical disarmament measure. Given this, and given that the Egyptian and Cuban problems with the recommendations are well known, it could be disingenuous for some delegations to suggest that consensus is nigh.

However, as Ambassador Landman of the Netherlands pointed out, the Chair knows best what the remaining difficulties are. He noted that while the statements delivered during Thursday’s plenary made it sound like the PrepCom could “make the extra mile” and arrive at an agreement, the Chair should call upon those countries that in his view have to make that mile, to do so. The Chair agreed to postpone a decision on the recommendations until Friday morning, though he said he would not hold consultations with delegations between now and then. Suggesting that the delegations work with each other on the issue, he said he would be happy to hear about any new initiatives.

Despite uncertainty about the future of the recommendations, most delegations welcomed the overwhelmingly positive atmosphere at this PrepCom. The Australian ambassador, describing some of her previous PrepCom experiences as similar to “pulling teeth,” emphasized that since the Committee has already adopted an agenda and held substantive debates, the session should by no means be considered a failure if it is unable to forward recommendations to the RevCon.

Indeed, this is the most constructive NPT conference in quite some time. While it will be disappointing if the spirit of compromise is diminished in the debate over the recommendations, it does not mean the RevCon is a lost cause. The fact is, the majority of states parties were willing to compromise. And while it remains to be seen what the Obama administration’s official policies will look like by the 2010 RevCon or to what degree other states parties might be willing to “give and take” next year, there have been many promising indications of good will and cooperation at this PrepCom that should be carried forward as a manifestation of the recommendations.

Reworking the recommendations

2009-05-14T00:32:00.001-04:00

On Wednesday evening, after consultations with various delegations, the Chair released a revised version of his draft recommendations to the 2010 Review Conference.

Overall, the revisions weakened the recommendations on disarmament, civil society participation, and education, but have bolstered those on implementing the Middle East resolution. The sections on non-proliferation and nuclear energy have also been adjusted, purportedly in an attempt to create more balance between the three pillars. Each of the three pillars now has an “action plan,” as several delegates requested during their general comments on Tuesday.

It remains unclear as to whether the PrepCom will be able to adopt the recommendations the end of its session. The amount of time remaining could possibly allow for a second revised document to be offered Thursday afternoon, giving the PrepCom a last chance to adopt it Friday afternoon. However, if the Committee cannot agree to adopt the revised document on Thursday, it is likely that the Chair will have to forward it to the RevCon as a working paper, despite his aversion to such a solution.

Below is a detailed assessment of the differences between the original recommendations and the revised version, pointing out where recommendations have been strengthened, weakened, or changed to some effect.

Introduction
The introductory paragraph of the revised text, CRP.4/Rev.1, adds a sentence noting, “[t]he States parties reaffirm the need to maintain a balance between the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty.” It also explains in more depth the methodology of the recommendations, explaining that the recommendations include “elements for [the RevCon’s] consideration in evaluating the implementation of the undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty,” and “areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future.”

Section 1. Universality
The revised section on promoting universality has weaker language on disarmament. Where CRP.4 recommended the RevCon “declare that the Treaty provides a legal foundation for the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and for the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control” (the language of Article VI), CRP.4/Rev.1 simply recommends the RevCon, “[d]eclare that the Treaty remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.”

As per the Algerian delegation’s suggestion during the general comments on Tuesday, the language on non-states parties has been changed to recommend the RevCon call on them to join as non-nuclear weapon states and without conditions.

This section also has new language on compliance—adding “[recognizing] consequences for breaches of Treaty violations”— and on nuclear energy—adding “[r]eaffirm that the Treaty fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”

Section 2. Action plans
Rather than outlining one action plan on nuclear disarmament, CRP.4/Rev.1 includes a three-part action plan for all three pillars.

Disarmament
The “plan” for nuclear disarmament is similar, but contains a few substantial changes that diminish disarmament. While CRP.4 recommended the RevCon “[r]ecognize growing expectations for progress to achieve nuclear disarmament, and indicate support for ongoing and future efforts in these fields,” CRP.4/Rev.1 recommends the RevCon indicates support for ongoing and future efforts and recognizes “the importance of practical nuclear disarmament by all nuclear-weapon States.”

