Disarmament Commission closes without recommendations for 13th year

by Katherine Prizeman, Global Action to Prevent War

The three-week session of the 2012 Disarmament Commission (UNDC) came to a close on Friday, 20 April, marking the 13th straight year without adoption of any consensus recommendations or guidelines and continuing an alarming trend of sub-standard performance in the UN disarmament machinery. The UNDC is continuously hailed as the only deliberative body for disarmament matters as well as one that enjoys universal membership. It is meant to serve as a policy-making body insofar as member states are expected to formulate and present consensus recommendations to negotiating forums (i.e. the Conference on Disarmament) on those consensus items which should then become subject to direct negotiations and, eventually, the drafting of international legal instruments.  The UNDC is a body that is supposed to serve as an essential part of the multilateral disarmament machinery contributing to the overall goal of general and complete disarmament. The UNDC has not, however, served this function in more than a decade. The Chair, Ambassador Enrique Roman-Morey of Peru, noted in his concluding remarks that diplomats will now have to go back to their usual responsibilities with “a sense of having almost accomplished” their duty to formulate consensus recommendations, guidelines, and proposals. It is indeed frustrating and disappointing for all parties, including member states and civil society.

Chairman Ambassador Roman-Morey stated that the UNDC had achieved “the minimum necessary to consider this session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission a relative success.” The question, however, is how another three-week session of deliberations that yielded no concrete results or substantive documents can be counted as a “relative success,” particularly when the same outcome has plagued the UNDC for 13 years. The session this year should be considered a continuation of the status quo, a striking paralysis preventing concrete movement forward in disarmament matters. This paralysis is pervading many parts of the UN disarmament machinery including the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD). The stalemate in the UNDC and the CD clearly demonstrates pervasive inflexibility with the laying down of ‘red lines’ making compromise nearly impossible.

After adoption of three purely procedural reports, the Report of the Disarmament Commission on the whole and the reports of the two Working Groups (nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation [I] and confidence-building measures [CBMs] in the field of conventional weapons [II]), delegations, along with the Chair, expressed varying degrees of frustration and underscored different causes of the continued paralysis. The Chair of Working Group I, the delegate of Saudi Arabia, noted that there was no consensus on any substance or recommendations, which was due not to a lack of effort, but to a lack of time. Likewise, the delegate of Indonesia, when presenting the report from Working Group II, asserted that the lack of consensus on substantive recommendations was a function of complexity rather than energy. Ambassador Roman-Morey referred to a deep sense of mistrust that has kept parties apart and positions divided and also pointed to the “exhausting discussions” on purely procedural matters, such as symbols used for the documents, as sources of provocation that have contributed to the elusiveness consensus. The Swedish and Argentinean delegates underscored that although substantive Chair’s ‘non-papers’ were discussed, they ultimately cannot be referred to without formal adoption and, therefore, their utility is virtually lost without an official record of the discussions (Working Group I’s non-paper outlined guiding principles and recommendations for achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, while Working Group II’s non-paper explored the objective, principles, and practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons). Two Working Papers on facilitating substantive discussions in the UNDC and recommendations on the function of the UNDC, from Japan and Poland respectively, were also submitted.

The extent to which political will was a source of the UNDC’s failure also came to light in concluding remarks. The Swedish delegation stated that it was not a lack of political will that caused another year without consensus. Contrastingly, Ambassador Roman-Morey had the opposite view: there is definitive political will not to pursue themes of universal disarmament. The Cuban delegation agreed that the failure was indeed a function of the lack of constructive political will that was manifest in the unwillingness of some states to disarm and renounce their nuclear weapons. More positive analysis of this year’s session came from the Japanese delegation that asserted that the DC had “laid solid groundwork.” Similarly, the Indonesian delegation, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), reaffirmed the role of the UNDC. The Mexican delegation also sounded hopeful in stating that although the results did not meet expectations, there were enriching discussions held. The Russian Federation also agreed that there were many candid discussions illustrating that all member states are ultimately in favor of nuclear disarmament.

Ambassador Roman-Morey stated that in “matters of disarmament one must be realistic while remaining positive.” How can those that work on the UNDC remain positive and realistic after such a prolonged stalemate? It is time to make serious commitments to break the status quo, formulate alternative and realistic pathways to consensus, and implement them as quickly as possible. High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane called on the member states to “adjust their sails” as the best course for meeting new challenges. To further this, the Chair suggested reformation of the procedural arrangements of the UNDC. Three continuous weeks of meetings have not helped achieve positive results in 13 years. Thus, Ambassador Roman-Morey suggested dividing the UNDC into two parts—two weeks in the spring, and one week in the fall when the First Committee begins its work. A suggestion offered in the past has also been opening all deliberations to civil society and academic experts to further enrich debate over recommendations.

Ultimately, employing the same methods and the same attitudes towards compromise will not suffice. The UN disarmament machinery is seriously faltering in its responsibilities and needs to explore new pathways for deliberation and trust.  As noted by the Austrian delegate, the General Assembly should take more leadership for exploring options for facilitating deliberations that seek to revitalize how the UNDC does its work. Member states must also explore new avenues of engagement and trust building so that successful disarmament outcomes become the norm rather than rare breakthroughs amidst many disappointments.

UNDC finally adopts agenda … but struggles to adopt programme of work

by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

After several hours of consultations on Thursday morning, the Chair reconvened the plenary meeting just before the lunch break to take stock of group positions on his proposed agenda. The Non-Aligned Movement indicated that it had not reached agreement on the compromise language on the nuclear item on the agenda and insisted on returning to the language from 2011: “Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”.

The Chair, preparing to postpone the rest of the Commission’s session until agreement could be reached on the agenda, appealed one last time for flexibility. However, as he emphasized, flexibility must actually allow member states to make progress toward the same goal—if flexibility means one party goes right and the other left, they will never meet again. The Chair indicated he would not continue with consultations but that is proposal remained on the table for delegations to consult upon with their capitals.

The Norwegian delegate took the floor to highlight once again the illogical nature of arguing over the precise language of the nuclear agenda item. Most of the arguments had reportedly centered on the difference between a “nuclear weapon free world” or a “world without nuclear weapons” or “elimination of nuclear weapons”. Mr. Langeland from Norway pointed out that just last year the General Assembly had adopted the New Agenda Coalition’s resolution “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world” and Japan’s resolution “United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”. Between these two resolutions, he argued, all states have signed up to some of this language.

After this intervention, the US delegation, with what it described as extreme reluctance, agreed to the NAM’s request for a return to the 2011 language on the nuclear agenda item. The NAM thanked the US for its flexibility and indicated its agreement, after which the Chair swiftly gavelled the adoption of the agenda.

Yet in the afternoon, discussion faltered over the programme of work. Some delegations, foremost Cuba, requested a different ordering of topics, moving the informal discussions on working methods and the disarmament decade declaration to the end of the two weeks. Others, including Italy, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States, preferred the Chair’s draft. There was also debate whether to deal with the agenda items in an alternating format or in blocs. Norway’s delegation pointed out that this debate is really one for the discussions on working methods, suggesting this discussion should therefore indeed be held first so that the Commission could determine how to move forward from there.

By the end of the day, the Commission did manage to adopt a revised programme of work. However, the struggle this week to adopt an agenda and then to agree on how to carry out this agenda suggests a troubled road ahead for the Disarmament Commission. With a precedent of failure following it from the last several cycles, coupled with the continued problems over getting down to work this year, optimism for success is at an all time low. The Commission, like the Conference on Disarmament, has failed to fulfill its mandated responsibilities for some time now and is actively creating the conditions for its own demise. If member states want to preserve the Commission, they must not just talk about flexibility but actually demonstrate it by beginning work and deliberating seriously on the key challenges facing the international community. How to best coordinate the meeting schedule for the UNDC is not one of those key challenges.

As the UNDC sees a third day without an agenda…

by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Tuesday morning, the Turkish delegation pondered how the Commission used to function, back when it actually managed to agree not just to an agenda but to recommendations for the General Assembly. It concluded that member states back then understood that the UNDC is a deliberative body not meant for negotiating binding texts. The Swedish delegation likewise argued that the UNDC was never meant to be a negotiating forum but that the way it has been working as not reflected this basic fact. Mr. Kvarnström noted that the UNDC has been described as the “think tank” of the disarmament machinery, “but such a description presupposes that some constructive thinking ought to actually emerge from our deliberations.”

The deliberative character of the UNDC should indeed give it the freedom to engage in discussions about anything. Yet, as High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane noted, “The greatest obstacles to progress in disarmament have long been the lack of trust or confidence in proposed initiatives due to uncertainties or suspicions about their true motivations.”

The aversion to agreeing to anything, whether procedural or substantive, binding or non-binding, has plagued all of the disarmament machinery for more than a decade. And this new cycle of the UNDC has been no different. Wednesday marked the third day of ongoing consultations to reach agreement on the agenda for the current UNDC cycle.