Likewise, while CRP.4 recommended the RevCon acknowledge that several commitments from 1995 and 2000 have not yet been fulfilled and called for an action plan to implement these commitments, CRP.4/Rev.1 simply recommends the RevCon “[r]eaffirm and update” these commitments, without mentioning they have not been fulfilled. It also divides the original list of disarmament initiatives into two paragraphs: one calling for facilitation of the entry into force of the CTBT and negotiations on a fissile materials [cut-off] treaty and the other calling for discussion on “ways and means to ensure the irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency of disarmament activities” and for recognition of the benefits of reducing operational status, reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons, and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, while the original version recommend the RevCon examine “ways and means to commence negotiations, in accordance with article VI, on a convention or framework of agreements to achieve global nuclear disarmament, and to engage non-parties to the Treaty,” the updates severely undermine this call by only recommending commencement of “open-ended discussions to identify possibilities available to establish an international legal framework for the achievement of global nuclear disarmament.” At least the new language also recommends the engagement of non-states parties “with the aim of attaining a world free of nuclear weapons.”

The language on security assurances, formerly in the non-proliferation section, has been moved to the disarmament section but remains identical.

Non-proliferation
The non-proliferation section has been strengthened. It now recommends the RevCon reaffirm that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is “a threat to international peace and security,” which is established language, rather than simply a “global challenge”.The paragraph on export controls adds quite a bit of substance, including a recommendation on transparency, dialogue, and cooperation and another calling for recognition of the importance of national rules and regulations on nuclear-related transfers.

There is also additional language on the IAEA, including a call for affirmation of “the need for full cooperation with the [IAEA] to resolve any outstanding verification issues,” which follows a new paragraph on the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. CRP.4/Rev.1 also recommends the RevCon “[r]eaffirm the importance of acceptance of the Agency’s full-scope safeguards,” and welcome the IAEA’s efforts to “increase the Agency’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activity” rather than just welcoming the IAEA’s efforts to strengthen safeguards.

Nuclear energy
Section 4 of CRP.4 covered nuclear energy, safety, and security. In CRP.4/Rev.1, ways to “advance peaceful uses of nuclear energy” has been given its own action plan and “ways and means to strengthen nuclear safety and security” is now a separate section.

The action plan on nuclear energy “notes” rather than “welcomes” the “growing applications” of nuclear technology, though it still reaffirms the “inalienable right” to nuclear energy of states parties.

Rather than stressing “the need to intensify consideration of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle,” the new version recommends stressing “the importance of extensive and transparent consultations in the consideration of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.” The rest of the language in this paragraph is the same as in the original.

Another paragraph has been added to include language on cooperation programmes to assist new-nuclear energy states develop adequate infrastructures.

Section 3. Nuclear safety and security
Maintaining much of the original language, the revised recommendations do not include the note that acquisition of nuclear materials by non-state actors “could potentially jeopardize the Treaty.” This section also no longer includes a recommendation to urge “careful consideration of measures of control and monitoring of global stocks” of weapon- usable materials “and the capacity to produce such materials” or to support efforts to “enhance the security of stockpiles” of such materials or to minimize their use in the civilian nuclear sector.

Section 4. Regional initiatives
Most of the language on nuclear weapon free zones remains the same, though in the new version the new Central Asian NWFZ is “noted” rather than welcomed. The new version adds a recommendation noting the importance of the UNDC’s guidelines for NWFZ, but it takes away the recommendation to “[n]ote the existence of strong support for the creating of a [NWFZ] in the Southern Hemisphere,” replacing it with a call to consider establishment of new zones “in regions with nuclear facilities and materials” and to note the importance of establishing WMDFZs.

Section 5. Middle East
Previously folded into the section on regional initiatives, the Middle East resolution now has its own section. Rather than describing the 1995 resolution as being “integrally linked” to the extension of the NPT, it is now “an essential element” of the decision to extend the Treaty.

The new version does continue to recommend consideration of a conference on implementing the resolution, though it no longer specifies the nuclear weapon states as the potential convenors. The rest of the section goes much further than the original language, adding a recommendation to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II at the RevCon “to consider practical steps to promote the earliest implementation” of the resolution and to consider appointing a special coordinator to hold consultations with the countries in the region and report to the review process, which has been suggested by Egypt and supported by other delegations, including the Russian Federation.

Section 6. Withdrawal
The two short paragraphs on withdrawal remain identical to the originals.

Section 7. Strengthening the review process
The new version eliminates the recommendation for consideration establishment of a “uniform, practical and cost-efficient reporting system for the implementation of the Treaty.” This section otherwise remains the same.

Section 8. Civil society; education
The new version significantly diminishes the recommendations on both subjects. It only recommends “noting” rather than “considering” the proposals for enhanced participation of NGOs in the review process. It also recommends “consideration” of the UN Secretary-General’s recommendations on disarmament and non-proliferation education rather than “encouraging” states to implement them, for which the original text called.

Revised recommendations

2009-05-13T18:26:00.002-04:00

After facilitating informal consultations between delegations on Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday morning, the PrepCom Chair released, at 5:45 PM on Wednesday, a revised version of his draft recommendations to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Analysis is forthcoming.

A glance at the recommendations

2009-05-10T23:12:00.000-04:00

At the end of the morning meeting on Friday, 8 May, Ambassador Chidyausiku released his draft recommendations for the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon). The recommendations include specific proposals that identify concrete practical actions; stand a reasonable prospect of commanding consensus; address issues related to implementation of Treaty; and build upon earlier decisions such as those at 2000 and 1995. He emphasized that they are not a comprehensive summary of all proposals that have been made to the RevCon, nor do they preclude any other item states parties might want to address.

The document attempts to balance the three pillars of the Treaty. Section 2 focuses on disarmament. It calls for the RevCon to consider adopting an action plan “setting practical and achievable and specified goals, and measures leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons,” such as the CTBT, FMCT, verified reductions, greater transparency, reducing operational status, refraining from qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, etc. It specifically recommends the RevCon “[e]xamine, inter alia, ways and means to commence negotiations, in accordance with article VI, on a convention or framework of agreements to achieve global nuclear disarmament, and to engage non-parties to the Treaty.”

In this context, the Chair’s disarmament recommendations seek a small but definite step forward in the disarmament agenda, beset by a decade of deadlock. Its inclusion of a nuclear weapons convention would, if adopted, for the first time put on the horizon the means for eliminating nuclear weapons.The non-proliferation recommendations do not go as far as those on disarmament, though they do emphasize the importance of safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Meeting the call of many delegations to this PrepCom who seek to eliminate double standards and political discrimination, this section suggests the RevCon affirm that export controls should be “implemented in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner ... in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty.” The non-proliferation section also addresses the issue of negative security assurances, where it recommends the RevCon look at ways “to achieve additional assurances that are legally-binding.”

While many governments are justifiably concerned about the emergence of a two-tiered international system, where global rules enforce the division between haves and have nots and where some “responsible” states are trusted with “sensitive” materials while others are not, the strengthening of non-proliferation norms is a worthy objective. In particular, improvements in the safeguards regime will certainly be vital in ensuring confidence in a nuclear weapon free world.

Section 4, on nuclear energy, calls on the RevCon to reaffirm article IV and to “[r]eiterate that restrictions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be applied for political purposes.” This rather extensive section addresses both the access and security aspects of nuclear energy. It tries to balance these two objectives in a way that supports multilateralization of the fuel cycle while ensuring that states’ decisions in this field, as long as they meet the obligations of the Treaty, do not jeopardize their access to nuclear material and equipment.

The contentious debate between rights and obligations related to article IV will undoubtedly continue, unfortunately distracting attention from dealing with the fact that continued promotion of nuclear power increases the difficulty of achieving or verifying a nuclear weapon free world.

Section 5c, on the Middle East resolution, recommends the RevCon “consider the proposal to call upon the nuclear-weapons States to convene a conference of all states of the Middle East region to address ways and means to implement the Resolution.” This call, along with the one made by Egypt and supported by Russia for the appointment of a special coordinator on the implementation of the resolution, seem to be gaining traction among delegations. However, the special coordinator is not mentioned in these recommendations.