Proposed agenda

On the table is the Chair’s proposed compromise for the agenda, which indicates that the two agenda items would be “recommendations for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures to achieve the objective of a nuclear weapons free world” and “practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons”. The compromise also indicated that during general debate states could conduct discussions, in informal meetings, on working methods of the UNDC and on elements for a declaration of the fourth disarmament decade. For both issues, friends of the Chair would distribute draft outcome documents in order to engage in further informal consultations in order to reach consensus. The final decision on these documents would be taken by consensus in a plenary meeting.

Many delegations have expressed disappointment with this proposed compromise, which still only has vague and unspecific agenda items while priority items were left to plenary discussions. The EU had wanted working methods of the UNDC to be an agenda item while the NAM had wanted the declaration as an agenda item. However, most recognized that it was better than not adopting an agenda at all and many states indicated their flexibility in order to move forward.

However, France, supported by Russia and the United States, insisted that the proposed agenda item on nuclear disarmament be amended to only address “creating the conditions” for a “world without nuclear weapons” (rather than a world “free” from nuclear weapons—suggesting that they don’t see nuclear weapons as “bad things” of which the world needs to free itself). This continuing refusal on the part of the nuclear weapon states to concretely discuss nuclear disarmament is unacceptable to many other states, leading to an impasse.

In between rounds of consultations, the Chair has allowed member states to deliver general statements, which has led to some substantive discussion on working methods and the role of the UNDC.

Specific suggestions for moving forward

Poland’s delegation noted that all sessions of the UNDC have considered ways and means to enhance its functioning and suggested that the recommendations adopted during those sessions should serve as a basis for overcoming the current stalemate. To this end, it submitted a working paper to the Commission, which includes the following three recommendations:

1. Poland’s working paper urges that the current UND cycle should seriously consider including a joint statement or Chair’s summary that reflects the views or positions of different delegations in the UNDC’s report if consensus cannot be reached on specific agenda items, in accordance with a decision made by the UNDC in 1990.

2. The working paper also encourages interaction with experts, which should also be reflected in the Chair’s summary.

3. Finally, the paper urges states to make every effort to ensure that Chair’s of subsidiary bodies are elected during the organizational session, which would allow them to conduct informal consultations on the subjects of these bodies before the beginning of the substantive session.

Some delegations had other specific suggestions. The Swiss delegation proposed that the UNDC adopt a single agenda item, because in the current formulation, an impasse in one area impedes progress in the other. Mr. Bavaud of Switzerland also suggested the UNDC open its proceedings to exchanges with representatives from the academic world and civil society and that it submit a report to the General Assembly that reflects the substantive discussion in the UNDC, such as through a Chair’s summary.

Since the UNDC is not the only piece of the UN disarmament machinery suffering from stalemate, the Swiss delegation also suggested that the UNDC could examine the respective roles of the various organs of the machinery, their interaction, and the way it could possibly be improved. In the framework of this approach, the UNDC “could also examine the processes that would be required to carry out a reform of the existing machinery and ways of creating the conditions that would make this exercise possible.”

Political will or working methods?

The Republic of Korea, expressing frustration with the UN disarmament machinery as a whole, called the UNDC’s attention to the message of the UN Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament in January 2012, “when he made it clear that the General Assembly is ready to consider other options to move the disarmament agenda forward.” Ambassador Shin argued that it “is now time for the disarmament machinery to act and to halt its endless debate.” He argued that member states need to come to grips with the “very rationale of the UNDC and its working methods” and called for more focused topics for deliberation.

Brazil’s delegation also called for focused discussions, noting that the debate during the last UNDC cycle “was excessively general and ambitious, making it more difficult to have concrete results.” Kazakhstan called for a “fresh perspective” for this cycle of UNDC, steering clear of the stalemate of the last cycle. Benin’s delegation suggested adopting a “small steps” agenda so that the Commission can begin work on specific priorities on which it can actually reach agreement. The Benin delegate emphasized that making progress is vital because the status quo poses a danger to all states, leading inexorably as it does to the continuation of a world in which the arms race is ongoing and in which resources are being gobbled up by weapons. Cuba’s delegation likewise highlighted the growing expenditure on nuclear and other weapons, arguing that it is unacceptable that more money is spent on waging war than promoting development.

Despite general dissatisfaction with the working methods of the UNDC, many delegations see the lack of political will and flexibility as the main impediment to progress. Cuba’s delegation argued that while the working methods could be improved, they are not the real obstacles to progress. Likewise, the Egyptian delegation argued that the discussions on methods of work in 2006 and 2009 “did not yield sufficient measures” and instead confirmed that the stalemate is mainly caused by lack of political will to achieve progress on nuclear disarmament.