As the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 was bound to the Middle East resolution, the implementation of the goals set forth in the resolution may play a major role in the continued vitality of the NPT regime. As such, failing to adopt serious and practical steps toward this end could begin to jeopardize the objective of achieving a permanent peace in the Middle East through disarmament and diplomacy, rather through the politics of arms racing and antagonism.

Regarding Treaty withdrawal, the document simply recommends that the RevCon acknowledge states’ right to withdraw and consider modalities “under which States parties could collectively respond to notifications of withdrawal.” It does not deal with any specific proposal, such as those suggesting response by the UN Security Council.

In terms of strengthening the Treaty, section 7a recommends the RevCon view the decisions from 1995 and 2000 as “embodying principles, objectives, or means” to promote the Treaty’s universality. Section 1 also deals with this issue, urging the RevCon to “[d]eclare that the Treaty is an expression of fundamental principles of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that are universal in scope.” This formulation emphasizes the relevance of customary international law, wherein even non-parties are legally bound by the Treaty’s provisions. It also recommends the RevCon call on all non-parties to “adhere” to the Treaty, rather than to call on them to join as non-nuclear weapon states (as urged by the majority of delegations at the PrepComs).

The rest of section 7 focuses on strengthening the review process, recommending that the RevCon consider “establishing a uniform, practical and cost-efficient reporting system for the implementation of the Treaty.” While it suggests the consideration of other proposals, it does not specifically mention Canada’s ideas of a standing bureau or annual meetings.

Though many continue to be cynical about the merits of institutional reform, implementing any of the thoughtful reforms suggested by Canada would almost certainly improve the quality of NPT meetings while providing governments with an additional incentive to take serious their obligations under the broader nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation framework.
Finally, section 8 calls on the RevCon to commend the contributions of civil society and to consider proposals for the enhanced participation of NGOs in the Treaty review process. It also encourages the RevCon to underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Last Tuesday, several NGOs presented their own set of recommendations to the PrepCom. Many of the NGO recommendations regarding nuclear disarmament overlapped with those of the Chair. The NGOs pushed for farther reaching measures though, calling for governments to eliminate “nuclear deterrence” from their security strategies; to establish international controls on delivery systems and anti-missile systems; and to join the International Renewable Energy Agency. These and other recommendations can be found at www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

Michael Spies contributed analysis to this article.

PrepCom Chair submits his draft recommendations for 2010

2009-05-08T13:52:00.002-04:00

At the end of the morning meeting on Friday, 8 May, Ambassador Chidyausiku (Chair of the PrepCom) released his draft recommendations for the 2010 Review Conference. The recommendations only include specific proposals that identify concrete practical actions; stand a reasonable prospect of commanding consensus; address issues related to implementation of Treaty; and build upon earlier decisions such as those at 2000 and 1995. He emphasized that they are not a comprehensive summary of all proposals.

Analysis will be forthcoming.

NPT PrepCom adopts an agenda for the Review Conference!

2009-05-06T10:39:00.002-04:00

First thing in the morning meeting on Wednesday, 6 May, the PrepCom adopted a provisional agenda for next year's Review Conference. The agenda will be the same as the one used at the 2000 Review Conference, with a minor technical update: in paragraph 16, the phrase “and the final document of the 2000 Review Conference” will be added.

In addition, the Committee approved the postponing of the Review Conference by one week. It will now be held from 3-28 May 2010 in New York. The Committee also approved the Non-Aligned Movement's nomination of the ambassador of the Philippines to serve as the Review Conference chair.

2010 NPT RevCon agenda within sight…

2009-05-05T18:37:00.003-04:00

On the opening day of the NPT PrepCom, the chair ambitiously announced that he would seek a decision on one of the keys tasks of the meeting: an agenda for the 2010 NPT RevCon (the second key task is agreeing to substantive recommendations to the RevCon). More than an inconsequential procedural step, the agendas to NPT conferences in recent years have become hotly disputed and politicized items. Governments frequently interpret the composition of the agenda as a statement of political value.

At the 2005 RevCon, NPT delegations were unable to begin their substantive deliberations for nearly three weeks due to disputes over the agenda, and in particular, US insistence that the agenda omit references to past NPT outcomes.