The Swiss delegation agreed that political will is often lacking or ineffectively capitalized upon, but also argued that lack of progress “is just as much due to causes that are institutional in nature.”Mr. Bavaud noted that the disarmament fora “no longer appear capable of providing answers to the challenges they face because many of the nations involved give precedence to questions of national security, to the detriment of global considerations.”

Norway’s delegation’s argued that it may be that the current standstill in disarmament multilateralism is due to lack of political will, but that this “would make it even more imperative to fully make use of the Commission to deliberate on matters where the views of member states differ, and consider ways to overcome these differences.” Mr. Langeland also noted that there has been progress lately, though there is growing impatience on how to eliminate nuclear weapons. He suggested that since UN member states have agreed on the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, they should make use of UNDC to deliberate on how to achieve this objective.

Likewise, the Australian delegation argued that the UNDC can play a key role in fostering the right environment, clarifying context, and sharing approaches for implementation of past commitments, such as the 2010 NPT action plan. Ms. Elias also noted that the UNDC’s discussions can also look at other complimentary measures to create a world free of nuclear weapons and suggested that they do this regardless of the language on specific agenda items.

Indeed, Brazil’s delegation called on states to “refrain from entering into blame games about who has caused this state of affairs” and to instead “engage in constructive discussions to find again the common ground needed to productive substantive and effective results in the area of disarmament.”

Regardless of what is on the UNDC’s agenda, “action has become a necessity,” as Mr. Bavaud of Switzerland said. “Restrictive approaches are no longer appropriate,” he argued, “because in today’s world, national interests and security in a global sense can no longer be separated. In this situation, we feel it is becoming increasingly difficult to deny the need for an in-depth review of the whole disarmament machinery, or of a new approach in this area.

The question is whether the multilateral disarmament bodies “will be able to translate the political will by an overwhelming majority of UN member states in advancing disarmament goals,” argued Mr. Langeland of Norway. “The alternative is continuing the process of making these two bodies even more marginalized. Lack of action in these two bodies will only increase the determination to consider other avenues in order to move forward.”

Package deal

by Dr. Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War

Day two of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) began with informal discussions regarding the Chair's revised proposal for an agenda to guide the UNDC's deliberations.

One major discussion dealt with the possibility of having single plenary sessions rather than parallel 'working' ones. There are always valid concerns involving the burdens on smaller missions of long meetings, though it is not clear how dividing into morning and afternoon sessions will require more issue attentiveness from delegations or how larger, plenary sessions will relieve pressure. In addition, there was debate about how to 'handle' discussions on working methods and on proposals for elements for a disarmament decade as well as concerns regarding the most appropriate issues to be adopted for the next three-year cycle.

For other disarmament stakeholders beyond the delegations, including civil society, these are all important concerns. Practical and concrete guidance from the UNDC on these matters would benefit all of our work, and would solidify the function of the UN as a 'norm setter' on disarmament matters. As the Chair reminded delegates as he distributed his ‘Compromise Proposal,’ 'negotiation' is not a part of the UNDC's mandate. Both agenda items and General Debate discussion topics would benefit from open deliberations by delegations, but fears of precedent-setting appear to be prevalent (if unacknowledged) in some quarters.

By accepting the Chair's compromise, as Norway reminded those in the room, no delegation is close to crossing a 'dangerous line.' There is simply no linkage of consequence binding these deliberations and the content of future negotiations. Indeed, a failure to agree on principles for deliberation sends a familiar, chilling message to the international community regarding prospects for future negotiation on real arms control and disarmament measures – an intensely difficult task and high bar to set.

For those states still requiring assurances, the Chair has indicated his willingness to compromise on all matters related to the agenda, including working methods. But of course, assurances offered are not always assurances received. The unspoken trust issues in the room might be related to individual items such as a repositioning of the 'decade' idea, but are likely related more to what we feel is a deeper concern for precedent setting. Where trust is insufficiently present, suspicions invade every crevice of possibility such that perceived misgivings behind even the most straightforward of proposals derail the process. Furthermore, even though there is no clear or direct line between non-binding deliberations in the UNDC and more-binding negotiations, the line seems visible to some delegations nonetheless. And the more disappointment is experienced in bodies such as the UNDC, the more substantial the connecting line seems to become.

The 'package deal' referred to by Iran and Cuba is an apt metaphor to describe the interconnected aspects of the UNDC's work insofar as delegations should view the ‘package’ of the items to be deliberated upon as a collection of issues that is representative of widespread compromise. At the same time, it should be understood by all delegations that the specific contents of this 'package' are flexible and that the fine print on the package label is for purposes of providing guidelines, not binding legislation.