The proposed agenda for the 2010 RevCon is reportedly based on the agenda of the 2000 RevCon, incorporating appropriate technical updates. According to sources, the chair was compelled to drop the addition of language calling for the review to take into account developments subsequent to 2000 – likely out of concern that this would permit the RevCon to single out specific cases of non-compliance. As of Tuesday, a single delegation continued to object to the adoption of the agenda as it stands.

A key sticking point in 2005, the agenda in 2000 provided a mandate for review of the Treaty taking into account the decisions and resolution adopted in 1995. It also provided for two subsidiary bodies: one to deal with practical disarmament steps and the other to deal with implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. In addition to these two topics, during the present review cycle delegations have requested other subsidiary bodies to deal with security assurances and with withdrawal from treaty (the latter was considered by a subsidiary body in 2005).

Especially in light of the numerous statements expressing renewed optimism and welcoming the recent high level attention to nuclear disarmament from many nuclear weapon states, the quick and painless adoption of the RevCon agenda would be a good sign that governments will be able to seriously work toward achieving substantive agreement in 2010.

United States delivers a positive statement to the NPT PrepCom

2009-05-05T11:16:00.004-04:00

On 5 May, the US delegation, headed by Rose Gottemoeller, delivered a statement during the Committee's general debate. The statement was a very encouraging sign that this US administration is taking the NPT seriously and is ready to change its attitude toward and position on a few key aspects of the implementation of the Treaty.

Gottemoeller read a message to the PrepCom from President Obama, which reaffirmed the United States' commitment to the Treaty and to achieving a successful outcome at this Committee and at next year's Review Conference.

She then delivered an assessment of the United States' basic positions on each of the three pillars of the Treaty: disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear energy. She reaffirmed that the US would seek ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. Most importantly, she reaffirmed the decision to extend the NPT in 1995 and the decision made at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, including the 1995 Middle East resolution. The statement did not make any reference to Iran or North Korea.

Check the Reaching Critical Will website soon for a complete copy of the US statement.

NPT PrepCom begins

2009-05-04T23:58:00.005-04:00

The third and final Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in the current review cycle for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) began today at UN Headquarters in New York. Government representatives delivered their countries’ “general debate” statements and non-government representatives engaged in several interactive panel discussions throughout the day. For details for the days events, see Reaching Critical Will’s newsletter, the NPT News in Review No.2. (Previous and future editions will be available online and you can also subscribe to receive it daily in your inbox.)

Reaching Critical Will is posting all government statements in near-real time. We will also post all other conference documents as we receive them, so stay tuned to the website for regular updates.

UNDC closes with only procedural reports

2009-05-01T15:31:00.002-04:00

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC)’s 2009 session closed on 1 May after three weeks—more or less—of deliberations. Once the Commission adopted its agenda after a few days of stalemate, the working groups got started on the second week of the Commission’s three week schedule. Working Group I, on “Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,” struggled to nominate a chair for a few days. In the end, Paolo Cuculi of Italy was elected chair. Given the limited amount of time available to the group, the chair decided to hold thematic debates on the issues and to start work on the recommendations next year.

For Working Group II, on “Elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade,” the chair, Johan Paschalis of South Africa, submitted a draft non-paper (pdf) for consideration. The group got through one revision process, swelling the chair’s original four page draft to 11 pages. They reportedly got about two-thirds of the way through a second revision process and plan to continue working on this draft next year. Unfortunately, it does not seem that the elements for a declaration will be ready by January 2010, as the Commission next meets in April of that year. It is unclear whether the decade will begin without the declaration, or whether the decade will begin once the General Assembly approves a declaration, presumably later in 2010.

At the final plenary meeting, the Commission as a whole adopted the reports of Working Group I, Working Group II, and a report of the Commission. There was some discussion about an amendment proposed by the Bureau, which the Commission ultimately decided not to include. The amendment was a paragraph noting that the UNDC recommends that consideration of the elements of the draft declaration be continued during its 2010 substantive session. Pakistan’s delegate felt this confused the issue and could potentially reopen the agenda for debate next year. The rapporteur, Ambassador Piet de Klerk of the Netherlands, explained that the Bureau felt this paragraph would not change anything about the UNDC’s agenda. After a brief discussion, however, the amendment was dropped at the suggestion of India.

In his closing remarks, the Chair of the UNDC, Ambassador Andrzej Towpik, argued that the Commission needs some critical self-assessment and perhaps some adjustments to its methods of work. He suggested the Commission devote one of its meetings next year to reviewing these issues. He also lamented that the UNDC was unable to agree to invite experts to deliver presentations to the Commission, and hoped this could be considered again next year. The Pakistani delegate took the floor to disagree with the Chair’s assessment that the Commission needed to reform its methods of work. He argued that it is “not always logical to apply a corporate model to intergovernmental meetings” and that instead of “dismantling” existing machinery, states should apply increased financial and human resources to what we have now. He also argued in favour of maintaining the rule of consensus, saying its rejection may give short-term benefits but not long-term solutions.

Overall, most delegates seemed revealed to get through the first year of the Commission’s new cycle without any major blockages and with the adoption of reports, however procedural they may be. Hopefully next year the UNDC can get to work on the first day, rather than the second week, and can produce substantive recommendations in the working groups.

Engendering New Nonproliferation Research and Viewpoints?

2009-04-30T18:25:00.008-04:00

That military matters and foreign policy tend to be dominated by men is hardly news. Built into the military are institutionalized hierarchies favoring male leadership. The civilian leadership structures also favor male leaders over female. Furthermore, while shallow, first-wave feminism has been adopted in many state and military institutions, deeper (transformative) understandings of feminism remain exiled.

The same gender inequalities seen in the state and military operate within the scholarly communities that exist to study national security theories and state policy.

This quick and dirty analysis of content in the Nonproliferation Review, a leading arms control journal, demonstrates an extreme gender imbalance. By counting the gender of authors of articles, viewpoints, and interviews in every NPR issue since 1994 it is observable that 84% of authors are men while only 16% are women. Men were published no less than 400 times while women were published only 74 times. See figure 1. Furthermore, in some articles women only appear as co-authors, not the principle authors, meaning that the instigators of particular studies appearing in the NPR are even more often men than the 84% figure implies.

In addition to this gross over-representation of male points of view are other problems built into nonproliferation scholarship as represented by the NPR. For example, while the NPR does publish an international roster of authors, the vast majority are US citizens with over-representation from EU nations, especially the UK. Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, and Russian authors also appear, but there is a lack of authors from Africa and much of Latin America. This observer could identify no African American, Latino-American or Native American voices, although there might be several examples. Indigenous voices are virtually non-existent in the pages of the NPR.

There is an over-representation of a set of elite US institutions such as Stanford University's Hoover and CSIS, the University of California, Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Henry L. Stimson Center, MacArthur Foundation, and of course the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterrey Institute of International Studies. Although I did not operationalize and count the representation of institutions, it is apparent that well-funded, centrist to conservative think tanks and academic centers dominate the NPR. They, along with the military and executive branch of government, represent the US nuclear weapons policy formation network. It's lonely at the top, and it's designed to be so.

The absence of certain voices from the pages of publications like the NPR is disconcerting, but not for the obvious reason. Solving this problem does not mean adding women, non-whites, and global-south nations, and stirring. The problems inherent in the tight and high circles that trade ideas in the pages of journals like the NPR are much deeper than that. In a sense, the lack of diversity represents a very real lack of democracy in policy making around nuclear weapons in the US. This is the same in virtually every nuclear nation, of course. The US, however, has by far the largest policy formation network. The ideological weight of the US is hegemonic world-wide and influences the possibilities of scholarship around nuclearism, war and international relations, for good and ill.

Figure 1.

UNDC struggles to elect working group chair

2009-04-20T16:43:00.006-04:00

On 20 April 2009, the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) convened to elect vice chairs and chairs for each of the two working groups scheduled to begin this year.

The Commission unanimously elected representatives of Benin and South Africa to serve as UNDC Vice Chairs, and South Africa to serve as chair of the working group on drafting elements for a declaration for the fourth disarmament decade. However, no candidate was nominated to chair the working group on recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. That meetings of that working group have been cancelled until a volunteer steps forward to chair it.

After the chairs were elected, the working group on the draft declaration commenced its work.

Thanks to Martin Cieslik of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy for reporting.